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Leveraging The First Comprehensive Measure Of Primal World Beliefs To Further 
Discussions In Political, Developmental, And Positive Psychology 
Abstract 
If behavior is influenced by the perceived character of situations, many disciplines that study behavior 
may eventually need to take into account individual differences in the perceived character of the world. In 
the first effort to empirically map these perceptions, subjects varied on 26 dimensions, called primal 
world beliefs or primals, such as the belief that the world is abundant. This dissertation leverages the first 
comprehensive measure of primals to further discussions in political, developmental, clinical, and positive 
psychology. Chapter I challenges the consensus that political conservativism is distinguished by the 
belief that the world is dangerous. Results suggest previous research relied on a measure highlighting 
dangers conservatives fear and neglecting dangers liberals fear, when both perceive the world as almost 
equally dangerous (8 samples; total N=3,734). A novel account of political ideology is proposed based on 
more predictive primals. Chapter II discusses how primals might develop. The author distinguishes 
retrospective theories—where primals reflect the content of past experiences—from interpretive 
theories—where primals act as lenses for interpreting experiences while remaining uninfluenced by 
them—and suggests twelve ways each theory’s relative merit can be empirically tested. A novel 
comprehensive framework for considering experiences in relation to any new construct is also proposed. 
Chapter III explores primals’ wellbeing-related correlates. By showing that many parents aim to teach 
negative primals to their children, some prevalence for meta-beliefs (i.e., beliefs about beliefs) 
associating negative primals with positive outcomes is established. Study 2 tests these meta-beliefs in 
six samples (total N=4,535) in regards to eight outcomes: job success, job satisfaction, emotion, 
depression, suicide, physical health, life satisfaction, and flourishing. Results indicate that negative 
primals are almost always associated with modestly to dramatically worse outcomes, across and within 
professions. In addition to filling a literature gap, and establishing bases for future comparison studies, 
findings could be used to strengthen interventions by undermining counterproductive meta-beliefs. 
Findings also underscore the urgent need for further research on the impact of primal world 
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FURTHER DISCUSSIONS IN POLITICAL, DEVELOPMENTAL, AND POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY 
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Martin E. P. Seligman 
If behavior is influenced by the perceived character of situations, many disciplines that study 
behavior may eventually need to take into account individual differences in the perceived 
character of the world. In the first effort to empirically map these perceptions, subjects varied on 
26 dimensions, called primal world beliefs or primals, such as the belief that the world is 
abundant. This dissertation leverages the first comprehensive measure of primals to further 
discussions in political, developmental, clinical, and positive psychology. Chapter I challenges the 
consensus that political conservativism is distinguished by the belief that the world is dangerous. 
Results suggest previous research relied on a measure highlighting dangers conservatives fear 
and neglecting dangers liberals fear, when both perceive the world as almost equally dangerous 
(8 samples; total N=3,734). A novel account of political ideology is proposed based on more 
predictive primals. Chapter II discusses how primals might develop. The author distinguishes 
retrospective theories—where primals reflect the content of past experiences—from interpretive 
theories—where primals act as lenses for interpreting experiences while remaining uninfluenced 
by them—and suggests twelve ways each theory’s relative merit can be empirically tested. A 
novel comprehensive framework for considering experiences in relation to any new construct is 
also proposed. Chapter III explores primals’ wellbeing-related correlates. By showing that many 
parents aim to teach negative primals to their children, some prevalence for meta-beliefs (i.e., 
beliefs about beliefs) associating negative primals with positive outcomes is established. Study 2 
tests these meta-beliefs in six samples (total N=4,535) in regards to eight outcomes: job success, 
job satisfaction, emotion, depression, suicide, physical health, life satisfaction, and flourishing. 






worse outcomes, across and within professions. In addition to filling a literature gap, and 
establishing bases for future comparison studies, findings could be used to strengthen 
interventions by undermining counterproductive meta-beliefs. Findings also underscore the 
urgent need for further research on the impact of primal world beliefs—teaching children or 
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Growing up, I hated science. It seemed like nothing but dull worksheets with pre-
determined answers. Only in grad school did I first experience its thrill, which is discovery. I may 
never get to sail un-sailed seas, but I can dig through data with statistical tools to unearth 
answers to fascinating questions nobody has answered before, and not just answers that other 
people care about, but ones that I care about, deeply. Six years ago, for example, I had no idea 
that the most basic beliefs individuals hold about reality fall along three dimensions of Safe, 
Enticing, and Alive; I had no idea these beliefs were so stable; and I had no idea political 
conservatives don’t actually see the world as especially dangerous (low Safe scores). Also, who 
would have thought that finding one’s own intuitions to be demonstrably false was so much fun? I 
think it says something positive about the state of humanity that so many of us have dedicated 
ourselves to indulging in discovery—luckily a pro-social addiction—and society has chosen to 
support our lifestyle.  
While I hope this dissertation qualifies my acceptance into the community of discovery 
addicts, this community may by its nature find this dissertation a tad unsatisfying. I spent most of 
my graduate career learning the skills of psychometric validation and developing the Primals 
Inventory. The plan of a measurement-focused dissertation changed when I realized that, simply 
by being the most comprehensive measure of its kind, the Primals Inventory could be leveraged 
to quickly address some obviously important ongoing empirical discussions about relevant 
beliefs. Yet low-hanging empirical fruit is not necessarily the most delicious. Given primal world 
beliefs’ broad theoretical implications, the most delicious question is, can causation be 
established experimentally? While much in this dissertation seeks to inform how experimentation 
might be pursued, readers may feel like I’m sidestepping the big question to ask smaller ones—
because I am. Nevertheless, I invite readers to enjoy these discoveries anyway, if only as mere 
prologue to more important discoveries in the future. I suppose the same might be said of all 






Each of these three chapters represent more or less stand-alone research articles. Pre-
registered hypotheses in this dissertation can be found on the Open Science  Framework 
(https://osf.io/gw79e/?view_only=de0b61485c4748979414e51df0af5b5d). For readers unfamiliar 
with primals, useful nonessential background reading is Clifton and colleagues (2019) paper 
introducing primal world beliefs. A less time consuming option is glancing at Figure 1 in the 
appendix, which introduces the reader to all 26 primals, the main characters of this three-chapter 
story. Chapter 1 examines how primals might influence politics, pushing back against the 
accepted idea that conservatives see the world as dangerous. Chapter 2 discusses where 
primals might come from, focusing on the relevance (irrelevance rather) of experiences. Chapter 
3 explores which primals might contribute to wellbeing and success; it turns out that many 
parents aim to teach their children that the world is in various ways a bad place, which may not 
be the best idea. Overall, this dissertation aims to contribute to important ongoing discussions in 
political, developmental, clinical, and positive psychology while demonstrating the value of the 







CHAPTER 1 - THE PRIMAL WORLD BELIEFS OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY 
 
Abstract 
Cooperation requires agreement and compromise, which can be frustrated by deeper, 
unrecognized disagreements. Humans disagree on at least 26 primal world beliefs (“primals”) 
which are extremely basic beliefs about the world’s typical character. One primal, the belief that 
the world is dangerous, correlates with and is widely thought to contribute to political 
conservativism. However, this literature has relied on a measure which overemphasizes dangers 
conservatives fear and underemphasizes dangers liberals fear (replicated here, N=611). After 
administering a nuanced measure to eight samples (total N=3,734), the belief the world is 
dangerous shared surprisingly little variance with political ideology (<1%), placing it among those 
primals least correlated with political ideology. Six primals explained considerably more variance: 
Hierarchical (15%), Intentional (11.5%), Acceptable (9.2%), Worth Exploring (6.9%), Just (5%), 
and Progressing (2.6%). Together, their prominence suggests an alternative account in which 
conservatives see an inherently hierarchical, fair, cosmically sanctioned order to the universe that 
is being eroded, suggesting wisdom in constraining change and tolerating inequality; while 
liberals see an inherently nonhierarchical, unfair world that is improving, suggesting wisdom in 
accelerating change and resisting inequality. This account has implications for contemporary 








The Proposition in Question 
Humans possess a remarkable capacity to cooperate in large groups. Many cooperative 
efforts fail, however, due to a common fault-line separating those who typically favor change 
("liberals”) and those who typically oppose it (“conservatives”). Psychologists have sought to 
explain how this fault-line arises and perpetuates itself, proposing various contributing factors, 
such as values, demographics, Big Five traits, prejudices, cognitive ability, and genetics (Carney 
et al., 2008; Crawford et al., 2017; Haidt & Joseph, 2007; Pratto et al., 1997; Smith et al., 2011; 
Stankov, 2009). Laham and Corless (2016) observe that a family of proposed factors indicate 
conservatism is associated with fear. This family includes terror management theory, death 
anxiety, threat sensitivity, disgust emotions, fear of uncertainty, identity threat, and—the current 
interest—belief in a dangerous world (e.g., Hibbing et al., 2014; Inbar et al., 2009; Jost et al., 
2003; Weise et al., 2008; Weissflog et al., 2013).   
A great deal of research supports or evokes the following proposition: that a general 
belief that the world is a dangerous place (a) distinguishes political conservatism in cross-
sectional research and probably (b) drives conservatism or related constructs such as 
authoritarianism, attitudes about guns, and so forth (Allport, 1954; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996; 
Choma & Hanoch, 2017; Conway et al., 2020; Cook et al., 2018; Crowson, 2009; Dallago et al., 
2012; DeLuca et al., 2018; Duckitt, 2001; Duckitt et al., 2002; Duckitt & Fisher, 2003; Duckitt & 
Sibley, 2009; Federico et al., 2009; Hibbing et al., 2014; Janoff-Bulman, 2009; Jost, 2006; Jost et 
al., 2003; Lavine et al., 1999; Leone et al., 2019; Mcfarland, 2005; Oosterhoff, 2015; Park & 
Isherwood, 2011; Peterson et al., 1993; Scherer et al., 2015; Shook et al., 2017; Stroebe et al., 
2017; Van Hiel et al., 2007; van Leeuwen & Park, 2009; Weber & Federico, 2007; White et al., 
2020). This proposition makes intuitive sense (though perhaps less so among conservatives, e.g., 
Gilson, 2018). Many conservative views seem readily explained by fear, including keeping guns 
for protection, keeping criminals locked away, keeping immigrants out, keeping the military 






popular among the general public, popping up in news media (e.g., Ball’s, 2016, Atlantic article 
Donald Trump and the Politics of Fear) and social media, such as in this anonymized 2019 tweet:  
Conservatives are driven by fear. It rules their lives. Listen to language they use about 
immigrants, POC [people of color], new ideas, or any religion that isn’t theirs (itself a 
system of fear control). They need guns for “protection” and crave authoritarians, even 
wannabes like Trump. 
This tweet describes a centuries-old connection between fear and authoritarianism first 
articulated by the English philosopher, Thomas Hobbes, and it continues to animate research on 
right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and other political constructs. Hobbes 
(1651) argued that however cruel a leviathan a King might become, citizens must submit to the 
monarch to stop societal descent into a worse state of nature (i.e., anarchy) where life is nasty, 
brutish, and short—perhaps the most famous line in political philosophy. Duckitt’s (Duckitt et al., 
2002) well-known dual process model formalizes this connection saying, “high RWA [right-wing 
authoritarianism] expresses the motivational goal of social control and security, activated by a 
view of the world as dangerous and threatening.” One should submit to authority, in other words, 
because the world is a dangerous place.  
Driving the proposition coupling dangerous world belief and political conservatism is also 
large and accumulating empirical literature, including many complementary experimental and 
observational studies in the broader family of fear-related constructs (e.g., Cook et al., 2018; Jost 
et al., 2004; Landau et al., 2004; Willer, 2004). For example, Cohen and colleagues (2005) found 
that mortality reminders increased support for conservative politician George W. Bush. Oxley and 
colleagues (2008) famously tied conservatism to physiology, including skin conductivity (though 
this recently failed to replicate; Bakker et al., 2020).  
More pertinent to the proposition in question, however, is research measuring belief in a 
dangerous world directly. Sharing Hobbes’ intuition, Altemeyer (1988) developed a belief in a 
dangerous world scale to examine the roots of political ideology, particularly right-wing 






samples in the USA, New Zealand, Canada, Germany, Italy, Belgium, and South Africa (N = 
12,939), Perry, Sibley, and Duckitt (2013) offered an improved 10-item Belief in a Dangerous 
World (BDW) scale. Nearly all political psychology research examining belief in a dangerous 
world operationalizes this primal using a variant of this scale. This literature repeatedly shows that 
BDW scale scores correlate positively with increased conservatism and conservative tendencies 
(Shook et al., 2017; Stroebe et al., 2017; many others cited above). Correspondence with BDW 
scale scores has even become a criterion for validating conservativism measures (Choma & 
Hanoch, 2017; Crowson, 2009; White et al., 2020). While Duckitt and others (e.g., Federico, 
Hunt, and Ergun 2009) often interpret the BDW scale as a measure of the social world and 
theorize on that narrower basis, many do not. Leeuwen and Park (2009, p. 169) aptly summarize 
the cross-sectional research saying, “If you are someone especially concerned about dangers, 
you are probably politically more conservative.” On this foundation, researchers have theorized 
about the roots of political ideology.  
This investigation reports data suggesting conservatives and liberals see the world as 
more or less equally dangerous; researchers were misled because the BDW scale highlights 
dangers conservatives fear while neglecting dangers liberals fear; and other world beliefs offer a 
more promising foundation to theorize about political ideology. These suggestions require 
contextualizing dangerous world belief as a member of a larger category of world beliefs.  
A Larger Category of World Beliefs 
The most studied world belief to date is belief in a just world (often called BJW). Belief in 
a just world is the idea that the world is a karmic place where individuals get what they deserve 
and deserve what they get. It too was birthed out of a desire to explain a particular dependent 
variable, in this case blame and racism (Lerner, 1965, 1980; Montada & Lerner, 1998; Nesbit et 
al., 2012). However, whereas belief in a dangerous world remains mainly a creature of political 
research, belief in a just world was eventually connected to dozens of personality and wellbeing 
variables (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019; Clifton et al., 2019). To summarize, those high in 






hard work and kindness); (b) enjoy more success and wellbeing (presumably because they 
worked harder and were nicer); and (c) blame victims such as the poor and the sick (presumably 
because the unfortunate deserved it).  
Other world beliefs may engender this sort of cascading influence across personality and 
wellbeing variables, which should occur for precisely the same reason why world beliefs have 
been historically overlooked in the literature: the world is a uniquely encompassing place, such 
that researchers have been slow to conceptualize “the world” as a place at all. As previously 
argued (e.g., Clifton & Kim, 2020), understanding the behavior of any given creature requires that 
scientists observe the creature’s behavior in multiple environments. Scientists who observe a 
creature in one environment only, such as a chimpanzee in a room, are handicapped observers, 
unable to distinguish context-specific behaviors (i.e., state-like reactions to particular 
environments, or at least the creature’s beliefs/perceptions of that environment) from organism-
specific behaviors (i.e., trait-like expression of that creature’s peculiar temperament). But what if a 
creature has beliefs about the character of an environment that, for whatever reason, the creature 
never leaves? If so, such beliefs would theoretically drive patterns of action that would manifest 
as organism-specific traits while actually being driven by context-specific reactions to underlying 
perceptions. Furthermore, if said environment became populated by other creatures who also 
never left, but viewed the character of said environment differently, all such creatures would 
occupy the position of said handicapped observer, being unable to distinguish context-specific 
from organism-specific behaviors. Moreover, if creatures were ignorant of their disagreement 
about the place they cohabit—which is probable if beliefs are multiple and implicit—all such 
creatures would likely misattribute numerous individual differences to differences in traits, thereby 
committing the fundamental attribution error on a massive scale.  
If this situation applies to humans, substantial variance in most major human behaviors 
and outcomes that psychologists study—neuroticism, agreeableness, optimism, curiosity, 
extraversion, gratitude, depression, subjective wellbeing, life satisfaction, meaning in life, 






the cascading effects of beliefs about the most psychologically salient characteristics of the one 
place humans never leave. Yet few world beliefs have been studied. Because no effort has been 
made to empirically derive all major world beliefs and how they differentiate themselves 
statistically, previously identified world beliefs may overlap or be inaccurately labeled, and world 
beliefs that remain unidentified may be underlying causes of much-studied outcome variables, 
including political ideology.  
To address this gap, Clifton and colleagues (2019) conducted the first systematic effort to 
empirically map all major beliefs about the basic character of the world as a whole. They labeled 
the latent phenomena primal world beliefs or primals to distinguish simple, adjectival, goal-
relevant beliefs (e.g., the world is a dangerous place) from metaphysical, incidental, or historical 
world beliefs (e.g., the world is composed of 118 chemical elements). The effort was pursued with 
no particular dependent variable in mind or strong priors regarding dimensionality. It began with 
ten exploratory projects to identify candidate world beliefs. For example, they analyzed over 
80,000 tweets beginning with phrases like “the world is”; the 840 most-frequently-used adjectives 
derived from 190,000 texts (450 million words); data from 12 focus groups representing 
Americans, Chinese, and all major world religions; and over 1,700 instances of world description 
gleaned from 385 of history’s most influential sacred texts, philosophical treatises, novels, political 
speeches, and films. This led to the identification of 234 items representing candidate primals that 
were then subjected to three rounds of exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis.  
Subjects disagreed about the world on 26 normally-distributed meaningful and reliable 
dimensions (Figure 1 in supplement). Two had been previously studied: beliefs in a just and 
dangerous world. Typically, ~55% of item variability was explained by just three primals—formally 
called secondary primals but informally the ‘big three’—consisting of beliefs that the world is Safe 
(vs. dangerous), Enticing (vs. dull), and Alive (vs. mechanistic). These three primals 
intercorrelate, comprising the three main dimensions of an overarching belief that the world is 
Good (vs. bad), the general factor, also called the primary primal. Despite adopting a positive 






interpretation of the BDW scale. Top-loading items on Safe include On the whole, the world is a 
dangerous place and Real danger is everywhere, even if we don’t notice it. ‘Big three’ primals are 
also themselves multi-dimensional, each breaking out statistically into several lesser primals, 
called tertiary primals. ‘Big three’ Safe involves seven of these tertiary primals, as follows: Just—
which is conceptually and empirically identical to Belief in a Just World—as well as the beliefs 
that the world is Stable (vs. fragile), Pleasurable (vs. miserable), Harmless (vs. threatening), 
Progressing (vs. declining), Cooperative (vs. competitive), and Regenerative (vs. degenerative).  
The Primals Inventory measures all 26 primals (1 primary, 3 secondary, and 22 tertiary) 
and is currently the most accurate and comprehensive measure of primal world beliefs (for a 
review, see Clifton in press-b). It is partly best by default and also because it was developed 
using several techniques to prioritize content validity often at the expense of reliability, ensuring 
dimensionality would emerge only if latent phenomena actually existed. In one study, many high-
performing items were removed to test if subscales relied on signal from the underlying 
phenomenon rather than variance defined by bloated specifics (i.e., redundancy-generated 
artifacts). In all studies, item order was randomized differently for each participant. Nevertheless, 
even though most scales involved only four items at least one of which is opposite-scored, 
subscales were reliable, factor structures were stable, and further replication and invariance 
testing is forthcoming (Bartholomaeus & Clifton, 2020). Three test-retest studies across 2-weeks, 
9 months and 19 months indicated that, outside IQ, primals are among the most stable individual 
difference variables psychologists measure. Primals were orthogonal to most demographic 
variables yet strongly correlated with many personality and well-being variables in a pattern 
consistent with the possibility that a major source of human behavior has been overlooked. Clifton 
and colleagues’ (2019) specify eight areas for further research. One is politics.  
Primals’ Connection to Politics 
Proponents of the proposition coupling conservatism with dangerous world belief have 
good reason to suspect that political behavior is a promising domain to observe primals’ impact. 






the most informed voter must generate opinions on topics where few facts are known. If primals 
function as schemas that inform the interpretation of ambiguity (Janoff-Bulman, 1989), individuals 
should rely on primals to form many political opinions. For example, consistent with the 
proposition in question, increased spending on the military may seem more prudent the higher 
one’s base rate for national security threats. In this way, a primal shapes policy and political 
ideology—at least theoretically. But which primals shape politics?  
A first step towards answering this question is to examine which primals correlate with 
political ideology. The literature predicts that ‘big three’ Safe (vs. dangerous) should strongly 
correlate with political conservatism. But pre-registered hypothesis for the current investigation 
holds that Safe will be virtually orthogonal to political ideology. This was because two of the very 
first studies to use the Primals Inventory suggested (a) incongruence in correlation matrices; (b) a 
BDW scale validity issue; (c) orthogonality with conservatism; and (d) strong correlations between 
political ideology and other primals.  
Incongruence in Correlation Matrices 
Outside politics, conservatives do not seem to behave like people who see the world as 
dangerous ought to behave. Fifteen sensible correlates of seeing the world as dangerous include 
less agreeableness, less curiosity, less optimism, less gratefulness, less trust, and more 
neuroticism (personality variables); more negative emotion, more depression, and more anxiety 
(clinical variables); and less life satisfaction, less positive emotion, worse relationships, less 
meaning in life, less accomplishment, and lower overall wellbeing (positive psychology variables). 
These outcomes flow naturally from the perception that that the individual is in a place—like a 
warzone or snake pit—where ambiguity probably hides dire and numerous threats. Moreover, in 
an initial study of 524 Americans using an early version of the Primals Inventory, correlations 
between Safe and all fifteen of these variables were quite large and significant, ranging from r=-
.43 (agreeableness) to r=.61 (optimism), with replication forthcoming (Clifton et al., 2019; Clifton, 
2020b). Yet few of these fifteen variables distinguish conservativism, and those that do usually do 






repeatedly associated with less neuroticism, less depression, more optimism, and more life 
satisfaction (Napier & Jost, 2008; Schlenker et al., 2012). This incongruousness has puzzled 
researchers (Dallago et al., 2012; Van Hiel et al., 2007). Jost and colleagues (2003, p. 362) 
wonder, “To the extent that conservatives are more generally fearful than others, one might 
expect that they would also exhibit higher levels of neuroticism, but this does not generally seem 
to be the case.” One explanation might be Laham and Corless’ (2016) suggestion that 
conservatives may not be more fearful than liberals, but fear different threats.  
Scale Validity Issue 
Though a valuable social attitude measure, the BDW scale may suffer from what 
psychometricians since Brigham (1930) call the naming fallacy in which items measuring a 
narrow phenomenon are given a broad scale label (Laham & Corless, 2016). Dangers come in 
many forms, including natural disasters, predators, war, disease, car accidents, fires, falls, 
pollution, and poisoning. BDW scale items mention none of these dangers.1 The focus is instead 
the intentional actions of strangers primarily in the form of crime and six of ten items concern 
societal and moral decline. This is too narrow. Assuming belief in societal decline is sufficiently 
close to belief in world decline (i.e., low scores on the Primals Inventory Progressing subscale), 
Progressing is just one of seven components of ‘big three’ Safe. This implies some BDW scale 
items may be double-barreled and, more importantly, BDW scale scores may target Progressing 
and neglect other components, such as Just and Stable, which a small validity study confirmed 
but requires replication (N=122; BDW and Progressing: r=-.72; BDW and Just r=-.34; Clifton et al. 
2019).  
Safe’s Orthogonality With Conservatism 
 
1 In fairness, the Primals Inventory mentions none of these dangers either (see Table 1 of 
supplement for side-by-side comparison). Because Lipkus (1991) demonstrated that measures of 
world beliefs can opt out this level of granularity entirely, Primals Inventory items concern broad 
qualities, such as danger, fragility, decline, and so forth. But if the measurement strategy involves 






The BDW scale’s selective representation of dangers only becomes a serious problem 
for political ideology research unless examined political ideologies happen to score (a) oppositely 
on those dimensions and (b) equally on overall dangerous world belief. In the same initial study of 
524 Americans, this too was found to be the case. Conservatism was negatively related to 
Progressing, positively related to Just, and almost perfectly orthogonal to the general belief that 
the world is Safe (r=-.03, p<.05; Clifton et al. 2019). This is highly inconsistent with previous 
research and also requires replication.  
More Predictive Primals 
If belief in a dangerous world is not related to political conservatism, might other primals 
be more relevant? In early studies, most primals were as uncorrelated to conservatism as Safe. 
Yet conservatism was positively related to Intentional, Just, Alive, Acceptable, and Hierarchical, 
and negatively to Worth Exploring, Progressing, Interconnected, and Cooperative. By a 
considerable margin, the belief that the world is Hierarchical was most related.  
The Belief that the World is Hierarchical 
 Hierarchical is not the belief that hierarchies are common or commonly emerge—on that 
most people would agree—but that hierarchy is inherent and natural to all things such that 
everything can be meaningfully ranked by differences in real value. In other words, much like how 
belief in a dangerous world concerns the prevalence of threat, Hierarchical concerns the 
prevalence of differences that matter. An example top-loading forward-scored item states 
Humans, animals, plants, and pretty much everything else can be organized by how important or 
good they are. This perspective is epitomized by the medieval philosophy of The Great Chain of 
Being depicted by Fray Diego de Valades (1579; Figure 2 in supplement) which organizes all 
entities along a superior-inferior dimension, including angels, humans, birds, fish, animals, and 
plants. Those who hold the world as nonhierarchical, in contrast, see most differences as surface-
level, artificial, and typically meaningless. An opposite-scored item reads, Most things aren’t 
better or worse. It’s hard to organize the world into hierarchies, rankings, or pecking orders that 






Hierarchical has unusual psychometric properties. Whereas most candidate primals 
emerged across exploratory analyses of tweets, focus groups, and so forth, Hierarchical emerged 
almost exclusively from historical texts. Whereas most candidate primals involved obvious 
correlates (e.g., Good and optimism), Hierarchical was identified with no political implications in 
mind. Whereas most tertiary primals correlate strongly with Good, Safe, Enticing, or Alive, 
Hierarchical is among the few that stand apart. Finally, whereas most primals are highly 
predictive of many variables, Hierarchical appears to be a poor predictor of most everything 
besides political ideology. Orthogonality with demographic variables like income suggests that 
Hierarchical scores do not reflect motivated reasoning to justify personal status. Orthogonality 
with social desirability suggests that scores likely do not reflect sensitivity to appearing prejudiced 
(perhaps stronger among liberals). Orthogonality with most personality, clinical, and wellbeing 
variables (e.g., neuroticism and depression) makes Hierarchical a better fit for driving 
conservatism than dangerous world belief because no strong theoretical reason connects 
Hierarchical to these other variables. There would be no incongruence in the correlation matrix.  
A relationship between Hierarchical and conservatism complements existing political 
ideology research, including work on right-wing authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, 
and moral foundations. Birthed out of a desire to explain the rise of fascism in the early 20th 
Century (Adorno et al., 1950), the definition of right-wing authoritarianism has evolved over the 
decades. Today it is generally understood as an affinity for established authorities within the 
group and an aversion to out-groups (e.g., Whitley Jr., 1999). Relatedly, social dominance 
orientation concerns the preference that groups be organized along a superior-inferior dimension 
with one’s own group at the top (Pratto et al., 1994). Haidt and Joseph (2007, p. 382) suggested 
that five moral foundations (i.e., values) may shape political ideology.   
1. Care/harm – Protect and care for young, vulnerable, or injured kin 
2. Fairness/cheating – Reap benefits of dyadic cooperation with non-kin 
3. Loyalty/betrayal – Reap benefits of group cooperation 






5. Sanctity/degradation – Avoid microbes and parasites 
Loyalty, authority, and sanctity tend to distinguish conservatives, with right-wing authoritarianism 
and social dominance orientation distinguishing conservatives even more so (Graham et al., 
2009). The belief that the world is Hierarchical is conceptually related yet distinct from these 
constructs because Hierarchical (a) does not involve a preference for what should be (i.e., is not 
a value) and (b) concerns the world generally, not merely human inter-group or intra-group 
relations. Similarly to how the belief that intelligence is improvable has been shown to be a 
loosely-related instantiation of the broader belief that the world is Improvable, right-wing 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation may be human group-specific instantiations of 
Hierarchical (Clifton et al. 2019).  
If, in addition to Hierarchical, conservatives see the world as more Just, then perhaps 
what is higher in the hierarchy and lower in the hierarchy is thought to deserve its station. Other 
politically-relevant primals might further shape how reality is interpreted. In this way, a primals-
centric account of political ideology was emerging based on Hierarchical rather than dangerous 
world belief. However, the relative value of seemingly important but less predictive primals 
remained unclear.  
To summarize, it is widely accepted that political conservatism correlates with and is 
increased by the belief that the world is dangerous. But preliminary results using a more nuanced 
measure suggested otherwise; that previous findings were misleading due to a scale validity 
issue; and that other primal world beliefs are more promising than belief in a dangerous world. 
Therefore, hypotheses were preregistered on the Open Science Framework, summarized as 
follows: 
• Safe (along with most primals) would continue to poorly predict political ideology.  
• Hierarchical (and a few others) would be far superior predictors.  
• The BDW scale would continue to over-represent ways conservatives see the world 
as dangerous and under-represent ways liberals see the world as dangerous. 






Study 1: Which Primals Explain Variance in Political Ideology? 
Study 1 examines eight samples to more firmly establish which primals relate to political 
ideology and which do not.  
Samples 
Sample 1: AH.Org.  
AuthenticHappiness.Org is a website where the public can voluntarily participate in 
wellbeing research. Of 1,067 completed surveys from November, 2015 to April, 2019, 61 were 
excluded for failing attention checks and 233 for identifying as non-political, leaving 773 (Mage=44 
years, SDage=15). They were 81% female, 75% white, and 66% college graduates.   
Sample 2 and 3: YM.Org Americans and non-Americans 
YourMorals.Org is a website where the public can voluntarily participate in political 
research. Of 2,331 complete surveys from November, 2018 to August, 2019, 429 were removed 
for failing attention checks and remaining split into two samples: 1,422 Americans and 480 non-
Americans (this split was not pre-registered because the author did not realize many subjects 
would be non-American). Americans (Mage=36 years, SDage=14) were 65% male, 75% in or had 
completed college, 378 Republican/Republican leaning, and 736 Democrat/Democrat leaning. 
Non-Americans (Mage=33 years, SDage=13) were 60% male; 72% in or had completed college; 
65% from the U.K., Australia, or Canada; with 61 countries represented. Additional subjects were 
excluded from various analyses below due to missing data, as specified. Terms “conservative” 
and “liberal” were explained when appropriate because they can have different meanings in non-
American contexts.  
Sample 4: Immigrants 
American immigrants from India (n=47), West Africa (n=45), and South Korea (n=53) 
were recruited Spring 2019 via (a) flyers around the University of Pennsylvania; (b) 
undergraduate social media networks; and (c) immigrant student groups in the Philadelphia area. 
Subjects received $5 Amazon gift cards. Initial analysis indicated Primals Inventory scales were 






were removed before further analysis, leaving 98 subjects. All were non-white, 71% 2nd 
generation immigrants (primarily college age), 72% female, and 19 self-identified conservatives.  
Sample 5: Philly Pros 
Of 120 Philadelphia-area lawyers, car salespersons, and police officers recruited from 
January 2018 to March 2019, 10 were excluded for failing attention checks and 20 for identifying 
as non-political, leaving 80 (Mage=48 years, SDage=12). These were 80% white, 73% male, 40% 
Republican/Republican leaning and 60% Democrat/Democrat leaning.  
Sample 6: Undergraduates 
Of 497 University of Pennsylvania undergraduates participating for course credit in 
Spring 2018, 24 were removed for failing attention checks and 152 for identifying as non-political, 
leaving 321 (Mage=20 years, SDage=1). They were 50% white, 60% Freshmen/Sophomores, and 
76% female, with 57 Republican/Republican leaning and 264 Democrat/Democrat leaning.  
Sample 7: 2019 mTurkers 
Of 705 subjects recruited via Amazon Mechanical Turk in December 2019, 94 were 
removed for duplicative IP addresses or failing attention checks, leaving 611 (Mage=37 years, 
SDage=12 years). They were 51% male, 71% white, and 82% college graduates.  
Sample 8: 2015 mTurkers 
All samples above were administered during the Trump administration. To examine more 
diversity across time, this study includes the earliest sample in which Primals Inventory items 
were ever administered. Of 930 mTurk subjects recruited October 2015 (Study 1 in Clifton et al., 
2019), 175 were excluded for identifying as non-political, leaving 755 (Mage=37 years, SDage=12). 
They were 57% female, 81% white, and 54% college graduates.  
Measures 
The Primals Inventory involves 99 items, with 39 reverse-scored. It measures the 26 
primal world beliefs identified in Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) effort to map major primals 
humans hold. Table 2 in supplement displays descriptive statistics. Preregistered hypotheses 






subscale (1 reverse-scored). In six samples, political ideology was measured using minor variants 
of a typical single item measure—Which of the following best describes your political 
orientation?—with six or seven response options from Very Liberal to Very Conservative. In 
Sample 5 and 6, party affiliation was used as a proxy for political ideology.  
Analysis 
Except for sample 8, hypotheses were identified on the Open Science framework before 
data was analyzed. To determine which primals correspond to political ideology, the percentage 
of variance (r2) in political ideology explained by each primal was examined. Because political 
ideology was ordinal and skewed in some samples, r2 was computed using Kendall’s τ b (a 
nonparametric test) and converted using instructions from Walker (2003) and Strahan (1982). PI-
99 data was ipsatized consistent with previous research. Sample-weighted mean % variance 
explained in Figure 1 does not include the two samples using party as a proxy for political 
ideology (6 sample total: N=3,333), though the impact of this exclusion was examined, as well as 
the role of YourMorals.org samples where Hierarchical explained higher variance.  
Results 
As Figure 1 shows, Safe explained .9% of the variance in political ideology across 
samples (95% CI: [.3%, 1.5%]) while Hierarchical explained 15% (95% CI [7.0%, 23.0%]). This 
puts Safe in the middle of a group of 15 primals explaining between 0% to 1.5% of variance in 
political ideology, all with narrow confidence intervals, which were labeled the primals of virtual 
agreement across the political spectrum. In Sample 5, 6, and 7, the correlation between Safe and 
conservatism was positive, indicating subjects who were more conservative saw the world as 
safer than their liberal counterparts. The next five primals were labeled the primals of mild 
disagreement, ranging from 2% to 3.5% of variance explained, followed by five primals of 
moderate disagreement, ranging from Just (5%) to Intentional (11.5%). Worth Exploring at 6.9% 
was negatively related. At 15%, Hierarchical was labeled the primal of marked disagreement 
between political ideologies. When the two samples using party affiliation as a proxy for political 






across primals, with Hierarchical and Safe falling to 13.8% and .4%, respectively. The relative 
ranking of most primals was also not dependent on the two samples recruited from 
YourMorals.org where Hierarchical explained especially high variance: 28.4% and 31.5%, 
respectively. When excluding these samples, Hierarchical remained the most predictive while 
dropping considerably from 15% to 8.1% and Safe was impacted marginally, dropping from .9% 
to .8% variance explained. Table 3 in supplement provides sample-specific results. 
Figure 1 
% of Variance Explained in Political Ideology by Each Primal With 95% Confidence Intervals 
 
Note. (-) indicates negative relationships with conservatism. Because two of eight samples were 
excluded from weighted average for using party as a proxy for political ideology, total N=3,333.  
 
Discussion  
Study 1 replicated in eight samples more diverse and together seven times larger 
(N=3,734) than that used previously. 
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Did Safe remain a poor predictor of political ideology?  
Increased conservatism was repeatedly associated with little difference in the belief that 
the world is dangerous. In the only sample where Safe explained more than 2% of the variance in 
political ideology (9.1% in Sample 5: Philadelphia-area professionals), the relationship was 
positive, indicating it was Democrats who saw the world as dangerous. This one sample is also 
not responsible for Safe’s low mean variance explained (.9%) since Sample 5 was excluded from 
how the mean was calculated for relying on party information as a proxy for political ideology. 
Such results are surprising for being inconsistent with previous research coupling conservatism 
and belief in a dangerous world.  
Do conservatives and liberals see the world differently?  
The majority of primals were labeled primals of virtual agreement across the political 
spectrum. These include the beliefs the world is Abundant, Stable, Interesting, Changing, 
Understandable, Safe, Pleasurable, Regenerative, Enticing, Interactive, Meaningful, Beautiful, 
Funny, Improvable, and generally Good. Such near orthogonality conflicts with not just the 
dangerous world proposition, but various other theories of political ideology. This includes Ball’s 
(2016) suggestions that conservatives tend to see the world as a bad place and constantly 
changing (which should be reflected by lower Good and Changing scores ); and Duckitt’s (e.g., 
Duckitt et al., 2002) suggestion that conservatives see the world marked by instability (which 
should be reflected by lower Stable scores). When it comes to primals, liberal and conservative 
subjects saw the world similarly in most respects.  
Did Hierarchical remain the best predictor of political ideology?  
Hierarchical explained 15% of the variance in political ideology, much more than any 
other primal and sixteen times more than Safe. Still, heterogeneity was considerable. Despite a 
future expected range between 7% and 23%, in one sample (Sample 5), τ was nonsignificant, 
suggesting that even Hierarchical will not always be relevant. Furthermore, covariance was 
especially high because of Sample 2 and 3, where it explained ~30%. This may be because 






AuthenticHappiness.Org and because the YourMorals.org political ideology measure included not 
only the 7-point very liberal to very conservative response options, but three ‘opt-out’ type 
response options (Libertarian, other, and Don’t know/not political) where other samples had one 
option. This may have excluded more subjects lacking definite opinions, resulting in less error. 
Regardless, if one assumes that these samples were outliers and removes them from analysis, 
Hierarchical remains the primal most associated with political ideology and Safe remains a poor 
predictor.  
What primals seem to offer the best bases for theorizing about political ideology?  
Hierarchical was followed by five primals each explaining at least five times more 
variance in political ideology than Safe. Among these, Alive is discounted because higher 
correlations with Intentional (one of three tertiary primals associated with Alive) indicates that the 
secondary level is not the appropriate level of granularity to consider (see advice from Clifton, in 
press-b). Moreover, because Intentional (the 2nd most predictive primal) could be partly an artifact 
of increased religiosity among conservatives and Acceptable (the 3rd most predictive) may involve 
some construct overlap with conservatism, Hierarchical’s prominence is remarkable, further 
justifying its status as the sole primal of marked disagreement across the political spectrum.  
The next group of primals, the primals of mild disagreement, include Interconnected, 
Needs Me, Progressing, Cooperative, and Harmless. Based on variance explained, these primals 
may not be central to political ideology while still providing insight into how hierarchy is 
sometimes perceived. For example, in a recent Primals Inventory translation effort, Stahlmann 
and colleagues (2020) found evidence of a novel secondary primal in a German sample (N=592). 
Labeled Communal, this belief combines many of the same tertiary primals that predict political 
ideology in Study 1—providing some cross-cultural validation—but with greater emphasis on 
Cooperative such that the hierarchy is seen as itself resulting from a process of ruthless struggle.  
The finding least consistent with pre-registered hypotheses concerned Progressing which 
explained only 2.6% of the variance in political ideology. Nevertheless, the author proposes that 






research across time periods confirms its unimportance. Seven of the eight samples were 
collected during a time of prosperity for humans generally (during the economic boom just prior to 
the Covid-19 pandemic) but a terrible period for liberals specifically, in Trump’s America and the 
rest of the English-speaking world (e.g., Brexit). Yet a notable comparative tendency among 
liberals to see the world as getting better was preserved. To explore the impact of contemporary 
events, the author compared two similar national USA samples recruited the same way from the 
same source (mTurk): Sample 7 was recruited early December 2019—just over three years into 
the Trump presidency and at the height of the presidential impeachment drama—and Sample 8 in 
late October 2015—late in Obama’s 7th year in office and three months before any 2016 
Presidential primaries. Then candidate Trump was an intermittent poll leader and broadly 
considered a temporary phenomenon. In 2019, Progressing explained virtually no variance in 
political ideology (.2%). Back in 2015, however, it explains 10.3%, statistically tied with 
Hierarchical (10.1%). This shift may be a clue that, though primals are generally stable, 
Progressing may be more responsive to news events compared to other primals and may be 
relevant to political ideology even though sometimes it may appear less relevant.  
Thus, if any primals play a role in political ideology, the following six seem most 
promising: Hierarchical, Intentional, Just, Worth Exploring, Acceptable, and Progressing.  
Study 2: The Broader Nomological Net 
If the belief that the world is dangerous is a poor predictor of conservatism, why did 
previous correlational research suggest otherwise? Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) small validity 
study suggested one possible explanation, but would results replicate? Moreover, do the six 
highlighted primals, especially Hierarchical, predict political ideology because they are 
repackaging known correlates of conservatism that concern hierarchy-related topics, including 
Right-wing authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and Moral Foundations (Care/harm, 
Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, and Sanctity/degradation)? To address 







Study 2 involved a closer examination of Study 1 samples that included measures of 
other political constructs. This included the two YourMorals.Org samples, which for Study 2 
purposes were combined because fewer subjects completed relevant measures, and the 611 
Americans recruited via mTurk (Sample 7). No YourMorals.Org subjects took the BDW scale. 
mTurk subjects completed all measures, including the BDW scale, in the order listed below.  
Measures  
See descriptive statistics in Table 4 of supplement.  
Primals Inventory 
For Study 2, in addition to Hierarchical and Safe, the particular interest was Safe’s seven 
associated tertiary primals (Pleasurable, Regenerative, Progressing, Harmless, Cooperative, 
Stable, and Just).  
BDW Scale 
Perry, Sibley, and Duckitt’s (2013) BDW scale consists of ten items, including five 
reverse-scored items. As discussed above, it measures one variable intended to be a belief about 
the social world, though consistent with the scale label it is more often treated as a belief about 
the world generally (e.g., van Leeuwen & Park, 2009). See items in Table 1 of supplement.  
MF-30 
The MF-30 (Graham et al., 2008) measures the five moral foundations (i.e., values) of 
Moral Foundations Theory. Subscales include six items administered every fifth item. Three items 
use response options extremely relevant to not at all relevant and three items use strongly agree 
to strongly disagree. No items are reverse-scored. An example item from the Authority/subversion 
subscale is Respect for authority is something all children need to learn. 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism  
Most Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scales are permutations of Altemeyer’s 30-item 
(1988) scale, including Zakrisson’s (2005) 15-item version used in this study that employs seven 
reverse-scored items. An example is Our country needs a powerful leader in order to destroy the 






Social Dominance Orientation 
To measure Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) Pratto and colleagues’ (1994) original 
scale was used, consisting of 16 forward-scored items. The first item is Some groups of people 
are simply inferior to other groups. 
Political Ideology 
Study 2 used the same political ideology measure uses in Study 1.   
Analysis   
Pairwise Pearson rs between primals and BDW scale scores were compared to those 
found by Clifton and colleagues (2019, N=122) with significance of differences calculated using a 
2-tailed Fisher r-to-z transformation (Table 5 of supplement). Pairwise relationships between the 
six primals identified above and RWA, SDO, and Moral Foundations were also examined (Table 6 
and 7 of supplement). To further determine how the six primals fit within the nomological net and 
also how they compare with Safe scores, 12 exploratory linear regressions were run (summarized 
in Table 8 of supplement). These rely on the mTurk sample (N=611), duplicating models in 
YourMorals.Org data whenever >300 subjects took relevant measures.  
Results  
BDW scale scores were strongly related but not redundant with ‘big three’ Safe (r=-.67) 
partly because BDW scores unevenly reflected Safe’s dimensionality, emphasizing some primals 
(Progressing, r=-.66, and Harmless, r=-.67) and deemphasizing others (Just, r=-.30, and Stable, 
r=-.41). The average difference in r across all 26 primals was .06 with one significant difference 
(Intentional). Hierarchical and the other primals identified above did not strongly correlate with 
known correlates of conservatism, triggering no concerns over construct redundancy. Among 611 
mTurkers, both Hierarchical and BDW scale scores were moderately related to RWA, SDO, and 
Authority. Among YourMorals.Org subjects, these relationships were higher. Moreover, the 
divergence between the BDW scale and Safe mattered when it came to political ideology and its 
correlates. The most striking example was in relationship to RWA, which was strongly related to 






(r=.08, p>.05) but BDW scale scores were, though not strongly (r=.20, p<.001). Exploratory linear 
regression models indicated that the six proposed primals of political ideology explained 19.3% 
(mTurk) and 43.2% (YourMorals.org) of the variance in political ideology. Adding the 20 other 
primals neglibly increased variance explained. The six primals explained less than Moral 
Foundations explained (29% in the mTurk sample). These 11 variables (six primals and five 
moral foundations) explained almost no variance in political ideology not already explained by 
RWA and SDO, which together explained 35%. Both the six primals and the five Moral 
Foundations explained large portions of variance in RWA, 47% and 52% respectively. Regression 
analyses also found that Safe was not merely a poor predictor of political ideology, but that, 
among Safe’s seven associated tertiary primals, Just (one of the six proposed primals) was the 
sole predictor of any consequence.  
Discussion 
Study 2 replicated Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) main findings in a sample five times 
larger.  
Did the BDW scale over-represent ways conservatives see the world as dangerous?  
It is increasingly clear that previous correlational research has relied on a scale which 
overemphasizes dangers conservatives fear (e.g., decline) and underemphasizes dangers 
liberals fear (e.g., injustice) when neither group is much more likely to see the world as generally 
more dangerous. Results imply an alternative “Dangerous World Scale” could be readily created 
showing liberals as the ones who see the world as dangerous, potentially explaining why previous 
correlational research misled researchers. This validity misstep warrants re-evaluation of 
research that has relied on the BDW scale to operationalize belief that the world is dangerous, 
including non-political research (e.g., Murray and Schaller 2012; Miller, Zielaskowski, and Plant 
2012; Schaller, Park, and Faulkner 2003; Schaller, Park, and Mueller 2003). Moreover, above 
findings also call into question the centuries-old Hobbesian connection between the belief that the 
world is dangerous and right-wing authoritarianism. If conservatives do not actually see the world 






Are the six more promising primals redundant with existing political constructs?  
Study 2 results indicate yes and no. No because the six primals identified in Study 1 are 
clearly not redundant with Moral Foundations, RWA, or SDO. Hierarchical correlated with RWA at 
only r (620) =.39 and with SDO at only r (620) =.32. Such modest relationships suggest that right-
wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation can be understood as human-specific and 
human-group-specific instantiations of a much broader belief about the world. In correlating 
positively with Authority, Sanctity, and Purity and negatively with Care and Fairness, Hierarchical 
correlates to moral foundations similarly to how conservativism correlates to moral foundations. 
However, the answer is also Yes because the six primals identified in Study 1 explained almost 
no variance in political ideology not already explained by RWA and SDO. Indeed, RWA also 
explained the same variance in political ideology provided by Moral Foundations. With all these 
constructs competing to explain the same variance in political ideology, the question is, what 
causes what?  
General Discussion 
This investigation challenges a central proposition in the political psychology literature 
while providing an explanation for why previous research may have been misleading. In short, 
researchers have thought that conservatives and liberals inhabit two perceived worlds where 
opposite political behaviors make more sense: some see the world as a dangerous place full of 
threats (conservatives), driving policy preferences such as keeping criminals locked away, 
keeping immigrants out, and keeping guns for protection. Some see the world as safer (liberals), 
allowing more room for being forgiving, welcoming, and weaponless. But above results show that 
conservatives and liberals see the world as about equally dangerous and previous studies seem 
to have found otherwise because the main measure of dangerous world belief happened to 
highlighted threats conservatives fear while neglecting threats liberals fear.  
This is consonant with emerging research on other threat-relevant political constructs (for 
a review, see Duckitt, 2020). In some large samples (total N=24,391), conservatives more 






omission (i.e., neglect), with no overall difference in threat sensitivity (Kahn et al., 2020). A meta-
analysis of 134 samples (N=369,525) found statistically significant yet fairly trivial relationships 
between conservatism and mortality salience (r=.08), subjective threat perception (r=.12), and 
objective threat experience (r=.07), and a nonsignificant relationship to fear of death (r=.02; Jost 
et al., 2017). Likewise, in the present investigation, the belief that the world is dangerous 
explained only .9% of the variance in political ideology, placing it nearly in the middle a large 
group of fifteen primal world beliefs—just below the belief the world is Funny at 1.0%—sharing so 
little variance with political conservatism that they were dubbed the primals of virtual agreement 
across the political spectrum.  
 Six primals, however, notably distinguished political ideology, as follows: 
• Hierarchical (vs. nonhierarchical) is the belief that most things have differential value 
and can be ranked (positively related to conservatism, explaining 15.0% of variance).  
• Intentional (vs. unintentional) is the belief that most things happen for an underlying 
purpose (positively-related, 11.5%).  
• Acceptable (vs. unacceptable) is the belief that the world and most things in it are 
best accepted as is (positively-related, 9.2%).  
• Worth Exploring (vs. not worth exploring) is the belief that everything is worth trying 
or doing, at least once (negatively related, 6.9%). 
• Just (vs. unjust) is the belief that the world is a fair place where you typically get what 
you deserve, for good or ill (positively-related, 5%).  
• Progressing (vs. declining) is the belief that the world is getting better instead of 
worse (negatively-related, 2.6%).  
These primals may distinguish political ideologies because they describe two other perceived 
worlds in which opposite political behaviors make sense.  
Two Other Perceived Worlds  
While all individuals see the universe as full of different things, individuals may 






to assume differences are important, reflecting an underlying value structure that is not just 
natural and pervasive, but even cosmically ordained. What has more value is treated fairly—and 
thus finds its way to the top—and what has low value and not worth exploring is too treated 
fairly—and finds its way to the bottom. For this reason, the current state of affairs—whatever it 
is—should probably be accepted as it is, not because it can’t be changed, but because it probably 
shouldn’t be. Unfortunately, however, change is part of life and the world’s hierarchies are being 
slowly eroded. Thus, constraining change to the status quo and accepting inequality is just 
common sense (i.e., the two parts of conservatism as commonly defined).  
Another group (liberals) may tend to assume differences are unimportant, reflecting 
superficial, arbitrary differences in kind that rarely entail differences in value. Because everything 
is roughly equal, everything is equally deserving and worth exploring. Thus, they see existing 
hierarchical structures—in society, nature, and anywhere else—as typically unjust, oppressive, 
not acceptable as it is, and certainly not ordained by some cosmic force. Those on top rarely 
deserve their luck and those on the bottom rarely deserve their misfortune. Fortunately, however, 
change is a part of life, and this dismal state of affairs is slowing improving. Thus, accelerating 
change to the status quo and rejecting inequality is just common sense (i.e., the two parts of 
liberalism as commonly defined).   
The notion that political ideology stems in part from these two perceived worlds—
shorthanded hierarchy theory—offers intuitively appealing explanations of many conservative 
policy preferences. For example, punitive measures consistent with historical standards of 
punishment appear sensible if criminals presumably get what they deserve as part of society’s 
natural order. Excluding immigrants appears sensible when it is presumed that real, natural, and 
meaningful distinctions underpin nationality. The dangerous world proposition does offer a better 
explanation of increased gun ownership, but in this case no explanation is needed. Stroebe, 
Leander, and Kurlanski (2017) found that BDW scale scores to be unrelated to gun ownership, 






(r(399)=.10, p<.05). If an explanation is needed, it is why those who see the world as dangerous 
are hardly bothering to arm themselves.  
Hierarchy theory offers a superior explanation of why many correlates of conservatism 
arise. This includes a distaste for political correctness (which can be seen as glossing over 
differences); increased religiousness (because purpose underlies events); a general appreciation 
for wealthy persons (whose greater income implies greater value); tendencies towards 
authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (which treats differences as important); and 
personality characteristics such as low Openness (because many things are not worth exploring) 
and high conscientiousness (because the world rewards fairly; e.g., Carney et al., 2008; Jost, 
2006). Turning to moral foundations, the dangerous world proposition poorly explains why 
conservatives score lower on care/harm because, in increasingly dangerous places, people 
typically become more concerned about safety issues, not less. Hierarchy theory, moreover, 
makes sense of why conservatives place greater value on loyalty, authority, and sanctity given 
their view of a just, even cosmically-ordained, hierarchy. A Hobbesian explanation tying the belief 
that the world is dangerous to authoritarianism can be constructed, but it is circuitous. When 
seeking to explain attitudes towards existing social hierarchies, the simpler explanation is 
probably the one involving general assumptions about hierarchy than general assumptions about 
danger. Finally, personality-based theories of political ideology, including the dangerous world 
proposition, have historically struggled to explain both parts of conservatism as commonly 
defined in psychological research as the tendency to (a) preserve the established order and (b) 
tolerate inequality (Hirsh et al., 2010). Hierarchy theory readily explains both. If differences 
reflects true value, considerable social inequality is not just appropriate but inevitable.  
Limitations 
One point of contention may be definitional. The term world in primal world beliefs refers 
to “an individual’s broadest psychologically meaningful habitat” (Clifton et al., 2019, p. 83). Most 
researchers typically use world more narrowly. For example, in depression research, Beck (e.g., 






meant beliefs about familiar persons in one’s immediate social context, such as a spouse or boss 
(personal communication, March 1st 2019). Duckitt (e.g., Duckitt et al., 2002) and other BDW 
researchers also define the world socially, though in their case primarily meaning strangers and 
their intentional actions. There may be a variety of research for which it is inappropriately 
retroactive to apply Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) definition.  
The causal implications of hierarchy theory is conjecture. While it looks like these are the 
six primals of political ideology, and it seems clear that they describe two worlds in which 
opposite political behavior makes sense, their correlational relationship to political ideology might 
be due to causality going in the other direction (e.g., primals could be post hoc rationalizations of 
a prior political commitments) or third variables (e.g., religiosity). Both the dangerous world 
proposition and hierarchical theory relies on cross-sectional research, which has limited value.  
Other study limitations include the reliance on the Primals Inventory’s Hierarchical 
subscale which, having been introduced alongside 25 other constructs, would benefit from more 
focused psychometric validation to determine the validity of the author’s interpretation. Though 
Safe explained only .9% of the variance in political ideology, further research using multi-variate 
approaches will likely identify contexts in which the belief the world is dangerous is more relevant. 
Studies rely on a commonly used but simplistic 1-item measure of political ideology when 
unidimensional left-right understandings of political ideology are limited (Feldman, 2013). In most 
samples, there were more liberals than conservatives, which may indicate selection bias and 
overweighting the importance of primals delineating degrees of liberalism. Above findings are 
directly relevant to belief in a dangerous world research only, not other members of the threat-
relevant family of constructs that Laham and Corless (2016) identifies. Finally, hierarchy theory is 
at best only a partial explanation of political ideology, since much variance in political ideology 
remains unexplained. 
Future Directions 
Hierarchy theory has a variety of implications for understanding human cooperation.   






Hierarchy theory suggests strategies for political campaigning, messaging, and strategy, 
especially among Republicans most mischaracterized by the dangerous world proposition. If a 
politician’s goal is to widen one’s base and attract independents, the most effective strategy may 
be to appeal to primals about which there is more agreement. Obama’s 2008 campaign 
messages “Yes, We Can,” “Change We Can Believe In,” and “Hope,” imply that change is 
possible, which is presumably more appealing to those scoring high on Improvable, one of the 15 
primals of virtual agreement across the political spectrum. However, if a politician seeks primarily 
to mobilize a base of supporters, messages appealing to primals that distinguish those supporters 
may be preferred. Many USA Republican presidential campaign messages, for example, call for a 
return to a better time in the past. Examples include Make America Great Again (2016 Trump 
campaign); Are You Better Off Than You Were Four Years Ago and It’s Morning Again in America 
(1980 and 1984 Reagan campaigns); and He’s Making Us Proud Again (1976 Gerald Ford’s 
campaign). Such messages presumably appeal less to those who believe the past was worse 
than the present (i.e., those scoring high on Progressing; i.e., liberals). Likewise, slogans 
suggesting that intergroup or interpersonal differences are inconsequential may do poorly among 
those scoring high on Hierarchical. Example messages from the 2020 Democratic presidential 
primary include We’re All in This Together (O’Rourke), We Rise (Booker), and For Everyone 
(Biden). Indeed, a great deal of liberal American political messaging, from Clinton’s 2016 
message Forward Together to William Jennings Bryant’s Equal Rights to All, Special Privileges to 
None, should be relatively unappealing to those scoring high on Hierarchical, many of whom may 
expect that some people deserve special privileges. If so, messages of equality might help in 
primaries, but hurt in general elections. As a way of testing hierarchy theory versus the 
dangerous world proposition, experiments could compare the appeal of slogans about threat to 
slogans about difference.  
Historical events 
If hierarchy theory helps explain contemporary clashes between the forces of change and 






following example: Seligman (2019) suggests that the first millennia of the common era was 
marked by very little material progress. Then, starting in Western Europe circa 1450, an explosion 
of progress begins, spreads globally, and continues through the present. He asks, why the 
sudden growth? One piece of the puzzle may involve hierarchy theory. The worldview of the 
Medieval period is epitomized by de Valades (1579) Great Chain of Being (Figure 2 in 
supplement), Catholicism, the divine right of kings, and feudalism. Feudalism rests on a series of 
obligations between superiors and inferiors, with God at the top, sanctioning the hierarchy as 
divinely ordered. Not merely one’s station, but experiences of all types, are interpreted as the 
deserved consequence of sin or good deeds (Ziegler, 2013). Medieval Europeans lived in the 
shadow of decaying Roman buildings, including structures they no longer knew how to build and 
infrastructure they continued to rely on, especially roads. The daily water supply of 12th century 
Latin Caesarea, for example, was supplied by several miles of Roman aqueducts built ~1,000 
years prior (Reifenberg, 1950; Riley-Smith, 1990). Top Medieval thinkers (e.g., Aquinas, 
Averroes) were not considered great for new ideas, but for contextualizing old ones. Together, 
this suggests a society where individuals regardless of status would have likely scored high on 
Hierarchical, Intentional, Just, and Acceptable, and low on Worth Exploring and Progressing. 
Then came the Black Death in the 14th century which killed one third of Europeans, a scale of 
unprecedented loss in European history. Plague paid no respect to different persons, killing rich 
and poor, pious and evil alike. The resulting vast societal re-organization and social mobility 
further highlighted the meaningless of sacrosanct distinctions (Ziegler, 2013). Massive labor 
shortages resulted in massive wage increases, putting nobles at the mercy of peasants who 
increasingly negotiated better terms or left manors for the first time in generations. Layered on 
were the great changes of the Reformation, the Renaissance, Humanism, the discovery of an 
entirely unknown and promising continent, and the emergence of a powerful merchant class (e.g., 
the Medici) that defied traditional hierarchies. All this may have contributed to the primals of 
conservatism losing its grip on some segments of society.  






This article began by noting that cooperation is a signature human adaptation but many 
cooperative efforts fail because of a conservative-liberal fault-line. If hierarchy theory is correct 
and primals reasonably malleable, two question follows. First, should societies seek to 
homogenize members’ primals to maximize cooperative potential? Perhaps someday this may be 
a reasonable course, but certainly not yet. Primals research is in its infancy. Researchers have 
little idea whether and how primals can be changed or the net effects of change. It may be foolish 
(and unkind), for example, for liberals to try to decrease Just when previous research has tied low 
belief in a just world to depression and many other unwanted outcomes. However, as studies 
proceed, primals research does offer three things of immediate practical value for increasing 
cooperation: a measure that people can use to identify their own primals, terminology with which 
to discuss deeper disagreements that may (or may not) underlie political differences, and a 
modicum of increased understanding of where the other side is coming from—small but perhaps 
worthwhile contributions at this polarized time.  
Second, if societies should eventually seek to homogenize its primals to maximize 
cooperative potential, in what direction? The path of societies seeking to lock in gains at the 
expense of future progress might be increased beliefs that the world is Hierarchical, Just, 
declining, not worth exploring, Intentional, and Acceptable. However, for societies prioritizing 
long-term progress, the path is less clear. If groups homogenize to believe that differences are 
meaningless, all outcomes unfair, and so forth, problems may result, such as grand short-sighted 
social experiments that fail (e.g., the French Revolution). Perhaps the ideal human society finds 
ways to manage—rather than eliminate—the inevitable tensions that arise between those who 
wish to preserve the current order, and those wanting to change it.  
Concluding Remarks 
The basic notion underpinning the psychological relevance of primal world beliefs is 
nothing new, being traceable to debates among Ancient Greek philosophers such as Heraclitus 
and Pythagoras. The basic notion is as follows: similarly to how perceptions of local environments 






Over the last several decades, researchers applied this basic notion to political ideology, noting 
that dangerous world belief describes a pair of worlds in which many opposite political behaviors 
make sense. Confidence grew as correlational studies repeatedly tied dangerous world belief to 
political ideology, and experimental work in threat-related literatures found many complementary 
results. Still, some found it puzzling why, outside political contexts, conservatives did not seem to 
behave like people who see the world in this way ought to behave, and recently other literatures 
began unearthing less consonant findings (Duckitt, 2020; Laham & Corless, 2016).  
Hoping further description might lead to explanation, the current investigation leverages 
the first reasonably comprehensive measure of primal world beliefs to identify which primals 
correlate to political ideology and which do not. The resulting profile shows three things. First, 
conservatives and liberals see the world as about equally dangerous. Second, previous literature 
had found otherwise because a previous measure highlights threats conservatives fear and 
neglects threats liberals fear. Third, six other world beliefs each explain several times more 
variance in political ideology than belief in a dangerous world and also describe a novel pair of 
worlds in which opposite political behaviors make sense. Because this research involves 
replication, preregistration, multiple samples, a few thousand subjects, and a more nuanced 
measure, researchers can have some confidence in these descriptive conclusions, if not the 
explanation they suggest. After all, just because behaviors are consonant with a belief does not 
mean the belief caused the behavior. Yet the same could be said of the dangerous world 
proposition. Hierarchy theory swaps out the primals, but the basic notion that made the 







Adorno, T. W., Frenkel-Brunswik, E., Levinson, D. J., & Sanford, R. N. (1950). The authoritarian 
personality. Harper & Row. 
Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Addison-Wesley. 
Altemeyer, B. (1981). Right-wing authoritarianism. University of Manitoba press. 
Altemeyer, B. (1988). Enemies of freedom: Understanding right-wing authoritarianism. Jossey-
Bass. 
Altemeyer, B. (1996). The authoritarian specter. Harvard University Press. 
Bakker, B. N., Schumacher, G., Gothreau, C., & Arceneaux, K. (2020). Conservatives and liberals 
have similar physiological responses to threats. Nature Human Behaviour, 4, 613–621. 
Ball, M. (2016, September 2). Donald Trump and the Politics of Fear. The Atlantic. 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/donald-trump-and-the-politics-of-
fear/498116/ 
Bartholomaeus, J., & Clifton, J. D. W. (2020). Wait, so the 99-item Primals Inventory really does 
break out in to 22 factors? Invariance testing of the PI-99 using exploratory structural 
equation modeling. 
Bartholomaeus, J., & Strelan, P. (2019). The adaptive, approach-oriented correlates of belief in a 
just world for the self: A review of the research. Personality and Individual Differences, 
151(May), 109485. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2019.06.028 
Beck, A. T., Rush, A. J., Shaw, B. F., & Emery, G. (1979). Cognitive therapy of depression. 
Guilford Press. 
Brigham, C. C. (1930). Intelligence tests of immigrant groups. Psychological Review, 37(2), 158–
165. https://doi.org/10.1037/h0072570 
Carney, D. R., Jost, J. T., Gosling, S. D., & Potter, J. (2008). The secret lives of liberals and 
conservatives: Personality profiles, interaction styles, and the things they leave behind. 
Political Psychology, 29(6), 807–840. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2008.00668.x 






for Trump and Clinton. Personality and Individual Differences, 106, 287–291. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2016.10.054 
Clifton, J. D. W. (2020a). Managing validity versus reliability trade-offs in scale-building decisions. 
Psychological Methods, 25(3), 259–270. https://doi.org/10.1037/met0000236 
Clifton, J. D. W. (2020b). The Value of Seeing the World as a Bad Place: A Cross-Sectional 
Search for Unicorns. 
Clifton, J. D. W. (in press). Measuring primal world beliefs. In W. Ruch, A. Bakker, L. Tay, & F. 
Gander (Eds.), Handbook of positive psychology assessment. European Association of 
Psychological Assessment. 
Clifton, J. D. W., Baker, J. D., Park, C. L., Yaden, D. B., Clifton, A. B. W., Terni, P., Miller, J. L., 
Zeng, G., Giorgi, S., Schwartz, H. A., & Seligman, M. E. P. (2019). Primal world beliefs. 
Psychological Assessment, 31(1), 82–99. https://doi.org/10.1037/pas0000639 
Clifton, J. D. W., & Kim, E. S. (2020). Healthy in a crummy world: Implications of primal world 
beliefs for health psychology. Medical Hypotheses, 135(September 2019), 109463. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mehy.2019.109463 
Cohen, F., Ogilvie, D. M., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2005). American 
roulette: The effect of reminders of death on support for George W. Bush in the 2004 
presidential election. Analyses of Social Issues and Public Policy, 5(1), 177–187. 
Conway, L. G., Woodard, S. R., Zubrod, A., & Chan, L. (2020). Why are Conservatives Less 
Concerned about the Coronavirus (COVID-19) than Liberals? Testing Experiential Versus 
Political Explanations. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781107415324.004 
Cook, C. L., Li, Y. J., Newell, S. M., Cottrell, C. A., & Neel, R. (2018). The world is a scary place: 
Individual differences in belief in a dangerous world predict specific intergroup prejudices. 
Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 21(4), 584–596. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1368430216670024 
Crawford, J. T., Brandt, M. J., Inbar, Y., Chambers, J. R., & Motyl, M. (2017). Social and 






issues are most divisive. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 112(3), 383–412. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/pspa0000074 
Crowson, H. M. (2009). Does the DOG Scale Measure Dogmatism? Another Look at Construct 
Validity. The Journal of Social Psychology, 149(3), 265–283. 
https://doi.org/10.3200/SOCP.149.3.365-383 
Dallago, F., Mirisola, A., & Roccato, M. (2012). Predicting right-wing authoritarianism via 
personality and dangerous world beliefs: Direct, indirect, and interactive effects. The Journal 
of Social Psychology, 152(1), 112–127. 
DeLuca, J. S., Vaccaro, J., Seda, J., & Yanos, P. T. (2018). Political attitudes as predictors of the 
multiple dimensions of mental health stigma. International Journal of Social Psychiatry, 
64(5), 459–469. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020764018776335 
Duckitt, J. (2001). A dual-process cognitive-motivational theory of ideology and prejudice. 
Advances in Experimental Social Psychology, 33(December 2001), 41–113. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0065-2601(01)80004-6 
Duckitt, J. (2020). Threat, Conservatism, and Authoritarianism. 
Duckitt, J., & Fisher, K. (2003). The Impact of Social Threat on Worldview and Ideological 
Attitudes. Politica, 24(3), 199–222. https://doi.org/10.1111/0162-895X.00322 
Duckitt, J., & Sibley, C. G. (2009). A dual-process motivational model of ideology, politics, and 
prejudice. Psychological Inquiry, 20(2–3), 98–109. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/10478400903028540 
Duckitt, J., Wagner, C., Du Plessis, I., & Birum, I. (2002). The psychological bases of ideology 
and prejudice: Testing a dual process model. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
83(1), 75–93. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.83.1.75 
Federico, C. M., Hunt, C. V., & Ergun, D. (2009). Political Expertise, Social Worldviews, and 
Ideology: Translating “Competitive Jungles” and “Dangerous Worlds” into Ideological 
Reality. Social Justice Research, 22, 259–279. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11211-009-0097-0 






handbook of political (pp. 591–626). Oxford University Press. 
https://psycnet.apa.org/record/2013-40838-018 
Gilson, T. (2018, March 22). No, Liberals, You’re Wrong: Conservatism Isn’t About Fear. The 
Stream. https://stream.org/no-liberals-youre-wrong-conservatism-isnt-about-fear/ 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. (2008, July). Moral Foundations Questionaiire. 
https://moralfoundations.org/questionnaires/ 
Graham, J., Haidt, J., & Nosek, B. a. (2009). Liberals and conservatives rely on different sets of 
moral foundations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 96(5), 1029–1046. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/a0015141 
Haidt, J., & Joseph, C. (2007). The moral mind: How five sets of innate intuitions guide the 
development of many culture-specific virtues, and perhaps even modules. In P. Carruthers, 
S. Laurence, & S. Stich (Eds.), The Innate Mind (Vol. 3, pp. 367–391). Oxford. 
Hibbing, J. R., Smith, K. B., & Alford, J. R. (2014). Differences in negativity bias underlie 
variations in political ideology. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 37, 297–350. 
https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X13001192 
Hirsh, J. B., DeYoung, C. G., Xu, X., & Peterson, J. B. (2010). Compassionate liberals and polite 
conservatives: Associations of agreeableness with political ideology and moral values. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 36(5), 655–664. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167210366854 
Hobbes, T. (1651). Leviathan. In Renascence Editions. https://doi.org/10.5840/tpm20032291 
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2009). Conservatives are more easily disgusted than 
liberals. Cognition and Emotion, 23(4), 714–725. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/02699930802110007 
Janoff-Bulman, R. (1989). Assumptive Worlds and the Stress of Traumatic Events: Applications 
of the Schema Construct. Social Cognition, 7(2), 113–136. 
https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.1989.7.2.113 






conservatism. Psychological Inquiry, 20(2–3), 120–128. 
Jost, J. T. (2006). The end of the end of ideology. American Psychologist, 61(7), 651–670. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0003-066X.61.7.651 
Jost, J. T., Fitzsimons, G., & Kay, A. C. (2004). The ideological animal. In J. Greenberg, S. L. 
Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental psychology (pp. 268–288). The 
Guildford Press. 
Jost, J. T., Glaser, J., Kruglanski, A. W., & Sulloway, F. J. (2003). Political conservatism as 
motivated social cognition. Psychological Bulletin, 129(3), 339–375. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/0033-2909.129.3.339 
Jost, J. T., Stern, C., Rule, N. O., & Sterling, J. (2017). The politics of fear: Is there an ideological 
asymmetry in existential motivation? Social Cognition, 35(4), 324–353. 
https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2017.35.4.324 
Kahn, D. T., Björklund, F., & Hirschberger, G. (2020). The intent and extent of collective threats: 
A data-driven conceptualization of collective threats and their relation to political 
preferences. Idc, 1–67. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.31234/osf.io/evxu6 
Laham, S. M., & Corless, C. (2016). Threat, morality and politics: A differentiated threat account 
of moral and political values. In J. P. Forgas, L. Jussim, & P. A. M. Van Lange (Eds.), The 
social psychology of morality (pp. 56–70). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. 
https://proxy.library.upenn.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1817571173?
accountid=14707 
Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., Miller, C. H., 
Ogilvie, D. M., & Cook, A. (2004). Deliver us from evil: The effects of mortality salience and 
reminders of 9/11 on support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 30(9), 1136–1150. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204267988 
Lavine, H., Burgess, D., Snyder, M., Transue, J., Sullivan, J. L., Haney, B., & Wagner, S. H. 
(1999). Threat, authoritarianism, and voting: An investigation of personality and persuasion. 






Leone, L., Giacomantonio, M., & Lauriola, M. (2019). Moral foundations, worldviews, moral 
absolutism and belief in conspiracy theories. International Journal of Psychology, 54(2), 
197–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijop.12459 
Lerner, M. J. (1965). Evaluation of performance as a function of performer’s reward and 
attractiveness. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1(4), 355–360. 
https://doi.org/10.1037/h0021806 
Lerner, M. J. (1980). The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion. In The Belief in a Just 
World. Springer US. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-0448-5_2 
Lipkus, I. (1991). The construction and preliminary validation of a global belief in a just world 
scale and the exploratory analysis of the multidimensional belief in a just world scale. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 12(11), 1171–1178. https://doi.org/10.1016/0191-
8869(91)90081-L 
Mcfarland, S. G. (2005). On the eve of war: Authoritarianism, social dominance, and American 
students’ attitudes toward attacking Iraq. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(3), 
360–367. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167204271596 
Miller, S. L., Zielaskowski, K., & Plant, E. a. (2012). The Basis of Shooter Biases: Beyond Cultural 
Stereotypes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 38(10), 1358–1366. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167212450516 
Montada, L., & Lerner, M. J. (1998). Responses to victimizations and belief in a just world. 
Plenum Press. 
Murray, D. R., & Schaller, M. (2012). Threat(s) and conformity deconstructed: Perceived threat of 
infectious disease and its implications for conformist attitudes and behavior. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 42(2), 180–188. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.863 
Napier, J. L., & Jost, J. T. (2008). Why are conservatives happier than liberals? Psychological 
Science, 19(6), 565–572. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02124.x 
Nesbit, S. M., Blankenship, K. L., & Murray, R. A. (2012). The influence of just-world beliefs on 






Oosterhoff, B. (2015). Dimensions of Political Reasoning : Associations among Informational 
Assumptions , Sociopolitical Values , and Domain-Specific Judgments about Laws. In 
Dissertation. West Virginia University. 
Oxley, D. R., Smith, K. B., Alford, J. R., & Miller, J. L. (2008). Political Attitudes Vary with 
Physiological Traits. Science, 321(5896), 1667–1670. 
https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1157627 
Park, J. H., & Isherwood, E. (2011). Effects of concerns about pathogens on conservatism and 
anti-fat prejudice: Are they mediated by moral intuitions? Journal of Social Psychology, 
151(4), 391–394. https://doi.org/10.1080/00224545.2010.481692 
Perry, R., Sibley, C. G., & Duckitt, J. (2013). Dangerous and competitive worldviews: A meta-
analysis of their associations with Social Dominance Orientation and Right-Wing 
Authoritarianism. Journal of Research in Personality, 47(1), 116–127. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2012.10.004 
Peterson, B. E., Doty, R. M., & Winter, D. G. (1993). Authoritarianism and attitudes toward 
contemporary social issues. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(2), 174–184. 
Pratto, F., Sidanius, J., Stallworth, L. M., & Malle, B. F. (1994). Social Dominance Orientation: A 
Personality Variable Predicting Social and Political Attitudes. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 67(4), 741–763. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.67.4.741 
Pratto, F., Stallworth, L. M., & Sidanius, J. (1997). The gender gap: Differences in political 
attitudes and social dominance orientation. British Journal of Social Psychology, 36(1), 49–
68. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.2044-8309.1997.tb01118.x 
Reifenberg, A. (1950). Caesarea: A Study in the Decline of a Town. Israel Exploration Journal, 
1(1), 20–32. 
Riley-Smith, J. (1990). The atlas of the crusades. Swanston Publishing. 
Schaller, M., Park, J., & Faulkner, J. (2003). Prehistoric dangers and contemporary prejudices. In 







Schaller, M., Park, J. H., & Mueller, A. (2003). Fear of the dark: Interactive effects of beliefs about 
danger and ambient darkness on ethnic stereotypes. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 29(5), 637–649. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167203029005008 
Scherer, A. M., Windschitl, P. D., & Graham, J. (2015). An Ideological House of Mirrors: Political 
Stereotypes as Exaggerations of Motivated Social Cognition Differences. Social 
Psychological and Personality Science, 6(2), 201–209. 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1948550614549385 
Schlenker, B. R., Chambers, J. R., & Le, B. M. (2012). Conservatives are happier than liberals, 
but why? Political ideology, personality, and life satisfaction q. Journal of Research in 
Personality, 46, 127–146. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jrp.2011.12.009 
Seligman, M. E. P. (2019). The history of agency and human progress. Departmental talk to the 
University of Pennsylvania Psychology Department. 
Shook, N. J., Taylor Boggs, S., Ford, C. G., & Boggs, S. T. (2017). Dangerous worldview: A 
mediator of the relation between disgust sensitivity and social conservatism. Personality and 
Individual Differences, 119, 252–261. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2017.07.027 
Smith, K. B., Oxley, D. R., Hibbing, M. V, Alford, J. R., & Hibbing, J. R. (2011). Linking Genetics 
and Political Attitudes: Reconceptualizing Political Ideologyp. Political Psychology, 32(3), 
369–397. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2010.00821.x 
Stahlmann, A. G., Hofmann, J., Ruch, W., Heintz, S., & Clifton, J. D. W. (2020). The higher-order 
structure of primal world beliefs in German-speaking countries: Adaptation and initial 
validation of the German Primals Inventory (PI-66-G). Personality and Individual 
Differences, 163, 110054. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2020.110054 
Stankov, L. (2009). Conservatism and cognitive ability. Intelligence, 37(3), 294–304. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.intell.2008.12.007 
Strahan, R. F. (1982). Assessing magnitude of effect from rank-order correlation coefficients. 
Educational and Psychological Measurement, 42(3), 763–765. 






Motivational Bases of American Gun Ownership. Personality and Social Psychology 
Bulletin, 43(8), 1071–1085. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167217703952 
Van Hiel, A., Cornelis, I., & Roets, A. (2007). The intervening role of social worldviews in the 
relationship between the five-factor model of personality and social attitudes. European 
Journal of Personality, 21(2), 131–148. https://doi.org/10.1002/per.618 
van Leeuwen, F., & Park, J. H. (2009). Perceptions of social dangers, moral foundations, and 
political orientation. Personality and Individual Differences, 47(3), 169–173. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2009.02.017 
Walker, D. A. (2003). JMASM9: Converting Kendall’s tau for correlational or meta-analytic 
analyses. Journal of Modern Applied Statistical Methods, 2(2), 525–530. 
https://doi.org/10.22237/jmasm/1067646360 
Weber, C., & Federico, C. M. (2007). Interpersonal attachment and patterns of ideological belief. 
Political Psychology, 28(4), 389–416. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9221.2007.00579.x 
Weise, D. R., Pyszczynski, T., Cox, C. R., Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Kosloff, S. 
(2008). Interpersonal politics: The role of terror management and attachment processes in 
shaping political preferences. Psychological Science, 19(5), 448–455. 
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9280.2008.02108.x 
Weissflog, M., Choma, B. L., Dywan, J., van Noordt, S. J. R., & Segalowitz, S. J. (2013). The 
political (and physiological) divide: Political orientation, performance monitoring, and the 
anterior cingulate response. Social Neuroscience, 8(5), 434–447. 
https://doi.org/10.1080/17470919.2013.833549 
White, K. R. G., Kinney, D., Danek, R. H., Smith, B., & Harben, C. (2020). The Resistance to 
Change-Beliefs Scale: Validation of a New Measure of Conservative Ideology. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 46(1), 20–35. https://doi.org/10.1177/0146167219841624 
Whitley Jr., B. E. (1999). Right-Wing Authoritarianism, Social Dominance Orientation, and 
Prejudice. In Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (Vol. 77, Issue I). 






ratings. Current Research in Social Psychology, 10(1), 1–12. 
http://www.uiowa.edu/~grpproc/crisp/crisp.html 
Zakrisson, I. (2005). Construction of a short version of the Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 39(5), 863–872. 
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.paid.2005.02.026 







CHAPTER 2 - TESTING IF PRIMAL WORLD BELIEFS REFLECT EXPERIENCES—AT LEAST 
SOME EXPERIENCES IDENTIFIED AD HOC 
 
Abstract 
Do negative primal world beliefs reflect experiences such as trauma, crime, or low socio-
economic status? Clifton and colleagues recently suggested that primals—defined as beliefs 
about the general character of the world as a whole, such as the belief that the world is safe (vs. 
dangerous) and abundant (vs. barren)—may shape many of the most-studied variables in 
psychology. Yet researchers know very little regarding why individuals adopt their primals nor the 
role of experience in shaping primals. Many theories can be called retrospective theories; these 
theories suggest that past experiences lead to the adoption of primals that reflect those 
experiences. For example, trauma increases the belief that the world is dangerous and growing 
up poor increases the belief that the world is barren. Alternatively, interpretive theories hold that 
primals function primarily as lenses on experiences while being themselves largely unaffected by 
them. This chapter identifies twelve empirical tests where each theory makes different predictions 
and hypothesizes that retrospective theories are typically less accurate. I end noting that, even if 
retrospective theories are typically inaccurate, that does not imply experiences do not shape 
primals. I end by offering a conceptual architecture—the Cube Framework—for exploring the full 
range of human experience and suggest that, though psychologists have historically focused on 
negative, externally-imposed experiences of short-duration (e.g., trauma), positive, internally-










After psychologists introduce new constructs, such as learned helplessness or grit 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews, & Kelly, 2007), many 
researchers eventually ask an important question: Which experiences influence (or are influenced 
by) my construct? Having recently introduced a construct (Clifton et al., 2019), I too turned to this 
question, beginning with a literature search for a tool that would enable systematic theorizing 
about a broad range of experiences in relation to my construct. What I found instead were a few 
organizing frameworks unsuited to this particular task of general theorizing (e.g. Duerden et al., 
2018) and a handful of largely overlapping clinically-oriented checklists dominated by a particular 
type of involuntary, negative experiences of quick duration, such as injury or death of a family 
member (e.g., the Social Readjustment Rating Scale by Holmes & Rahe, 1967; the Life 
Experiences Survey by Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978). Moreover, despite positive 
psychology’s promising departure from psychology’s historical focus on negative experiences 
(Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000), the positive psychology literature has yet to produce 
commensurate checklists of positive experiences. Thus, absent the tool I sought, I conducted the 
sort of ad hoc process that is common among researchers. In this process, hypotheses emerge 
concerning those experiences the researcher happens to think of, often ones already examined in 
relevant literatures or ones intersecting personal experience. This process has weaknesses. 
Chief among them is that research can never support a reasonably adequate understanding of 
the role of experience if no reasonably comprehensive range of things one personally encounters, 
undergoes, or lives through—Miriam-Webster’s definition of experiences—is ever considered. 
Thus, after discussing a newly introduced construct and engaging in a typical process of ad hoc 
literature-driven hypothesis generation, I conclude this chapter with an atypical offering: a simple 
yet comprehensive conceptual framework for considering the full range of human experiences 






The New(ish) Construct: Primal World Beliefs 
For decades a few literatures have independently examined the possibility that particular 
dependent variables, such as political ideology and recovery from trauma, may stem from 
individual differences in generalized beliefs about the sort of world this is (Perry, Sibley, & Duckitt, 
2013; Janoff-Bulman, 1989). The most studied of these beliefs is belief in a Just world, which is 
the belief that the world is a place where one gets what one deserves and deserves what one 
gets. Originally identified by Lerner (1965, 1980) to study the roots of blame and racism, Just has 
since been tied to dozens of variables that Just is thought to causally influence. In sum, those 
higher in Just tend to be kinder (presumably because the world rewards kindness); more hard-
working (presumably because the world rewards hard work); more successful (because they’ve 
worked harder, were nicer, and are motivated to post-hoc justify success); and blame victims like 
the sick and poor (presumably because they probably got what they deserved). Clifton and 
colleagues (2019) recently pulled these world belief literatures together, calling beliefs about the 
basic character of the world primals or primal world beliefs, and engaged in an extensive 
empirical process to map all major primals. We found that Just was one of 26 different primals 
most of which had never been studied (see Figure 1 in appendix) and many of the new primals 
are more predictive of human behavior than Just, such as the belief that the world is Beautiful (vs. 
ugly) and Pleasurable (vs. miserable).  
This suggests the plausibility of a truly remarkable scenario described by Clifton and Kim 
(2020, p. 1). In sum, understanding the behavior of any creature requires observations of that 
creature in multiple environments. But humans can only ever observe each other in one 
environment: the world. Not realizing we profoundly disagree about this world along many 
dimensions, human efforts to understand each other’s behavior should lead inevitably to a 
specific type of failure: overexaggerating the importance of dispositional differences (i.e., the 
fundamental attribution error). Thus, it is theoretically possible that psychologists have overlooked 






colleagues (2019) identify dozens of variables, such as BIG 5 personality traits and subjective 
wellbeing, that are perhaps impacted.  
As research exploring the causal role of primals continues, it is worth asking a related but 
separate question: Where do primals come from? Specifically, which experiences shape (and are 
shaped by) primal world beliefs? The former question is broad and requires, among other things, 
a deep discussion of genetics and the ontology of personality traits, which is out of scope. This 
chapter concerns the more specific latter question about identifying relevant experiences. 
Distinguishing Retrospective and Interpretive Theories 
Theories of how experiences shape primal world beliefs often fall into two broad types: 
retrospective theories and interpretive theories. Retrospective theories suggest that experiences 
play a key role in shaping primals such that primals often reflect the content of the individual’s 
background. In this view, for example, the rich are likely to see the world as more Abundant, the 
poor are likely to see the world as more barren (i.e., low Abundant scores), and experiencing 
dangerous environments locally should cause one to see the world as more dangerous globally. 
This is consistent with an intuitively-appealing theory animating much of the pre-existing literature 
on primals originally posed by traumatologist Janoff-Bulman (1989) and adopted by several 
others (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998; Foa, Ehlers, Clark, Tolin, & Orsillo, 1999; Kauffman, 
2002; Boelen, van den Hout, & vanden Bout, 2006). This theory holds that traumatic events 
dramatically increases the belief that the world is dangerous (i.e., low Safe scores on the Primals 
Inventory). Since our (Clifton et al., 2019) identification of several previously unidentified primals, I 
have observed anecdotally at talks and conferences that similar retrospective intuitions emerge to 
explain primals’ origins. For example, many researchers intuit that privileged racial groups will 
see the world as more Just and Abundant than underserved racial groups. What all these 
retrospective theories and intuitions have in common is the notion that past experiences 
characterized by X quality pushes the individual towards seeing the world as characterized by X 
quality to such an extent that primals reveal not just one’s beliefs but also one’s demographics.  






functions as a lens used to interpret experiences while being itself largely uninfluenced by them. 
For example, an interpretive theory of how the primal Abundant relates to personal wealth would 
predict that being rich (or poor) would have little to no impact on the belief that the world is 
Abundant. Likewise, experiencing dangerous environments or trauma (or safe environments) 
would have little to no impact on the belief that the world is Safe. Though such interpretive 
theories are reasonable, it’s fair to say that they are typically not as intuitively appealing as their 
retrospective counterparts.  
Nevertheless, I hypothesize that interpretive theories are generally more accurate than 
retrospective theories, though likely with some moderate exceptions such as childhood trauma 
and chronic pain. My rationale stems from the central point of Janoff-Bulman’s (1989) original 
article, subtitled Applications of the Schema Construct, where she suggests that world beliefs 
likely operate as schemas.  
Though definitions of schema vary (van der Veer, 2000), the paradigm has been central 
to belief research for decades (e.g., Crum, 2013; Dweck, 2017; Beck, 1963, 1964, 1967, 2005). 
The term usually refers to pre-existing mental models about an object used to generate 
expectations, assist interpretation and memory reconstruction, and guide interaction (e.g., Piaget, 
1926; Brewer, 2000; Rumelhart, 1980; Nash, 2013; Bernstein, Roy, Skrull, & Wickens, 1991; 
Janoff-Bulman, 1989). For example, Davis (1991) found that a schema for an egg involves at 
least 45 different modifiers such as nutritious, delicate, and laid in nests.  
In addition to introducing the idea of schemas (1926), Piaget theorized how schemas 
would typically relate to experiences (1971). When facing evidence of a schema violation, Piaget 
posits two options—accommodation (revising one’s schema) or assimilation (reinterpreting the 
new information to minimize its importance)—and assimilation would be overwhelmingly favored. 
Decades of research confirms this. When facing schema-inconsistent information, individuals 
tend to ignore it, reject it, reinterpret it, or adopt other rejection-seeking behavior (e.g., Brewer, 
2000; Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Hastie, 1981; Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975). As schema’s 






original schema (e.g., Vernon, 1955; Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000), thus creating a self-
supporting feedback loop. In addition to altering percepts directly, a schema’s influence on 
behavior can also lead to actual outcomes that provide further “evidence” of the original schema, 
creating a self-fulfilling feedback cycle (e.g., Labianca, Gray, & Brass, 2000). In these ways, 
schemas contribute to the phenomenon termed confirmation bias (e.g., Nickerson, 1998; Merton, 
1948; Jussim, 1986).  
Though Janoff-Bulman (1989) acknowledged that “the tendency is towards assimilation 
rather than accommodation,” she thought trauma would be an exception that would reliably and 
dramatically alter world assumptions, including what we (Clifton et al., 2019) call primal world 
beliefs. Her (1992) book on trauma was entitled Shattered Assumptions and her theory is 
sometimes called shattered assumptions theory. Yet Kaler and colleagues (2008) found that in 
only about a quarter of those recently traumatized was there any reliable change in world beliefs 
and—moreover—these were equally divided between those coming to see the world as more 
negatively and those coming to see the world more positively. Indeed, as Mancini, Prati, and 
Bonnano (2011) note, despite the popularity of shattered assumptions theory, there is little 
evidence much shattering happens. This is partly due to the absence of control groups, but also 
the smallness of observed effects which, when it is observed at all, is typically small, even among 
Holocaust survivors (e.g., Prager & Solomon, 1995). Indeed, if those who experienced first-hand 
the mass systematic internment, deprivation, torture, and slaughter during the Holocaust—
arguably one of the most traumatic events in history—do not see the world as that much worse 
than those who escaped the experience, then retrospective explanations of how negative primals 
arise probably has less to offer than intuition suggests.  
Yet, as Mancini, Prati, and Bonnano (2011) point out, shattered assumptions theory 
remains popular among researchers and clinicians—even lay people—likely in part because of its 
intuitive appeal. Indeed, after encountering similar patterns of retrospective intuitions in 
connection to newly-identified primals, I have come to suspect several biases are at play, 






people cannot help but believe the things they do because of their backgrounds while our own 
primal world beliefs stem from something more objective and clear-eyed (Clifton, in press). 
Others are on a journey; I have arrived.   
It may be that, rather than experiences influencing primals in a straightforward way, 
individuals use past experiences to justify whatever primal they already hold. For example, if one 
sees the world as a dangerous place and gets into a car accident, perhaps on average he will 
eventually frame that experience as evidence of what he knew all along. Likewise, if one who 
sees the world as a safe place and gets into a car accident, perhaps on average she will 
eventually frame this experience as exceptional, having occurred for local, particular, and 
temporary reasons. Indeed, because the world is a giant dataset, there is much information that 
can be garnered in support of any primal. And if primals direct attention and resist assimilation as 
the schema literature suggests, researchers should expect such garnering to occur, and thus 
retrospective theories to be generally inaccurate.  
Could a theory explaining how experiences relate to primals be both non-retrospective 
and non-interpretive? Perhaps. However, whereas retrospective theories could be completely 
false without fundamentally altering current assumptions about primals and their nature, the same 
is not true of interpretive theories. Fundamental to researcher’s (Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Clifton et 
al., 2019; Clifton & Kim, 2020; Clifton, in press) understanding of primals is the same assumption 
underlying researcher’s conceptions of beliefs generally (e.g., Crum, 2013; Dweck, 2017; Beck, 
1963, 1964, 1967, 2005). Namely, that beliefs influence thought and behavior largely via 
ambiguity interpretation. If primals were found to exert no influence on the interpretation of one’s 
personal experiences, then primals are either (a) exclusively symptoms rather than causes of 
primals’ numerous personality and wellbeing correlates; (b) primals’ impact on these outcomes 
are unmediated by interpretation; or (c) primals do influence the interpretation of some new 
information but, for some reason, not new personal experiences. Given current research, these 







To determine whether retrospective or interpretive theories are typically more accurate 
across different primals and different experiences, multiple hypotheses in which each theory 
makes diverging predictions must be examined. Table 1 specifies twelve hypotheses which were 
selected according to three criteria.  
• The measurability of the relevant life experience  
• The involuntariness of the experience (to avoid confounding causal relationships)  
• The clarity of alternative retrospective and interpretive predictions  
 
Multiple hypotheses are necessary because some involve disputable assumptions that others do 
not. For example, perhaps the most dubious assumption underlies hypotheses #4: Is the world 
really more dangerous for women than men when men are more likely to be killed violently and 
die on average five years sooner (e.g., Rochelle, Yeung, Bond, & Li, 2015)? Perhaps, but among 
a variety of threats that disproportionately impact women, it is indisputable that most women 
spend life surrounded by biologically stronger, faster, more aggressive individuals who are 
motivated to assault them, often do, and whose denials are traditionally more likely to be believed 
over women’s accusations (e.g., Lassek & Gaulin, 2009). Thus, if researchers were to find that 
nevertheless women and men see the world as equally Safe, that can be considered inconsistent 
with a retrospective theory of how Safe develops, though not compelling unless other hypotheses 
relying on different assumptions are also examined.  
All twelve hypotheses can be determined by interpreting correlational effect sizes, with 
thresholds for interpretation varying depending on the hypotheses. However, based on 
commonly-used thresholds (e.g., Cohen, 1992), the threshold of r>.30 that Kaler and colleagues 
(2008) used to examine a retrospective theory, and my own research experience, I suggest the 
following admittedly arbitrary thresholds for pairwise relationships: 
• r > .30 can be considered clearly consistent with the retrospective prediction and 
clearly inconsistent with the interpretive prediction 
• .295 > r > .20 can be considered weakly consistent with the retrospective prediction 
and weakly inconsistent with the interpretative prediction 
• .195 > r > .10 can be considered weakly inconsistent with the retrospective prediction 
and weakly consistent with the interpretive prediction 
• .095 > r > -.095 can be considered clearly inconsistent with the retrospective 







Because the twelve hypotheses seek to derive conclusions from orthogonality, I would remind the 
reader that, while correlation does not indicate causation, under certain assumptions 
orthogonality does suggest causality’s absence or trivialness. Of course, researchers should 
check those assumptions, particularly curvilinearity, possible third variable confounds, indirect 
pathways, and counterbalancing effects. For example, Mancini, Littleton, and Grills (2016) found 
that the negative psychological impact of the Virginia Tech shootings was mitigated by the 
countervailing effects of increased social support which may influence, among other things, 
beliefs about the world (Mancini, 2019). Nevertheless, if primals do not reflect backgrounds in a 
straightforward manner as evidenced by bivariate analysis, this would suggest that retrospective 
theories are inaccurate even if further analysis reveals confounds, indirect pathways, or 
counterbalancing effects. Retrospective theories are by definition not nuanced in this way.  
Previous research sheds light on several of these 12 hypotheses, especially trauma 
research. For example, converting Prager and Solomon’s (1995) results to a Pearson’s r 
suggests that that subjects who experienced the Holocaust saw the world as less benevolent at 
r(158)=.31. This is clearly consistent with the retrospective prediction and clearly inconsistent with 
the interpretive prediction—but barely so. Using the World Assumptions Scale, Kaler and 
colleagues (2008) found in a sample of 735 undergraduates that increased lifetime trauma 
correlated with world benevolence beliefs at r=-.14 and recent trauma did not seem to have any 
impact on these beliefs. Given the severity of the Holocaust compared to, say, getting mugged, 
could it be that r=.31 approximates an upper-limit average trauma effect?  
However, because hypotheses concern several primals that only the Primals Inventory 
measures and because the Primals Inventory is a more nuanced measure of primals (for a 
detailed discussion see Clifton, in press), it is ideal if all twelve hypotheses are examined using 
the Primals Inventory. To some extent this too has been done. On pages 310-323 of Clifton and 
colleagues (2019) supplement is a large correlation matrix showing some pertinent relationships 
among 524 Americans, ages 18–75 (M=37), who were approximately 50% women and 50% 






• Concerning Hypothesis #4, women did not see the world as more dangerous than 
men (r=.01, p>.05) 
• Concerning Hypothesis #5, growing up poor did not correlate with seeing the world 
as less Abundant (r=-.07, p>.05) 
• Concerning Hypothesis #6, those in families with higher incomes did not see the 
world as more Abundant (r=.05, p>.05).  
• Concerning Hypothesis #9, growing up poor did not correlate with seeing the world 
as less Pleasurable (r=-.06, p>.05).  
• Concerning Hypothesis #10, high family income did not correlate with seeing the 
world as more Pleasurable (r=.03, p>.05).  
 
These results are, based on above thresholds, clearly inconsistent with retrospective predictions 
and clearly consistent with interpretive predictions. But these results also come from one sample 
in which only a preliminary version of the Primals Inventory was used, literally thousands of 
correlational relationships were examined without correcting for multiple comparisons, above 
hypotheses were not pre-registered, and most of the twelve hypotheses were not examined. 
Much remains unclear.  
Table 1 
Twelve Alternative Retrospective and Interpretive Predictions  
 








Trauma often increases the belief 
that the world is dangerous. 
Therefore, increased trauma 
should correlate substantially with 
lower Safe scores. 
The primal Safe is used to interpret 
trauma while being itself little 
affected by it. Therefore, increased 
trauma should be marginally 







Living in dangerous places 
increases the belief that the world 
is dangerous. Therefore, living in 
a more dangerous zip code based 
on crime statistics should 
correlate with lower Safe scores. 
The primal Safe is used to interpret 
dangerous situations while being 
itself marginally affected by them. 
Therefore, living in a dangerous zip 
code should be marginally related 
or orthogonal to Safe scores.   
4 
Sex Being physically weaker than 
many around you—especially 
people who are motivated to 
assault people like you, often do, 
and whose denials are likely to be 
believed over your accusations—
leads to seeing the world as more 
dangerous. Therefore, being 
female should correlate with low 
Safe scores. 
The primal Safe is used to interpret 
situations in which one is 
susceptible to dangers while being 
itself marginally affected by them. 
Therefore, being female should be 
marginally related or orthogonal to 
Safe scores. 
5 Abundant (vs. barren) 
Childhood SES Growing up poor often results in 
seeing the world as a more barren 
place with fewer resources and 
opportunities. Therefore, low 
childhood socio-economic status 
(SES) should correlate with low 
The primal Abundant is used to 
interpret material circumstances in 
childhood while being itself 
marginally affected by such 
circumstances. Therefore, low 






Abundant scores.  marginally related or orthogonal to 
Abundant scores. 
6 
Family income Being poor often results in seeing 
the world as a more barren place 
with fewer resources and 
opportunities. Therefore, low 
family income should correlate 
with low Abundant scores. 
The primal Abundant is used to 
interpret material circumstances 
while being itself marginally 
affected by it. Therefore, low family 
income should be marginally 





Living in a poor neighborhood 
often results in seeing the world 
as a more barren place with fewer 
resources and opportunities. 
Therefore, living in a lower-
income neighborhood should 
correlate with low Abundant 
scores. 
The primal Abundant is used to 
interpret material circumstances 
while being itself marginally 
affected by it. Therefore, living in a 
lower-income neighborhood should 
be marginally related or orthogonal 





Chronic pain Being in chronic physical pain 
often results in seeing the world 
as a more miserable and 
uncomfortable place. Therefore, 
chronic pain exposure should 
correlate with low Pleasurable 
scores.   
The primal Pleasurable is used to 
interpret experiences of pain while 
being itself marginally affected by 
it. Therefore, experiencing chronic 
pain should be marginally related 
or orthogonal to Pleasurable 
scores.  
9 
Childhood SES Higher SES while growing up 
corresponds with having more 
frequent and intense pleasurable 
experiences in childhood, which 
often results in seeing the world 
as a more pleasurable place. 
Therefore, higher childhood SES 
should correlate with Pleasurable 
scores.  
The primal Pleasurable is used to 
interpret pleasurable experiences 
in childhood while being itself 
marginally affected by it. Therefore, 
high childhood socio-economic 
status should be marginally related 
or orthogonal to the belief that the 
world is pleasurable. 
10 
Family income Higher family income corresponds 
with having more frequent and 
intense pleasurable experiences, 
which often results in seeing the 
world as a more pleasurable 
place. Therefore, higher family 
income should correlate with 
Pleasurable scores.  
The primal Pleasurable is used to 
interpret pleasurable experiences 
while being itself marginally 
affected by them. Therefore, family 
income should be marginally 
related or orthogonal to 







from childhood to 
adulthood 
Experiencing decline in personal 
SES often results in seeing the 
world as declining. Therefore, 
decline in SES from childhood to 
adulthood should correlate with 
lower Progressing scores. 
The primal Progressing is used to 
interpret decline in SES while 
being itself marginally affected by 
it. Therefore, decline in SES from 
childhood to adulthood should be 
marginally related or orthogonal to 




mean income  
Living in a declining neighborhood 
often results in seeing the world 
as declining. Therefore, living in 
an area that is in economic 
decline should correlate with 
lower Progressing scores.  
The primal Progressing is used to 
interpret neighborhood decline 
while being itself marginally 
affected by it. Therefore, 
neighborhood decline should be 
marginally related or orthogonal to 







Where Should Researchers Look Instead?  
If researchers find that retrospective theories are generally inaccurate, does that mean 
that experiences do not shape primals? No. Interpretive theories only presume that primals do not 
reflect the content of past experiences in a straightforward manner, but experiences come in 
many shapes and sizes and might influence primals in a variety of less straightforward ways. 
Where might researchers look next? What experiences should researchers focus on?  
These questions are impossible to answer without a reasonably exhaustive framework by 
which a breadth of human experiences can be considered. After recently introducing the primals 
construct (Clifton et al, 2019), I asked the same question that many researchers before me have 
asked: Which experiences influence (or are influenced by) my construct? Failing to unearth some 
sort of comprehensive framework or measurement tool that identifies a broad range of 
psychologically important human experiences that I could use as a basis for systematic theorizing 
about experiences in relation to my construct, I created the following Cube Framework. I provide 
it here to aid other researchers examining other constructs, to highlight areas for further research 
on the primals construct, and to invite comment before building a more comprehensive 
experience checklist than is currently available. 
Three Dimensions of the Cube Framework  
There are three major psychologically salient continuous dimensions by which all 
experiences vary. For practicality, the Cube Framework simplifies these dimensions into 
dichotomies. The point is not to know precisely where a particular experience falls on a dimension 
but for the researcher to have a tool to guard against the consideration of only a narrow slice of 
human experience.   
Chronic-acute 
All experiences happen in time. Thus, all experiences can be sorted into more acute 
experiences that take moments/days/weeks and more chronic experiences that take 






experiences, such as having a chronic illness or negative boss. However, demographic 
information is often important precisely because it captures chronic experiences, such as being 
male or poor.  
Internal-external 
All experiences are to varying degrees under the individual’s control. Several literatures 
draw attention to the psychological importance of this distinction including learned helplessness, 
attribution theory, optimism/explanatory style, personality, locus of control, and incremental theory 
(Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Harvey et al., 2014; Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Lewin, 
1936; Rotter, 1966; Blackwell, Trzesniewski, & Dweck, 2007). Though many experiences, such 
as going to college, can be either internally driven or more externally imposed, many experiences 
can be fairly readily categorized as more often one or the other. A death in the family or inheriting 
a fortune, for example, are experiences that are usually externally imposed.  
Positive-negative 
All experiences vary by subjective desirability (good, neutral, or bad). Though most 
difficult to measure objectively, this dimension is also the most psychologically impactful. There is 
a massive gulf, after all, between a good childhood and a bad childhood, a good sex life and a 
bad sex life, and so forth. However, like the internal-external dimension, exactly where any given 
experience falls on the positive-negative dimension may be up for debate. Nevertheless, many 
experiences will be readily characterizable. Death and injury, for example, can be thought of as 
negative. Receiving a promotion or falling in love can be considered positive.  
Eight Experience Types in the Cube Framework 
The permutations of these three dimensions reveals eight types of human experience 
(Figure 2).   
Bad choices 
Acute, internally-driven, negative experiences—bad choices—may include losing one’s 
savings in a poor investment, stealing, cheating, sexually assaulting someone, sleeping with a 







Chronic, internally-driven, negative experiences—bad habits—may include a gambling 
habit, smoking, pessimism, distrust, overeating, overspending, continually returning to an abusive 
partner, or staying in a cult.  
Bad luck 
Acute, externally-imposed, negative experiences—bad luck—may include natural 
disasters, car accidents, stroke, fire, and sudden deaths in the family. The large majority of 
experiences mentioned by the Social Readjustment Rating Scale (Holmes & Rahe, 1967) and the 
Life Experiences Survey (Sarason, Johnson, & Siegel, 1978) consists of such bad luck 
experiences. Studying them is clearly worthwhile, but they represent only a narrow slice of life. 
Bad times 
Chronic, externally-imposed, negative experiences—bad times—may include being 
raised by a negative parent, growing up receiving person praise rather than process praise 
(Kamins & Dweck, 1999); coping with chronic pain, being unemployed, having an unkind boss, 
involuntarily fighting in a war, or living in a society prejudiced against your gender or race.   
Good choices 
Acute, internally-driven, positive experiences—good choices—may include falling in love, 
identifying your mission in life, taking a backpacking trip across Europe, or converting to a 
religion.   
Good habits 
Chronic, internally-driven, positive experiences—good habits—may include staying 
physically active, mastering a skill, engaging in some life-giving activity like ballroom dancing or 
playing in the local philharmonic, chronically believing the best about others, being an avid 
reader, gardening, spending time outdoors, being in a committed relationship, being an avid 
traveler, taking care of a dog, volunteering for charity, or raising children.  
Good luck 






fortune, winning the lottery, getting adopted, being recruited for a job, being granted a pardon, or 
receiving a voucher to go to a better school.  
Good times 
Chronic, externally-imposed, positive experiences—good times—may include living in a 
peaceful society, being raised by a highly supportive parent, receiving a four-year liberal arts 
education, enjoying sustained access to medical care, or being mentored by a teacher.  
Figure 2 
The Cube Framework Uses Three Dimensions to Define Eight Experience Types  
 
Suggestions for Applying the Cube Framework 
Instead of listing out all human experiences, the Cube Framework provides a method that 






in two ways. First, the researcher can ask themselves eight questions about each experience 
type. For example, What good choices might influence or be influenced by my construct? Yet 
examining experiences by only type risks the Cube Framework becoming a filter such that only 
experiences that fit neatly within each type are considered. Addiction, depression, and obesity, for 
example, are clearly chronic and negative (and important to study) but less clearly categorized 
along the internal-external dimension, and thus may not emerge from eight questions about the 
eight types. Therefore, second, I suggest that psychologists also theorize by dimension, one 
dimension at a time. For example, when considering the acute-chronic dimension I might ask 
myself: What experiences that relate my construct might happen in a moment...in an hour…in a 
day…in a week, in a month…in a year…in a decade…or last a lifetime? Using both by-type and 
by-dimension approaches ensures that a diversity of experiences are considered.  
The Cube Framework allows flexibility because it is able to incorporate any additional 
fourth dimension the researcher might deem important. For example, there is arguably at least 
one other psychologically-important dimension on which all experiences vary that the Cube 
Framework does not incorporate: the age at which an experience occurs in the life of the person. 
The Cube Framework does not include this dimension because I found adding it led to the 
identification of relatively few novel hypotheses, lowered the utility of the framework by 
complicating it, and, most importantly, age is a characteristic of the person rather than the 
experience. However, if a researcher wishes to ensure diversity along this or any other fourth 
dimension, researchers can consider not one cube but two cubes, with each cube labeled 
according to the fourth dimension, such as Childhood Experiences and Adulthood Experiences. 
Then the researcher can consider childhood bad times separately from adulthood bad times, 
childhood good choices separately from adulthood good choices, and so forth.  
Applying the Cube Framework to Primals Research 
With the big exception of research over the last two decades in positive psychology, 
psychologists have historically focused on acute, externally-imposed, negative (i.e., bad luck) 






positive. Thus, when considering which experiences might influence primals, positive and chronic 
experiences (good times and good habits), such as having a highly-supportive parent or teacher, 
might be worth further examination. Positive acute experiences, such as powerful moments of 
transcendence, are also promising.  
Furthermore, if retrospective theories are typically inaccurate—if exposure to X quality 
typically has no impact on ways of thinking about the world generally—then perhaps exposure to 
alternative ways of thinking about X quality is what matters. This exposure might occasionally be 
self-driven by the philosophically adventurous but more typically result from personal social 
interactions with mentors, friends, colleagues, therapists, parents, or others who see the world 
differently. Exposure may also occur through storytelling via, for example, movies and novels. For 
example, a premise of the 2003 and 1999 hit films Love Actually and American Beauty is that 
love and beauty are everywhere, even in the midst of pain and suffering—even perversion. Be it 
via real-life encounters or fictional stories, encounters with alternative lenses on reality may 
sometimes result in one coming to prefer them. Informal social pressures may also be at work. 
For example, one primals research study awaiting duplication indicates that students are more 
likely than the general public to see the world as dangerous. Is this because the student context 
is a particularly dangerous one—the retrospective explanation? Likely not. Instead, perhaps the 
task itself or particular subcultures implicitly encourage—teach—this primal through a variety of 
formal and informal incentives and social mechanisms. If exposure to different lenses on reality 
impacts which lenses individuals choose for themselves, perhaps researchers will find that one 
experience that often impacts primal world beliefs is the simple act of taking the Primals 
Inventory, learning what primals one holds, and discovering one has options.  
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter I have asked the typical question a researcher asks after introducing a 
construct: Which experiences influence (or are influenced by) my construct? In the case of 
primals, I discussed two broad possibilities. The first holds that primals generally reflect our 






primals are used to interpret experiences while being themselves marginally influenced by them 
(interpretive theories). This chapter then specified twelve empirical tests to shed light on which 
approach is typically more accurate, which I hypothesize will most often be interpretive theories 
despite having less intuitive appeal and running counter to some existing theory. If future 
empirical research confirms this, researchers will have to look elsewhere to determine which 
experiences might impact primals. To facilitate that search, I have provided the Cube Framework 
as a tool for methodically considering a range of human experiences and generating hypotheses. 
My own use of it suggests that a promising place to look will be chronic and positive experiences, 
such as having a supportive and esteemed parent or mentor who implicitly or explicitly 
encourages certain primals, as well as acute and positive experiences, such as transcendent 
experiences.  
In closing, however, I confess some pessimism. It may be that few naturally-occurring life 
experiences reliably influence primals. Perhaps primals typically emerge early in life for 
idiosyncratic reasons in a process non-deterministically yet strongly impacted by genetics. 
Primals could then perpetuate themselves through mechanisms associated with schemas. This 
would not mean, however, that primals cannot be changed by experiences, just that they 
generally are not. Researchers already know that beliefs very similar to primals can be reliably 
altered through Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (e.g., Beck, 2005). Thus, even if experiences that 
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CHAPTER 3 - THE VALUE OF SEEING THE WORLD AS A BAD PLACE: A CROSS-
SECTIONAL SEARCH FOR UNICORNS 
 
Abstract 
Preliminary studies suggest that negative primal world beliefs, which are basic beliefs about the 
world’s typical character such as the world is dangerous and the world is barren, are strongly 
correlated with lower wellbeing. Theory suggests that some covariance is likely explained by 
primals shaping wellbeing. Thus, a critical next step is manipulating primals to test causality. 
Future interventions may fail to successfully alter primals, however, without addressing certain 
meta-beliefs—beliefs about beliefs—that likely bolster negative primals. This chapter examines 
prospective meta-beliefs, which are assumptions that a negative primal offers a means for 
achieving future goals, such as seeing the world as dangerous keeps people safe. Study 1 
(N=180) establishes prevalence for such prospective meta-beliefs by showing that many parents 
aim to teach negative primals to their children. I then search within six samples representing 48 
occupation groups (Study 2, N=4,535) for contexts where, on average, such meta-beliefs hold 
true, at least concerning job success, job satisfaction, negative emotions, depression, suicide, 
physical health, life satisfaction, and psychological flourishing. This search finds six instances in 
which a negative primal correlated with positive outcomes—each involving small sub-samples 
and modest effect sizes—and 1,854 instances in which negative primals correlated with negative 
outcomes—many in sizeable samples with large effect sizes. This pattern suggests that many 
prospective meta-beliefs are false, which could be incorporated into interventions designed to 
undermine these prospective meta-beliefs and the negative primals they presumably support. 
This chapter also helps establish the direction and size of correlational relationships between 
primals and important clinical and wellbeing outcomes, which is useful for theory-building and 







I always think everything could be a trap—which is why I’m still alive.  
—Prince Humperdink, The Princess Bride, 1987 
 
Introduction 
 Clifton and colleagues (2019) recently discovered that humans disagree about the 
world’s most basic qualities along many more dimensions than previously realized—26 in total, 
including the belief that the world is beautiful, dangerous, just, interconnected, and even funny. 
Calling these beliefs primals or primal world beliefs, they found that most primals group into three 
main beliefs—informally called the ‘big three’—the beliefs that the world is Safe (vs. dangerous), 
Enticing (vs. dull), and Alive (vs. mechanistic), which in turn group into the general factor, the 
overall belief that the world is a Good place. Each belief is statistically distinct, stable across time, 
and largely orthogonal to demographic variables, as well as highly correlated to many personality 
and wellbeing variables.  
 However, the claim about wellbeing correlates comes with an asterisk. Prior to Clifton 
and colleagues’ (2019) work, only one primal—Just, often called BJW or Belief in a Just World—
had received broad research attention, which established that Just has many wellbeing-related 
correlates (Bartholomaeus & Strelan, 2019). Those high in belief in a just world tend to be more 
successful and productive, presumably because of the expectation that hard work will be 
rewarded, with high Just scores being tied to everything from better grades to higher GDP 
(Dalbert & Stoeber, 2005; Furnham, 1993). Those high in belief in a just world also enjoy much 
higher wellbeing. For example, Dzuka and Dalbert (2006) found that senior citizens of East 
Slovakia enjoyed much higher life satisfaction when they also saw the world as just (r(122)=.45, 
p< .001) and this relationship is even stronger in the general adult population (e.g., r(422)=.57, 
r(80)=.67, r(80)=.54, p<.01; Otto, Glaser, & Dalbert, 2009).  
 However, prior to Clifton and colleagues (2019) work, most primals remained unidentified 
and, so far, only two studies have used the 99-item Primals Inventory—currently the only 






colleagues’ (2019) foundational paper validating the Primals Inventory, one study of 524 
mTurkers completed a preliminary 94-item version to examine correlations between primals and 
health, negative emotion, depression, life satisfaction, and psychological flourishing, with most 
results undiscussed and buried in a 507-page supplement. In the other study (N=404), Stahlmann 
and colleagues’ (2020) examined primals relationship to life satisfaction in the course of validating 
a German 66-item version of the Primals Inventory. Both studies unearthed moderate to large 
relationships between primals and wellbeing that are worth replicating and warrant discussion.  
 Moreover, researchers note that, consistent with current depression theory, schema 
theory, personality theory and the success of established interventions such as Cognitive 
Behavioral Therapy, considerable covariation between primals and wellbeing is likely to be 
explained by primals influencing wellbeing correlates (Clifton et al., 2019; Stahlmann et al., 2020; 
Beck, 1964, 2005; Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Dweck, 2008, 2017; Butler et al., 2006; Hofmann et al., 
2012). Considerable covariance, however, might also be explained by the primal being an 
indicator of the outcome variable, not a cause. For example, seeing the world as a barren place 
could lead to depression or be a symptom of depression. To resolve this issue, experimentation is 
necessary, which will require interventions capable of altering primal world beliefs—perhaps a tall 
order, given how fundamental primals appear to be.  
 One step towards designing effective interventions may be addressing two types of meta-
beliefs (i.e., beliefs about beliefs) that bolster negative primals. Retrospective meta-beliefs 
suppose that one has little choice but to hold a primal because certain experiences are thought to 
irrevocably shape the individual’s identity (i.e., a causality claim) and most individuals who have 
the experience share a similar identity (i.e., a probability claim). For example, a primals study 
subject has commented, “I know many of my opinions [primals] are biased due to growing up and 
currently being very poor. It has colored my perception of the world and I know of no way to 
change that.” In this view, it is presumed that others with similar backgrounds often share the 






 While retrospective meta-beliefs concern the past, prospective meta-beliefs concern 
future utility. During seven years studying primals, I have encountered many prospective meta-
beliefs that connect negative primals to positive outcomes. Six of the perhaps more common are 
listed in Table 2. They associate negative primals with being happier, healthier, more successful, 
more knowledgeable, more respected, and more helpful to society. Like retrospective meta-
beliefs, prospective meta-beliefs often involve causal and probabilistic components (e.g., “my 
negative primals help me do better at my job” versus “people with more negative primals are 
usually better in my job”). Since these outcomes are measurable, both components are testable, 
and the probabilistic components readily testable via correlational research.  
Table 2 
Six Prospective Meta-Beliefs Purporting the Utility of Negative Primals 
Relevant outcome Anecdotal sources Paraphrased meta-belief 
Job success Police officer, lawyer, 
businessperson 
While positive primals might make me feel better, 
it’s a luxury I can’t afford because people usually 
don’t succeed in my job without a darker view of 
things. 
Negative emotions  
(job and life satisfaction, 
and suicidal behavior) 
Police officer, parent, car 
mechanic, student 
More often than not, seeing the world as this 
amazing place leads to disappointment with what 
you get, both at work and home, which can make 
you depressed, lose hope, and even get suicidal—
best keep expectations low. 
Physical health  Police officer, healthcare 
worker, soldier, Prince 
Humperdink (quoted above) 
Seeing the world as safe where everyone sings 
‘Kumbaya’ leaves people vulnerable to predation, 
physical threat, germs, illness, and even death—
you gotta stay vigilant. 
Perception accuracy Many individuals holding 
negative primals 
Indulging a fantasy rarely helps anyone to achieve 
their goals, whatever the goal might be, and the 
belief that the world is this wonderful place is a 
fantasy. 
Reputation costs Intellectual, activist, 
politician, social worker, 
literary critic 
When people see the world as positive, they’re 
judged as naïve, insensitive to the struggles of 
those less fortunate, and a poor example to others. 
Group goals Environmentalist, religious 
missionary, senator, social 
worker 
The world has lots of terrible problems, from the 
environment to social justice. People who think the 
world is already good-to-go don’t work as hard to 
make things better—you can’t solve a problem 
without recognizing it. 
 
 After checking if, beyond anecdotal evidence, such meta-beliefs are in fact common 
(Study 1), this chapter scours six samples representing 48 occupation groups (Study 2; N=4,535) 






outcomes, thereby testing the probabilistic components of several of these prospective meta-
beliefs. The eight outcomes touch on the first three prospective meta-beliefs in Table 2 and are 
as follows: job success, job satisfaction, negative emotion, depression, suicide, physical health, 
life satisfaction, and overall psychological flourishing. In conducting this research, Study 2 also 
contributes to the literature by more firmly establishing the size and direction of correlational 
relationships between primals and wellbeing-related variables.   
Study 1: Does Anyone Actually Associate Negative Primals With Positive Outcomes?  
Is it really true that a non-trivial portion of the population believes that negative primals 
are more helpful than positive primals? To explore this, asking adults about the general utility of 
their own primals was not ideal to due a concern that responses might be confounded by 
retrospective meta-beliefs. Furthermore, disadvantaged minorities may be more likely to see 
value in negative primals because the world is often more against them compared to other 
groups. Therefore, on the assumption that parents want what is best for their children’s future, I 
asked New York City minority parents to complete an adapted version of the Primals Inventory 
designed to measure which primals they wished to teach their children. I pre-registered 
hypotheses on the Open Science Framework before analyses were conducted. 
Sample 
Minority parents living in inner city New York neighborhoods were recruited via a popular 
minority youth advancement program in which their children had been enrolled. Of 185 subjects 
(Mage=47 years, SDage=8), 84 described themselves as black, 52 as Hispanic, 17 as white, and 
the rest as mixed or other. Most were mothers (79%), Democrats (67%), and some form of 
Christian (64%). Median annual family income was $80,000.  
Measure 
 Described above, Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) Primals Inventory (PI-99) is currently the 
most valid measure of primal world beliefs (Clifton, in press-b). However, to measure prospective 






measure opinions about which primals’ offer the most utility for their children. Thus, PI-99 scale 
instructions were edited as follows:  
Below are very general statements about the world Parents have the privilege and 
responsibility of preparing their children to navigate the real world—not the world we wish 
we lived in, but the actual world as it is now. Each statement listed below begins with the 
phrase "I help my kids when I teach them that..." Please indicate the extent to which you 
agree with each phrase. Please share your sense of agreement or disagreement. When 
in doubt, go with what initially feels true of the real world. There are no wrong answers. 
There’s no need to overthink.  
The stem “I help my kid(s) when I teach them...” then appeared in large bold font every five items, 
with items minimally edited to be grammatically correct. In nearly all cases, this merely involved 
the insertion of “…that” before items. For example, “...that, oOn the whole, the  world is a safe 
place.” For the sake of brevity, only select subscales were included. These involved (a) negative 
primals hypothesized as most likely to be worth teaching children; (b) subscales representative of 
other groups of subscales; and (c) a few other subscales that may be interesting for sample-
specific reasons. Thus, I administered 49 items (19 reverse-scored) that allowed me to compute 
scores on twelve meta-beliefs concerning the belief that the world is Safe (29 items), Pleasurable 
(5 items), Regenerative (4 items), Progressing (4 items), Harmless (5 items), Cooperative (4 
items), Stable (4 items), and Just (5 items), Abundant (4 items), Funny (4 items), Hierarchical (5 
items), and Improvable (5 items).  
Analysis 
 Because this adaptation of the Primals Inventory was novel, I conducted a reliability 
analysis of each subscale before hypotheses were examined, removing items whose inclusion 
lowered internal reliability more than α=.01. This resulted in removing one item each from 
Cooperative, Stable, Just, Abundant, Funny, Hierarchical, and Improvable. Reliability for 
Regenerative was considered too low (α=.50) to justify further examination and was jettisoned. I 






having a score <2.5 was considered as believing in the utility of a negative primal and having a 
score <4 was considered as believing in the utility of avoiding a distinctly positive primal. My pre-
registered hypothesis was that, for Safe and its seven associated tertiary primals, the portion of 
the population with scores <2.5 would not be insubstantial (defined as <9.45%) but either 
meaningful (between 9.45% and 19.45%), substantial (between 19.45% and 29.45%), major 
(between 29.45% and 50%), or a majority (>50%).  
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Eleven Meta-Beliefs Among 185 New York City Minority Parents 
Belief in the helpfulness of seeing 
the world as… 





Safe (vs. dangerous) 3.10 .62 .05 3.07 14% (meaningful) 92% .27 .89 
   Pleasurable (vs. miserable) 3.57 .75 .06 3.60 7% (insubstantial) 64% .56 .69 
   Progressing (vs. declining) 2.99 .91 .07 3.00 21% (substantial) 85% .29 .73 
   Harmless (vs. threatening) 2.44 .87 .06 2.40 53% (majority) 94% -.62 .69 
   Cooperative (vs. competitive) 3.11 1.21 .09 3.33 32% (major) 65% -.68 .81 
   Stable (vs. fragile) 2.66 1.10 .08 2.67 41% (major) 83% -.8 .76 
   Just (vs. unjust) 3.11 .89 .07 3.25 19% (meaningful) 79% .13 .64 
Abundant (vs. barren) 3.64 .89 .07 3.67 11% (meaningful) 50% .15 .73 
Funny (vs. not funny) 2.90 1.14 .08 3.00 36% (major) 77% -.49 .83 
Hierarchical (vs. nonhierarchical) 2.46 1.12 .08 2.50 49% (major) 88% -.59 .76 
Improvable (vs. too hard to improve) 3.97 .72 .05 4.00 2% (insubstantial) 39% 1.55 .70 




Figure 3  









 Many parents believed that instilling negative primals in their children is the best way to 
prepare their children to navigate life, though to different extents depending on the primal (see 
Table 3 and Figure 3). Based on pre-registered thresholds, an insubstantial proportion of parents 
thought that seeing the world as too hard to improve (2%) or miserable (7%) would most benefit 
their children. However, meaningful, substantial, major, and a majority proportions of parents, 
ranging from 11% to 53%, expressed the belief that their children would most benefit by being 






and full of physical threats. Furthermore, in all but one instance, a large majority of parents 
thought that seeing the world as distinctly positive was not ideal, even among only those who saw 
more value in the positive primal. For example, 92% of parents thought that seeing the world as 
safe to very safe (i.e., scores of 4-5 on a 0-5 scale) would be best for their children and 85% held 
that a strong belief that the world is getting better should be avoided.  
Discussion 
 Meta-beliefs purporting the utility of negative primals cannot be a major driver of negative 
primals unless such meta-beliefs are to some degree prevalent in the population. Based on the 
assumption that parents strongly want their kids to achieve success and wellbeing, Study 1 
sought to examine prevalence of theoretically promising primals in a theoretically promising 
population. This was done by asking 180 New York City ethnic-minority parents what primal world 
beliefs they most want to instill in their children. Strongly left-skewed score distributions would 
have suggested near consensus that more positive primal world beliefs offer more utility, and vice 
versa for right-skewed distributions. What was found, however, was normal distributions, 
suggesting disagreement among subjects, with two points worth highlighting.  
First, as hypothesized, a substantial number of parents reported a belief that the best 
way to prepare children to navigate life was to teach them that the world is in various ways a bad 
place: including that that the world is full of physical threats; does not reward or punish fairly; is 
rarely that funny; is full of fragile situations that could easily fall apart; is cut-throat; and is getting 
worse. Second, putting aside parents who see negative primals as most helpful and focusing only 
on parents in the right side of the distributions, fewer parents considered distinctly positive 
primals as offering more utility than slightly positive primals. If this result is minimally 
generalizable, this indicates a common conception that seeing the world as slightly good supports 
positive outcomes, but seeing the world as distinctively good is too good because very positive 
beliefs are actually associated with less desirable outcomes. Could that be true? This question is 






Study 2: Establishing Primals’ Success and Wellbeing Correlates   
 Study 1 results suggest that a portion of the population believe (a) that negative primals 
correspond with achieving success and wellbeing and (b) that distinctly positive primals 
correspond with less success and wellbeing than slightly positive primals. Study 2 examines data 
from six samples and occupational contexts to determine the plausibility of these two meta-beliefs 
when it comes to eight outcomes: job success, job satisfaction, physical health, negative 
emotions, depression, attempted suicide, life satisfaction, and psychological flourishing. A 
secondary aim was to build on the initial findings of Clifton and colleagues (2019) and Stallman 
and colleagues (2020) to better establish where primals fit within the nomological net. I pre-
registered the study on the Open Science Framework before two of the six samples were 
collected and all analyses conducted. See Table 9 and 10 in appendix for descriptive statistics.  
Samples 
Sample 1: AH.Org 
AuthenticHappiness.Org is a wellbeing-focused website where the general public can 
voluntarily participate in self-report survey research and receive scores on completed measures. 
From May 20th, 2019 to March 23rd, 2020, a primals measure was taken 5,316 times with 3,925 
unique user-IDs involving no missing responses on relevant subscales. Of these, 59% were male, 
66% were younger than 45, and 63% were college graduates. Though respondents were in 92 
countries, 68% were in the USA; 5% in Australia; 4% each in the U.K., India, and Canada; 2% in 
South Africa; 1% in the Philippines; and <1% in each remaining country. Subjects identified 
themselves with one of 65 possible occupations which were aggregated into 10 occupation 
groups. Of these 3,925 subjects, 1,072 completed the life satisfaction measure, doing so on 
average 5.2 months from when they completed the primals measure; 1,118 completed measures 
of physical health, negative emotion, and psychological flourishing, doing so on average 1.6 
months from when they completed the primals measure; and 1,291 completed the depression 






Subsample demographic composition was not notably different than the parent sample. No 
subjects provided information on job success, job satisfaction, or attempted suicide.  
Sample 2: YM.Org 
YourMorals.Org is another website where the general public can voluntarily participate in 
self-report research surveys and receive scores on the measures they complete. But instead of 
wellbeing research, most studies concern political topics. From November, 2018 to August, 2019, 
2,331 people completed the primals measure with 1,727 having no missing responses.  Of these 
subjects (Mage=34 years, SDage=14), 69% were male and 72% reported being in or completing 
college. The respondents were spread across 56 countries, with 74% were in the United States; 
7% in Canada; 5% in the U.K.; 4% in Australia; 1% in New Zealand; and <1% in each remaining 
country. Subjects identified themselves with one of 59 possible occupations which were 
aggregated into 18 occupation groups. Of 1,843 subjects, 1,639 completed a measure of socio-
economic status which could be used as a proxy for professional success and 328 completed the 
satisfaction with life measure. A small portion of subjects did not complete measures 
concurrently. Subsample demographic composition was not notably different than parent sample. 
No subjects in this sample completed measures of job satisfaction, physical health, negative 
emotions, depression, attempted suicide, or psychological flourishing.  
Sample 3: mTurk 
Of 882 American mTurkers who completed a lengthy survey, 192 were excluded for 
failing two or more of five validation items, leaving 692 (Mage=36 years, SDage=11). Of these, 56% 
were male, 49% married, 61% were college graduates, 72% work full-time, and 68% were white. 
This sample completed a personal income question which was used as a proxy for job success 
among those with full-time jobs, as well as measures of physical health, negative emotion, 
depression, life satisfaction, and psychological flourishing. No subjects completed measures of 
job satisfaction or attempted suicide.  






American immigrants from India (47 subjects), West Africa (45 subjects), and South 
Korea (53 subjects) were recruited January, 2018 to April, 2019 to take the survey for $5 Amazon 
gift cards. Subjects were recruited via (a) flyers around the University of Pennsylvania campus; 
(b) social media networks of three undergraduate student researchers who were themselves 2nd 
generation immigrants; and (c) student groups (e.g., Penn’s African Student Association) in the 
greater Philadelphia area. Initial analysis showed primals subscales to be unusually unreliable 
(compared to reliability coefficients reported by Clifton et al., 2019) presumably because of 
reported English disfluency or the need for cultural adaptation of the measurement instrument. 
Therefore, prior to any further analysis of results, I examined whether one or more of the three 
subgroups were driving the unreliability, determined it was the Indian group which, when 
removed, left 98 subjects, and subscale reliability rose to typical levels. Of remaining subjects, all 
were non-white, 71% were 2nd generation (primarily college age) and 72% were female. This 
sample completed measures of negative emotion, satisfaction with life, and psychological 
flourishing. No subjects provided information on job success, job satisfaction, depression, or 
attempted suicide.  
Sample 5: Philly Pros 
A sample of Philadelphia-area professionals including lawyers (private practice), car 
salespersons, and police officers were recruited from January 2018 to March 2019. Because car 
salespersons proved especially difficult to recruit, they were offered a 5$ Amazon gift card for 
their participation. Of 120 completed surveys across occupational groups, 10 were excluded for 
failing more than one attention check, leaving 110 (Mage=47 years, SDage=13) who were 67% 
married, 73% male, and 88% white. Subjects provided detailed information on job success and 
also completed measures of job satisfaction, physical health, negative emotion, attempted 
suicide, satisfaction with life, and psychological flourishing, though not a depression inventory.  
Sample 6: Undergrads 
A sample of 497 undergraduate college students at the University of Pennsylvania 






failing more than one attention check, leaving 473 (Mage=20 years, SDage=1). Of these students, 
27% were freshmen, 33% were sophomores, 23% were juniors, 17% seniors, 74% were female, 
and 48% were white. They provided information on all eight outcomes.  
Seventeen Valenced Primals 
The Primals Inventory (PI-99) consists of 99 items, 39 of which are reverse-scored. The 
PI-99 resulted from Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) broad-based effort to empirically derive all 
major primals humans hold. For example, one of ten projects aiming to capture candidate primals 
involved the analysis of over 80,000 tweets beginning with the phrases “the world is,” “the 
universe is,” and “life is.” Another project involved the analysis of over 1,700 instances of world 
description gleaned primarily from sources that experts considered to be the 385 historically most 
influential sacred texts, philosophical treatises, novels, political speeches, and films. These 
projects led to the identification of 234 items subjected to three rounds of factor analysis (N = 
930, N = 524, N = 529) which identified the 26 temporally-stable, normally-distributed, 
meaningful, reliable dimensions in the form of one primary primal (i.e., the belief the world is 
Good), three secondary primals (the beliefs that the world is Safe, Enticing, and Alive), and 22 
tertiary primals. Pertinent to Study 2, however, were only those primals with clear valence. 
Changing, for example, cannot be considered negative or positive for conceptual and empirical 
reasons. Based primarily on empirical relationships with Good, I prioritized the 17 primals 
highlighted in Figure 4. These include Good; Safe and its seven associated tertiary primals; and 









Seventeen Primals With the Clearest Valence  
 
 
Note. Figure adapted from Clifton and Kim (2020) 
 
Study 2a: Job Success 
Measures  
YourMorals.Org subjects (Sample 2; n=1,639) reported working in 27 professional 
contexts (18 sub-samples and 9 sub-sub-samples where n≥30), as follows: 
• Educators, including teachers and administrators at all levels (n=136); sub-sub-
sample of pre-college teachers (n=62) and college professors (n=32) 
• Sales and communications (n=46) 
• Business, including entrepreneurs, owners, executives, managers, and consultants 
(n=128); sub-sub-sample of mangers/executives (n=46) and small business 
owners/entrepreneurs (n=34) 
• Clerical, including secretaries and administrative office workers (n=47) 
• Creative arts, such as design, fashion, filmmaker, musician, photographer (n=69); 
sub-sub-sample not including designers or fashion (n=54).  
• Customer service (n=73); sub-sub-sample of hospitality workers (n=38) and non-food 






• Engineer, not including information technology (n=57) 
• Food service (n=46) 
• Government (n=35) 
• Healthcare, including doctors, nurses, dentists, etc. (n=70) 
• Lawyers (n=33) 
• Manual labor, such as construction (n=83) 
• Military/public safety (n=35) 
• Researcher/analyst (n=74) 
• Student (n=227) 
• Technology (n=166); sub-sub-samples of programmers (n=116) and other (n=50) 
• Miscellaneous, including farmer, finance, insurance, and journalist (n=248) 
• Unemployed (n=66) 
 
Across these occupational contexts, success was measured using a single item with 10 response 
options asking subjects to rank themselves compared to others in their country in regard to 
income, education, and respect. Job success among Sample 3: mTurk subjects who were full-
time workers making $10,000 or more annually (N=476) was measured by personal income, 
another proxy for success. Sample 5: Philadelphia Professionals and Sample 6: Undergraduates 
offered more precision due to several job-specific success indicators administered on the 
recommendation of members of each occupation:  
• Car salesperson success was determined by cars sold per month, monthly closing 
ratio, monthly commission, dealership rank, and salary 
• Private-sector lawyer success was determined solely by current salary 
• Police officer success was determined by annual community compliments, 
community complaints, special assignments, and salary  
• Student success was determined by High School and College GPA, standardized 
test scores (SAT), and quality and quantity of relationships with friends and teachers. 
 
Undergraduate relationships with friends (α=.87) and teachers (α=.87) was measured by two 
subscales from Pascarella and Terenzini’s (1980) Student Involvement Questionnaire. Example 
items include It has been difficult for me to meet and make friends with other students (reverse-
scored) and Since coming to this university I have developed a close, personal relationship with 
at least one faculty member.  
Analysis  
Across samples and within each profession where n≥30, I examined pairwise Pearson 
correlations (rs) to determine when decreases in primals scores (i.e., more negative beliefs) might 






computed Kendall’s τ b (a non-parametric test) and then converted it to Pearson’s r for cross-
sample comparison. For Sample 5: Philly Professionals, I partialed age and years spent 
practicing the profession (this data was not available for other samples), which would presumably 
control for generation-related or seniority effects. To determine whether seeing the world as 
slightly positive vs. distinctly positive was associated with greater job success, I conducted t-tests 
comparing those who on average selected the Slightly Agree response option indicating the belief 
that the world is positive (PI-99 scores rounded to 3) to those who on average selected Agree or 
Strongly Agree (PI-99 scores rounded to 4 or 5), doing so when n≥30  in both groups. Due to low 
power relatively fewer extreme scores, subjects averaging 4 were not compared to those 
averaging 5 and t-tests were not conducted within occupationally-defined subgroups.  
Despite conducting several hundred analyses, correcting for multiple comparisons in the 
course of this sort of research was deemed inappropriate for several reasons most of which are 
summarized by Rubin (2017), O’Keefe (2003), and Rothmann (1990). First, multiple comparisons 
never influences statistics; Rubin (2017) notes a gambler might buy 100 lottery tickets to increase 
his or her chances of winning, but this does not alter the promise (i.e., p-values) of individual 
tickets. Second, my pre-registered hypotheses were specific to the overall pattern of correlates 
associated with a category—in this case 17 valenced primals—which entails examining many 
statistics. As long as conclusions are confined to the pattern and not a particular result, the 
multiple comparison problem is irrelevant because the analysis allows for a portion of false 
positives. (To aid researchers interested in particular relationships, I report significance 
thresholds of p<.0001.) Third, most multiple-comparison correction techniques are not designed 
for this sort of analysis approach involving several thousand analyses, potentially resulting in a 
large increase in false negatives (e.g., Rothman, 1990). Fourth, multiple comparison problems 
concern p-values and not effect sizes and I rely primarily on effect-sizes to interpret relationships. 
Fifth, with many large effect sizes, p values were often too small to play a meaningful role in 
comparing relationships. Sixth and seventh, whereas multiple comparison is most problematic 






I examine all outcomes in multiple samples and report results of all analyses conducted. This 
approach precludes cherry picking. Still, multiple tests of the same hypothesis does inflate alpha 
levels (Rubin, 2017) and, though I analyze 17 statistically distinguishable primals, much of the 
variance is explained by one primal (Good). Therefore, I encourage some caution in the 
interpretation of these results.   
Results 
Those with more positive primals enjoyed more job success, but not much more and not 
always. Of the 68 relationships displayed in Table 4 (4 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,639), 36 
were significant (p<.05). In all 36, negative primals were associated with less job success. Effect 
sizes were small (with none among Sample 5: Philly Professionals). This pattern of results held 
nearly without exception when looking across a variety of success indicators and 31 different 
occupations and occupational groups, as detailed below. Furthermore, putting aside those who 
see the world negatively, of 55 t-tests comparing job success levels among those who hold 
slightly positive versus distinctly positive primals where both groups ≥30, 19 were significant 
(p<.05). In all 19 cases, those with slightly positive primals reported less job success. Primals 
notably associated with job success included Progressing, Pleasurable, Safe, and Good—Just 
was predictive but not especially. Primals least related to job success include Worth Exploring, 








Job Success’ Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r 








N 1639 476 98 426 
Good .22** .10* .09 .24** 
  Safe .26** .17* .08 .23** 
    Pleasurable .20** .16* .11 .21** 
    Regenerative .15** .09 .05 .16* 
    Progressing .22** .17* .11 .20** 
    Harmless .24** .20** .10 .12* 
    Cooperative .16** .09 -.02 .22** 
    Stable .15** .09 -.03 .12* 
    Just .16** .12* .15 .14* 
  Enticing .12** .02 .11 .18* 
    Interesting .13** .01 .07 .18* 
    Beautiful .09* -.01 -.02 .16* 
    Abundant .17** .06 .18 .18* 
    Worth Exploring .02 .01 .04 .13* 
    Meaningful .09* .05 .09 .07 
    Improvable .07* .02 .13 .12* 
    Funny .03 .09 .05 .06 
*p<.05 **p<.0001 Note. Negative relationships are bolded. k Derived from Kendall’s τ b and then converted to 
a Pearson’s r. 
 
Occupation-Specific Success Results in Sample 2: YM.Org. Of 459 examined 
relationships between 17 primals and success within 27 occupation categories where n≥30, 110 
relationships were significant (p<.05). In 97% of these relationships, negative primals were 
associated with less job success. Two of three exceptions were in the creative industry, driven by 
a sub-sample of filmmakers, musicians, and photographers within which success was associated 
with seeing the world as less Beautiful (r(52)=-.28, p=.043). The other exception was among 
college professors within which success was tied to seeing the world as less Worth Exploring 
(r(30)=-.36, p=.046). The only other significant relationship among professors was Funny 
(r(30)=.37, p=.037), which was positively related to success. Across relationships, Enticing and its 
tertiary primals were positively related to success 31 times, while Safe was related 65 times. 
Primals least related to success include Worth Exploring, Meaningful, and Improvable, which 
were only related one time each. Primals most related include Harmless (13 times), Safe (13 
times), Abundant (9 times), Pleasurable (8 times), Progressing (8 times), Beautiful (8 times), Just 






a small sub-group of small business owners/entrepreneurs, including the belief that the world is 
Progressing (r(32)=.55, p=.0008) and Regenerative (r(32)=.46, p=.006).  
Figure 5 
 




Occupation-Specific Success Results in Sample 5: Philly Pros. Within three small 
sub-samples of specific occupations in the Philadelphia metro area (car salespersons, lawyers, 
and police), I examined 204 relationships between 17 primals and 12 outcomes ((6 car 
salesperson outcomes x17)+(1 lawyer outcome x 17)+(5 police outcomes x17)), finding 24 
significant positive relationships and no negative relationships. Twenty-one of the significant 
positive relationships, however, were among police officers. In this very small subsample (n=26), 
several positive primals were related to the composite success measure, including Good, 
Regenerative, Enticing, Beautiful, Meaningful, Improvable, and Funny. These relationships were 






community compliments, had no relationship to being awarded special assignments, and were 
especially related to salary, particularly among Enticing and it’s tertiary primals. Figure 5 displays 
the strongest relationship found across all examinations of job success in all groups, which was 
between the belief that the world is Funny and salary (r(24)=.71, p<.0001), dropping nominally 
when controlling for age or years in law enforcement.  
Occupation-Specific Success Results in Sample 6: Undergrads. High school and 
college grade point averages, as well as SAT scores, were generally unrelated to primals (see 
Table 5). Of seven significant relationships, two were negative, and all effects were small. 
Looking at a subgroup of students for which SAT Verbal and Math scores were available, 
Cooperative’s positive relationship to combined SAT scores was more driven by its relationship to 
Verbal scores than Math scores; Safe’s and Progressing’s positive relationship to combined SAT 
scores was more driven by Math than Verbal; and Meaningful’s negative relationship was driven 
by both Math and Verbal. Meanwhile, no negative primal and all positive primals were related to 
establishing good relationships with teachers and peers while in college.  
Table 5 
Academic Success’ Relationship to 17 Primals Among Sample 6: Undergrads Using Pearson’s r 










N 468 446 470 463 469 
Good .06 .01 .01 .38** .25** 
  Safe .07 .12* .05 .31** .19** 
    Pleasurable .09 .05 .03 .30** .18* 
    Regenerative .01 .05 .02 .24** .13* 
    Progressing .01 .18* .01 .24** .12* 
    Harmless .07 .03 -.00 .13* .12* 
    Cooperative .04 .15* .14* .20** .15* 
    Stable .03 .06 -.06 .22** .11* 
    Just .03 -.01 -.01 .20** .18** 
  Enticing .04 -.08 -.01 .36** .22** 
    Interesting .01 -.01 .03 .34** .17* 
    Beautiful .08 -.05 .04 .25** .16* 
    Abundant .04 .01 -.02 .27** .12* 
    Worth Exploring .12* -.05 .02 .18** .13* 
    Meaningful -.05 -.18* -.03 .30** .17* 
    Improvable .05 -.04 -.07 .24** .20** 
    Funny -.02 -.04 -.11* .21** .13* 
*p<.05 **p<.0001 Note. Negative relationships are bolded. k Derived from Kendall’s τ b and then converted to 









If success is associated with negative primals in any occupation, prime candidates may 
be occupations involving low incidence of failure but high cost of failure, such as a police officer 
and lawyers. This did not bear out. In general, primals are not strongly associated with success 
outcomes, but, when they are associated, the connection is almost always to positive primals, 
including among low-failure-incidence and high-failure-cost jobs where this result is theoretically 
least likely. It may well be that in these contexts expecting the worst might have benefits, but 
these benefits might be counteracted by the negative effects of negative beliefs, such as being 
less agreeable, more introverted, less emotionally stable, less proactive, more suspicious of 
colleagues, and less happy, all of which is thought to impact workplace success (e.g., Rode et al., 
2008; Boehm & Lyubomirsky, 2008). Also noteworthy was that in no occupation was less success 
associated with seeing the world as distinctly positive compared to slightly positive. The more 
positive, it seems, the more success, even for more objective measures of success less likely 
impacted by positivity bias (e.g., salary).  
Nevertheless, these success measures were of variable quality and, the more objective 
and higher quality the measure, the smaller the relationship with primals appears to be. Analyses 
of Sample 2 and 3 relied on proxies for success—perhaps poor proxies—and the relationship 
between primals and success among Sample 4: Undergrads was driven by relationship scores—
not more objective measures like grades and test scores. In Sample 5: Philly Professionals, 
which involved objective success metrics tailored to what success means in each profession 
(e.g., monthly cars sold for car salespersons), primals were quite unrelated to success. Though 
analysis of Sample 5’s three sub-samples did reveal some fascinating and remarkably strong 
connections, these sub-samples were too small to justify conclusions of any strength. Further 
research should examine, for example, the altogether unbelievably high relationship between 
Funny and salary among police officers (r=.71), the moderate relationship between Enticing and 
peer friendships among undergraduates (r=.36), and the moderate relationships between 






Results for Just were noteworthy for not being noteworthy. As mentioned, Just has 
received by far the most research attention, with several studies finding connections between 
Just and job success, productivity, grades, and even GDP (e.g., Furnham, 1993). The idea is 
that, similarly to why people work harder in contexts where they believe hard work will be 
rewarded, people work harder in worlds where they believe hard work will be rewarded. Though, 
unable to replicate Dalbert and Stoeber’s (2005) connection between Just and grades among 
undergraduates, Just was nevertheless often related to success at low levels. But several other 
primals, including Good, Safe, Pleasurable, and Progressing, were just as if not more related to 
success. Researchers who study success factors might consider the role other primals play 
besides the belief that the world is just.   
Study 2b: Job Satisfaction 
Measure 
I used Thompson and Phua’s (2012) psychometrically-validated four-item Brief Index of 
Job Satisfaction Measure (BIAJS) to measure job satisfaction. This scale was designed as an 
affective measure of how one feels about their job, rather than a measure of objective job 
conditions, such as renumeration and opportunities for advancement. This scale includes no 
reverse-scored items. An example item is I find real enjoyment in my job and all items refer to “my 
job”. Responses were collected on a five-point likert scale. I changed one word in the prompt for 
each sample as appropriate (e.g., Thinking specifically about your current job as a [lawyer/care 
salesperson/student/police officer], do you agree with the following?). 
Analysis 
Same as above.   
Results 
Subjects with more positive primals enjoyed more job satisfaction. Of 32 relationships 
displayed in Table 6 (17 primals x 2 samples; total N=583), 31 were significant (p<.05). In all 31, 
negative primals were associated with less job satisfaction. Several involved moderate effect 






police—were examined individually, across 51 relationships (17 primals x 3 sub-samples), there 
were 24 significant relationships (p<.05). Again, in all 24 relationships, negative primals were 
associated with less job satisfaction. Furthermore, putting aside those who see the world 
negatively, in 24 t-tests comparing job satisfaction among those who held slightly positive versus 
distinctly positive primals where both groups ≥30, 17 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 17 
cases, those with slightly positive primals reported less job success than those with distinctly 
positive primals. Primals notably associated with job satisfaction include Improvable, Enticing, 
Progressing, Pleasurable, Safe, and Good.  
Table 6 
Job Satisfaction’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r 
 
Sample 5:  
Philly Pros 
Sample 6:  
Undergrads 
N 110 473 
Good .46** .33** 
  Safe .38** .30** 
    Pleasurable .42** .27** 
    Regenerative .31* .21** 
    Progressing .37* .31** 
    Harmless .18 .19** 
    Cooperative .21* .21** 
    Stable .20* .11* 
    Just .38** .17* 
  Enticing .47** .29** 
    Interesting .37** .22** 
    Beautiful .39** .22** 
    Abundant .37** .22** 
    Worth Exploring .20* .17* 
    Meaningful .32* .17* 
    Improvable .46** .25** 
    Funny .22* .21** 
*p<.05 **p<.0001  
Discussion 
Job satisfaction has been previously tied to the belief the world is Just (e.g., Otto, Glaser, 
& Dalbart, 2009) but not other primals. In these two samples, negative primals (including Just) 
were routinely associated with slightly to moderately less job satisfaction. This connection to job 
satisfaction may partly explain why in Study 2a negative primals were hardly ever associated with 
job success. Even if in some occupational contexts negative primals contribute to job success, 






outcomes, one of which may be low job satisfaction, which is known to erode workplace 
performance (e.g., Rezvani et al., 2016). It should be noted, however, that these two samples 
represent a few hundred subjects (N=583) rather than the few thousand examined in connection 
to other outcomes. Still, because Sample 5: Philly Professionals involves three sub-samples in 
which similar effect-sizes were observed, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the observed 
pattern is somewhat common.  
Study 2c: Physical Health 
Measure 
Butler and Kern’s (2016) psychometrically-validated PERMA Profiler, which was used to 
measure general psychological flourishing (described below), includes a three-item global 
measure of physical health. Items are as follows:  
1. In general, how would you say your health is? (0 = “terrible”, 10 = “excellent) 
2. How satisfied are you with your current physical health? (0 = “not at all”, 10 = 
“completely) 




Same as above.  
Results 
Subjects with more positive primals reported better physical health. Of 68 relationships 
displayed in Table 7 (4 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,393), there were 65 significant 
relationships (p<.05). In all 65, negative primals were associated with worse health, with most 
effect sizes in the small to moderate range. This pattern of results held nearly without exception 
when looking across 19 different occupations and occupational groups, as discussed below. 
Furthermore, putting aside those who see the world negatively, in 58 t-tests comparing health 
among those who held slightly positive versus distinctly positive primals where both groups ≥30, 
43 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 43 cases, those with slightly positive primals reported 
worse health than those with distinctly positive primals. Primals most associated with job success 






correlated with better health at r=.40, p<.0001. Among those primals least related to health 
include Worth Exploring and Funny.    
Table 7 
Health’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r 






Sample 6:  
Undergrads 
N 1,118 692 110 473 
Good .25** .35** .39** .36** 
  Safe .24** .31** .36** .40** 
    Pleasurable .24** .32** .42** .36** 
    Regenerative .20** .26** .33* .35** 
    Progressing .20** .30** .26* .25** 
    Harmless .21** .24** .18 .26** 
    Cooperative .13** .14* .23* .29** 
    Stable .12** .12* .27* .26** 
    Just .18** .32** .24* .24** 
  Enticing .17** .29** .33* .23** 
    Interesting .12** .18** .22* .19** 
    Beautiful .14** .21** .20* .17* 
    Abundant .15** .28** .37* .22** 
    Worth Exploring .07* .22** .14 .14* 
    Meaningful .13** .19** .32* .19** 
    Improvable .19** .29** .36** .18** 
    Funny .08* .15** .08 .10* 
*p<.05 **p<.0001  
 
Occupation-Specific Health Results in Sample 1: AH.org. Within the 1,118 subjects 
who took both the PI-99 and PERMA Profiler, seven of ten professional groupings had n≥30: 
executives (n=49), managers (n=117), administrators and other professionals (n=360), clerks 
(n=61), skilled manual laborers (n=50), semi-skilled manual laborers (n=33), and no occupation 
(n=411). Eight of the 65 specific professions had n≥30: administrative person (n=46), 
licensed/certified professional (n=31), other manager (n=55), other professional (n=197), small 
business owner (n=30), student (n=351), teacher (n=39), and unemployed (n=35). Of 255 
examined relationships ((7 occupation groupings + 8 specific occupations) X 17 primals), there 
were 84 significant relationships (p<.05). In all cases, more negative primals were associated with 
less health. Worth Exploring and Funny were most unrelated to psychological flourishing across 
occupations. Primals especially predictive of health include Good, Safe, Pleasurable, 






Pleasurable among executives (r(47)=.43, p=.002) and clerks (r(58)=.43, p=.0002) but not skilled 
manual laborers (r(48)=.14, p=.31).  
Occupation-Specific Health Results in Sample 5: Philly Professionals. Of 51 
relationships between 17 primals and health among 3 professions (car salespersons, lawyers, 
and police), 20 were significant (p<.05). In all 20 cases, the negative primal was associated with 
worse health. Only Good and Abundant were related to health in all three groups.  
Discussion 
Seeing the world as dangerous was associated with less physical health, with small to 
moderate effect sizes. This replicates in 2,393 subjects in four samples and 19 occupation groups 
what Clifton and colleagues (2019) had found earlier in one sample of 524 subjects using a 
preliminary version of the Primals Inventory: there is a connection between primals and health. 
Positivity bias (or negativity bias), however, is likely a systematic source of error influencing 
measures of both health and primals. Yet it is not clear how this source of error could fully explain 
sometimes sizeable levels of covariance (e.g., r=.40 between health and Safe among 473 
undergraduates) or the consistent differentiation seen between particular primals and health (e.g., 
health was more highly correlated with Safe than Enticing in all 4 samples). This suggests that, in 
addition to belief valence, belief content also matters.  
The size and direction of the relationship between primals and health is not necessarily 
obvious. The avoidance of many physical dangers requires preparation and alertness, which can 
be motivated by the expectation that dangers are likely to be encountered, which may be driven 
in part by the belief that the world is generally a dangerous place (i.e., low Safe scores). It may 
also be the case that poor physical health can cause one to see the world as more dangerous, 
since declining health increases real and perceived vulnerability to increasingly less severe 
threats. Yet, recently argued (Clifton, 2020), the research thus far suggests that primals more 
often function as lenses used to interpret experiences while being themselves relatively 
uninfluenced by those experiences. If so, primals may not reflect experiences of being healthy or 






Another possibility is that negative primals contribute to poor health outcomes. Five 
causal pathways were recently proposed (Clifton & Kim, 2020). First and second, threat-relevant 
primals might influence perceptions of danger (e.g., percepts of a poisonous snake in the grass), 
resulting in (a) more frequent and acute stimulation of the cardiotoxic stress axis as well as (b) 
the gene expression pattern known as the conserved transcriptional response to adversity. These 
processes are associated with chronic and inflammation-related conditions including cancer, type 
2 diabetes, heart disease, and neurodegenerative disease. Third, primals such as Improvable 
might influence adherence to healthy behaviors, such as diet and exercise. Fourth, primals such 
as Regenerative and Just may influence treatment expectations, which are known to influence 
treatment outcomes through placebo effects and other mechanisms. For example, Just has 
already been tied to physician-adjudicated recovery from myocardial infarction (Agrawal & Dala. 
1993). Fifth, Clifton and colleagues (2019) theorized that Good, Meaningful, and Needs Me 
should contribute to the pattern of thought and action often understood to be trait optimism and 
having purpose in life, both of which have been associated with positive outcomes when facing 
several age-related chronic conditions (e.g., Alzheimer’s, stroke, respiratory disease). Indeed, 
optimists appear to live 11-15% longer than pessimists (Lee et al., 2019). Building on above 
results and these hypotheses, a good next step towards exploring the primals-health connection 
would be to compare Primals Inventory scores to more objective measures of physical health 
(e.g., blood pressure) as well as automatic physiological responses to potentially threatening but 
ambiguous stimuli.  
Study 2d: Negative Emotion 
Measure 
Butler and Kern’s (2016) PERMA Profiler also includes a three-item global measure of 
negative emotion frequency, as follows:  
1. In general, how often do you feel anxious? (0 = “never”, 10 = “always”) 
2. In general, how often do you feel angry? (0 = “never”, 10 = “always”) 







Negative emotion frequency typically correlates negatively with psychological flourishing and 
positive emotion, but remains sufficiently unrelated to warrant separate treatment.  
Analysis 
Same as above.  
Results  
Subjects with more positive primals reported more infrequent negative emotions. Of 85 
relationships displayed in Table 8 (5 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,491), there were 75 
significant relationships (p<.05). In all 75, negative primals were associated with more frequent 
negative emotions, with effect sizes ranging from small to r=-.50. This largest effect size was 
found between negative emotions and Pleasurable among 473 undergraduates. Similar results 
were observed when looking across 19 occupations and occupational groups, as discussed 
below. Furthermore, putting aside those who see the world negatively, in 65 t-tests comparing 
negative emotion frequency among those who held slightly positive versus distinctly positive 
primals where both groups ≥30, 49 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 49 cases, those with 
slightly positive primals reported more frequent negative emotions than those with distinctly 
positive primals. For example, 309 mTurkers who saw the world as slightly Safe averaged 4.9 out 
of 10 on negative emotion frequency while 78 subjects who saw the world as distinctly Safe 
averaged 2.9 on negative emotion frequency (t=9.5, p<.0001). In general, primals most 
associated with negative emotion infrequency include Pleasurable and Stable. Among those least 








Negative Emotions’ Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r 








Sample 6:  
Undergrads 
N 1,118 692 98 110 473 
Good -.44** -.46** -.35* -.42** -.42** 
  Safe -.43** -.41** -.33* -.48** -.44** 
    Pleasurable -.42** -.41** -.33* -.50** -.39** 
    Regenerative -.39** -.39** -.15 -.34* -.31** 
    Progressing -.29** -.28** -.22* -.33* -.31** 
    Harmless -.24** -.24** -.34* -.32* -.25** 
    Cooperative -.33** -.34** -.20 -.39** -.34** 
    Stable -.32** -.31** -.25* -.40** -.35** 
    Just -.19** -.17** -.23* -.23* -.24** 
  Enticing -.35** -.43** -.23* -.26* -.29** 
    Interesting -.37** -.49** -.30* -.25* -.24** 
    Beautiful -.24** -.33** -.23* -.22* -.21** 
    Abundant -.33** -.35** -.15 -.23* -.24** 
    Worth Exploring -.15** -.27** -.05  .05 -.09 
    Meaningful -.32** -.49** -.13 -.31* -.25** 
    Improvable -.31** -.31** -.12 -.27* -.28** 
    Funny -.17** -.11* -.13 -.06 -.18** 
*p<.05 **p<.0001 Note. Bold highlights the one positive relationship.  
 
Occupation-Specific Negative Emotion Results in Sample 1: AH.Org. As described 
above, within the 1,118 subjects who took both the PI-99 and PERMA Profiler, seven of ten 
professional groupings and eight of 65 specific occupations had n≥30. Of 255 examined 
relationships ((7 occupation groupings + 8 specific occupations) X 17 primals), there were 151 
significant relationships (p<.05). In all cases, more negative primals were associated with more 
frequent negative emotions. For example, negative emotions were strongly negatively correlated 
to Interesting among executives (r(47)=-.52, p=.0001), teachers (r(37)=-.57, p=.0002) and the 
unemployed (r(33)=-.60, p=.0002).  
Occupation-Specific Negative Emotion Results in Sample 5: Philly Pros. Of 51 
relationships between 17 primals and flourishing among 3 professions (car salespersons, 
lawyers, and police), 21 were significant (p<.05). In all 21, the negative primal was associated 
with more frequent experiences of negative emotion. Only Worth Exploring and Funny were 
unrelated to negative emotion in all three groups, while only Safe and Pleasurable were related in 








Subjects with more negative primals reported more frequent negative emotions, often 
much more. While it is possible that negative primals sometimes protect the individual from 
negative emotions such as disappointment, negative primals might in many other ways induce 
negative emotions, dwarfing any possible benefit. For example, negative primals like the belief 
that the world is a place where most things and situations tend to fall apart (Stable vs. fragile) 
may contribute to fear and anxiety across a variety of circumstances. Anxiety is in turn connected 
to many negative outcomes, such as poor academic performance (e.g., Liu, 2006), that may in 
turn induce further negative emotions, increase negative beliefs, and so forth in the sort of self-
perpetuating circle described by Fredrickson (e.g., 2001). Other research on negative beliefs, 
such as negative beliefs about one’s partner (e.g., Niehuis, 2011) or one’s abilities (e.g., King, 
2016) connect negative beliefs with negative emotion. Indeed, a half-century of depression 
research suggests that negative beliefs about the self, one’s future, or one’s social environment 
(Beck’s cognitive Triad, discussed below) do not protect the individual from negative emotion, but 
instead propels the individual towards both increased negative affect and clinical depression 
(Beck, 1963, 1964, 1967, 2005; Beck et al., 1979; Butler et al., 2006; Hofmann et al., 2012).  
Study 2e: Depression 
Measure 
I used Antony, Bieling, Cox, Enns, and Swinson’s (1998) 21-item Depression Anxiety 
Stress Scales (DASS-21) to measure depression. No items are reverse-scored and responses 
were collected on a 4-point likert scale (never, sometimes, often, almost always). An example 
item is I was unable to become enthusiastic about anything. However, in Sample 1: 
AuthenticHappiness.Org, the DASS-21 was not available. For that sample, I analyze Radloff’s 
(1977) 20-item CES-D, with four reverse-scored items. Example items include I felt lonely and I 
had crying spells. Response were collected on 4-point likert scale: Rarely or none of the time 
(less than 1 day), Some or a little of the time (1-2 days), Occasionally or a moderate amount of 






been feeling over the past week, with items probing various symptoms of depression. Both scales 
have been validated as measures of depression symptoms in nonclinical contexts.  
Analysis 
Same as above.  
Table 9 
Depression’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pairwise Pearson’s r 
 Sample 1:  
AH.Org 
Sample 3:  
mTurk 
Sample 6:  
Undergrads 
N 1,291 692 473 
Good -.48** -.52** -.49** 
  Safe -.45** -.40** -.45** 
    Pleasurable -.49** -.45** -.43** 
    Regenerative -.40** -.44** -.38** 
    Progressing -.32** -.26** -.29** 
    Harmless -.30** -.16** -.21** 
    Cooperative -.27** -.34** -.29** 
    Stable -.31** -.25** -.37** 
    Just -.37** -.22** -.30** 
  Enticing -.36** -.53** -.39** 
    Interesting -.28** -.54** -.33** 
    Beautiful -.23** -.40** -.24** 
    Abundant -.34** -.42** -.27** 
    Worth Exploring -.11* -.36** -.23** 
    Meaningful -.34** -.60** -.41** 
    Improvable -.36** -.37** -.28** 
    Funny -.17** -.15** -.21** 
*p<.05 **p<.0001  
Results 
Subjects with more positive primals reported fewer depression symptoms. Of 51 
relationships displayed in Table 9 (3 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,456), all were significant 
(p<.05)—all but one at p<.0001—and in all cases negative primals were associated with 
increased levels of depression, typically involving moderate to large effect sizes. This pattern held 
when looking across 19 represented occupations, as detailed below. Furthermore, putting aside 
those who see the world negatively, of 49 t-tests comparing those who hold slightly positive 
versus distinctly positive primals in which both groups had ≥30 subjects, 45 were significantly 
different (p<.05). In all 45 cases, those with slightly positive primals were more depressed than 
those with distinctly positive primals. Primals most associated with less depression include Good, 






Occupation-Specific Depression Results in Sample 1: AH.Org. Within the 1,291 
subjects who took both the PI-99 and the CES-D, seven of ten professional groupings had n≥30: 
executives (n=61), managers (n=151), administrators and other Professionals (n=405), clerks 
(n=73), skilled manual laborers (n=55), semi-skilled manual laborers (n=42), and no occupation 
(n=460). Ten of the 65 specific professions had n≥30: administrative person (n=52), 
licensed/certified professional (n=46), other manager (n=71), other professional (n=203), retired 
(n=33), small business owner (n=42), student (n=373), teacher (n=49), and unemployed (n=41). 
Of 289 examined relationships ((7 occupation groups + 10 specific occupations) X 17 primals), 
there were 221 significant relationships (p<.05). In all 221 cases, negative primals were 
associated with increased depression, though with some variation by occupation. For example, 
depression and Good were less correlated among administrators (r(50)=-.30, p=.03) and artists 
(r(29)=-.41, p=.02) than among the unemployed (r(39)=-.65, p<.0001), retirees (r(31)=-.69, 
p<.0001), and small business owners (r(40)=-.59, p<.0001).  
Discussion 
Negative primals are strongly associated with depression. Sample 1 effect sizes are also 
slightly suppressed because a substantial minority did not take the primals and depression 
measures concurrently but on average several months apart. While of course cross-sectional 
research like this cannot indicate causation, such results are highly consistent with theoretical 
paradigms that do suggest causation.  
From ancient times until the 1970s, highly negative yet non-delusional beliefs like People 
despise me or This situation is hopeless were listed among symptoms of melancholia/depression 
(Radden, 2002; Lewinsohn et al., 1976; Berger, 1977; Lewinsohn & Youngren, 1976; Coyne & 
Gotlib, 1983; Haas & Fitzgibbon, 1989). The consensus that negative beliefs were primarily 
symptoms of depression persisted even after Beck (1963, 1964, 1967; Beck et al., 1979) 
suggested that negative beliefs are more cause than symptom. Correlational research at the time 
found strong relationships between depression and negative beliefs—similar to results above—






negative beliefs are equally explained by either the depressive state causing the belief or the 
belief causing the depressive state (e.g., Lewinsohn et al., 1981; Beidel & Turner, 1986; Haas & 
Fitzgibbon, 1989; Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). What finally clarified the role of negative beliefs was the 
success of Cognitive Behavioral Therapy (CBT), which aims to increase the patient’s ability to 
persuade themselves of more positive, functional, (and often seemingly more accurate) beliefs. 
For example, two meta-meta-analyses examining 285 meta-analyses from 1994 to 2011 
concluded that, compared to alternatives (including nondirective therapy, relaxation therapy, 
supportive therapy, and a variety of pharmacological interventions and other treatments), CBT is 
typically a more effective tool capable of moderate to large treatment effects (Butler et al., 2006; 
Hofmann et al., 2012). Today, CBT is by far the most widespread form of talking therapy and has 
been adapted to treat many mental health issues besides depression largely because the impact 
of negative beliefs is not limited to depression. Most treatments approved by the Society of 
Clinical Psychology (2013) are either CBT or CBT-related. Field, Farnsworth, and Nielsen (2014) 
found that 94% of American counselors using any evidence-based treatment used CBT and 
conclude that evidence-based treatment is likely to remain practically synonymous with CBT for 
the foreseeable future.  
Beck and CBT are relevant to the interpretation of above correlations because primals 
are highly similar to—and to some degree already are—the beliefs Beck highlighted and CBT 
was designed to target. Beck organized depression-relevant beliefs into three topics called the 
Cognitive Triad: beliefs about the self (e.g., I am worthless), the self’s future (e.g., Nobody will 
ever love me), and the self’s world (e.g., My boss hates me). Though primals likely fall within the 
latter category, Beck used the term world primarily to refer to the individual’s immediate social 
environment, as the preponderance of his published examples suggest and he himself has 
confirmed (personal communication, March 1st 2019). Nevertheless, Beck’s suggestion about 
topics of belief may be less pertinent than the sort of modifiers he considered to be depression-
relevant. For example, the beliefs I am of average height; I am extroverted; or I have a soul; are 






depression-relevant beliefs involve particular modifiers. In the three prominent paragraphs 
introducing the Cognitive Triad in Cognitive Therapy of Depression (Beck et al., 1979, p. 11), the 
following modifiers are used: negative, defective, inadequate, diseased, deprived, undesirable, 
worthless, hard, frustrating, failed, uncomfortable, and difficult. Primals are described and 
measured using similar modifiers—sometimes precisely the same ones. Clifton (2018) observed 
that Beck’s modifiers are typically simple, global, current, stable, goal-relevant, and reaction-
normative—quite a specific type. Thus, if primals were found to not influence outcomes like 
depression, then primals’ special irrelevance to depression and other outcomes would itself 
require some explanation.   
Thus, for strong empirical and theoretical reasons, primals cannot be dismissed as mere 
symptoms of depression until more research is done. A key next step would be creating a CBT 
module targeting primal world beliefs and then running a randomized controlled trial to test the 
relative impact of a CBT-only condition, a primals module condition, a CBT + primals module 
condition, and a control condition. In addition to providing crucial information about causality, this 
research could shed light on how primals relate to other mental health problems where similar 
beliefs are thought to play a role and CBT is now commonly used as a treatment, such as 
generalized anxiety, stress, and suicidal thoughts.  
Study 2f: Attempted Suicide  
Measure 
I used one item from Osman and colleagues’ (2001) four-item Suicidal Behaviors 
Questionnaire-Revised scale to measure having attempted suicide. This scale has been validated 
for clinical and nonclinical samples. The item used was Have you ever thought about or 
attempted to kill yourself? Response options were collected on the following six-point scale: 
Never / It was just a brief passing thought / I have had a plan at least once to kill myself but did 
not try to do it / I have had a plan at least once to kill myself and really wanted to die / I have 
attempted to kill myself, but did not want to die / I have attempted to kill myself, and really hoped 







Since suicide data was ordinal and subjects not normally distributed, correlations were 
derived from Kendall’s τ b (a non-parametric test) and then converted to Pearson’s r. Otherwise, 
same as above.  
Table 10 
Attempted Suicide’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Kendall’s τ b Converted to Pearson’s r 
 
Sample 5:  
Philly Pros 
Sample 6:  
Undergrads 
N 110 473 
Good -.20 -.32** 
  Safe -.25* -.26** 
    Pleasurable -.20 -.34** 
    Regenerative -.17 -.17* 
    Progressing -.30* -.21* 
    Harmless -.12 -.10 
    Cooperative -.14 -.12* 
    Stable -.35* -.15* 
    Just -.10 -.24** 
  Enticing -.06 -.27** 
    Interesting -.11 -.18* 
    Beautiful .08 -.16* 
    Abundant -.11 -.23** 
    Worth Exploring .16 -.09 
    Meaningful -.15 -.37** 
    Improvable -.02 -.21* 
    Funny .07 -.06 
*p<.05 **p<.0001 Note. Positive relationships are bolded.  
Results 
Subjects with more positive primals were less likely to have seriously contemplated or 
attempted suicide. Of 32 relationships displayed in Table 10 (17 primals x 2 samples), there were 
17 significant relationships (p<.05). In all 17, negative primals were associated with increased 
suicide attempts, with five involving effect sizes r > .30. Furthermore, putting aside those who see 
the world negatively, of 24 t-tests comparing those who hold slightly positive versus distinctly 
positive primals in which both groups had ≥30 subjects, four were significantly different (p<.05). In 
all four cases, those with slightly positive primal world beliefs were less likely to have ever 
attempted suicide than those with distinctly positive primals. Primals notably associated 








Suicide kills approximately 800,000 annually, making it the 17th leading cause of death 
worldwide, with 79% of deaths occurring in low- and middle-income countries (World Health 
Organization, 2016). A predictor of suicide is being bullied and bullying others, either online or in 
person (Hinduja & Patchin, 2010)). Above results suggest that another predictor are more 
negative primal world beliefs. The strongest relationship was the belief among 473 college 
students that the world is meaningless (i.e., a place where most things, situations, and events 
likely do not matter, r=-.37, p<.0001). While most effect sizes are smaller than those in 
connection to some other outcomes examined in this chapter, they are in some ways more 
remarkable. Other outcomes concern concurrent states and feeling states (e.g., depression) 
whereas this outcome is the lifetime prevalence of a discrete, highly memorable event possibly 
having occurred many years prior. Error due to misremembering is likely low and the concern that 
the negative primal is a symptom of the outcomes is muted. Further research might examine 
whether suicide risk factors include low scores on Good, Meaningful, Safe, and Enticing.  
One prominent theory of suicide is the Interpersonal Theory of Suicide (Van Orden et al., 
2010). It suggests that certain beliefs about the self, especially the belief that one does not belong 
and is a burden on others, contributes to hopelessness, leading to suicidal desire. This desire, 
when combined with the presence of suicide capabilities (e.g., a weapon), can result in lethal or 
near-lethal action. Given this emphasis on belongingness, one exception to Study 2’s analysis 
plan was made: the author examined the relationship between attempted suicide and the belief 
that the world has an important role for the individual to play—the primal Needs Me—which is not 
one of the 17 valenced primals examined in this chapter. Indeed, Needs Me is perhaps the primal 
most correlated with attempting suicide (undergrads: r(474)=-.31, p<.0001; Philly professionals: 
r(108)=-.24, p=.048). Future suicide research, as well as research into the other seven outcomes 
examined in this study, might examine Needs Me or any of the nine other primals not examined in 







Study 2g: Life Satisfaction 
Measure 
I used Diener, Emmons, Larsen, and Griffin’s psychometrically-validated five-item 
Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS) to measure life satisfaction, which has been cited over 
25,000 times (Google Scholar, Feb. 2020). It was designed to measure a global judgement of 
one’s life according to one’s own criteria. It includes no reverse-scored items. Example items are 
In most ways my life is close to my ideal and If I could live my life over, I would change almost 
nothing. Responses were collected on a seven-point likert scale.   
Analysis 
Same as above.   
Results 
Subjects with more positive primals enjoyed more life satisfaction. Of 102 relationships 
displayed in Table 11 (6 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,773), there were 99 significant 
relationships (p<.05). In all 99, negative primals were associated with less life satisfaction, with 
many effect sizes moderate and some large. This pattern held without exception when looking 
across 21 different professions, as detailed below. Furthermore, putting aside those who see the 
world negatively, of 82 t-tests comparing those who hold slightly positive versus distinctly positive 
primals in which both groups had ≥30 subjects, 62 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 62 
cases, those with slightly positive primal world beliefs reported worse life satisfaction than those 
with distinctly positive primals. Primals notably associated with life satisfaction include Good, 
Safe, Pleasurable, and Just. Primals least related include Worth Exploring, Funny, Meaningful, 
and Improvable.  
Occupation-specific Life Satisfaction Results in Sample 1: AH.Org. Within the 1072 
subjects who took both the PI-99 and SWLS, seven of the 10 professional groupings had n≥30: 
executives (n=46), managers (n=113), administrators and other professionals (n=348), clerks 
(n=60), skilled manual laborers (n=53), semi-skilled manual laborers (n=30), and no occupation 






manager (n=54), other professional (n=190), small business owner (n=36), student (n=320), 
teacher (n=40), and unemployed (n=34). Across 238 examined relationships (14 professions X 17 
primals), there were 145 significant relationships (p<.05). In all 145, negative primals were 
associated with less life satisfaction. Worth Exploring was especially unrelated to life satisfaction 
across groups and all primals were unrelated to life-satisfaction among skilled manual laborers. 
Life satisfaction was strongly related to Enticing among the unemployed (r(34)=.67, p<.0001). 
Among clerks, Meaningful was especially predictive (r(58)=.50, p<.0001). Among executives, 
Interesting was strongly related (r(44)=.57, p<.0001).  
Occupation-Specific Life Satisfaction Results in Sample 2: YM.Org. Within the 328 
Sample 2 subjects who took both the PI-99 and the SWLS, there were three sub-samples where 
n≥30: students (n=42), tech workers (n=32), and a category of miscellaneous professionals 
including farmers, financiers, insurers, and journalists (n=84). Of 51 relationships between 
primals and life satisfaction in these sub-samples (17x3), 31 were significant (p<.05). In all cases, 
the negative primal was associated with less life satisfaction. For example, the belief that the 
world is Meaningful and Progressing was highly correlated with life satisfaction among students 
(r(40)=.56, p=.0001; r(40)=.51, p=.0006) but not tech workers (r(30)=.23, p=.19; r(30)=.24, p=.15). 
In all three groups, the more subjects saw the world as Good the higher was their life satisfaction: 
students (r(40)=.49, p=.001), tech workers(r(30)=.51, p=.002), and the miscellaneous category 
(r(82)=.62, p<.0001).  
Table 11 
Life Satisfaction’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r 










Sample 6:  
Undergrads 
N 1072 328 692 98 110 473 
Good .43** .52** .49** .42** .55** .54** 
  Safe .37** .45** .45** .50** .50** .49** 
    Pleasurable .43** .45** .45** .39** .52** .50** 
    Regenerative .32** .32** .37** .29* .33* .38** 
    Progressing .27** .30** .38** .30* .41** .33** 
    Harmless .24** .32** .36** .46** .29* .25** 
    Cooperative .22** .27** .23** .45** .34* .35** 
    Stable .20** .30** .27** .43** .39** .34** 
    Just .34** .34** .47** .29* .39** .32** 






    Interesting .25** .38** .18** .20* .45** .42** 
    Beautiful .29** .35** .35** .21* .36* .38** 
    Abundant .31** .37** .35** .21* .42** .39** 
    Worth Exploring .15** .16* .20** .00 .22* .31** 
    Meaningful .28** .36** .24** .03 .47** .31** 
    Improvable .32** .27** .38** .18 .41** .32** 
    Funny .26** .16* .26** .22* .20* .22** 
*p<.05 **p<.0001  
Occupation-Specific Life Satisfaction Results in Sample 5: Philly Pros. Of 51 
relationships between 17 primals and life satisfaction among 3 professions (car salespersons, 
lawyers, and police), 40 were significant (p<.05). In all cases the negative primal was associated 
with less life satisfaction, with many moderate and large effects. For example, life satisfaction was 
highly correlated with Cooperative among car salespersons at r=.63; with Interesting among 
lawyers at r=.49; and with Safe and Pleasurable among police officers, both at r=.71.  
Discussion 
Life satisfaction was strongly related to holding positive primals. There were no 
exceptions across samples, professions, or primals, and effect sizes were routinely moderate to 
large. Samples 1 and 2 also involved subjects who did not take measures concurrently, which 
likely dampened effect sizes. Given these results and the diversity of samples and occupations 
considered, there appears to be a robust connection in the population between one’s opinion 
about the sort of reality one finds oneself in and one’s opinion about the quality of one’s own life.  
This connection is not necessarily obvious. Satisfaction with life is largely unrelated to 
objective life circumstances (e.g., finances, physical health, Argyle, 1987), involving instead an 
explicit comparison between one’s own life and some reference norm (e.g., Fox & Kahneman, 
1992). Historically, there has been some debate regarding the nature of this norm. One line of 
inquiry suggests that life satisfaction springs from comparisons made between one’s current 
circumstances and one’s previous circumstances, as well as conjectures of other directions life 
could have taken (e.g., Fox & Kahneman, 1992; Zhang et al., 2014). Another line of research 
suggests the reference norm is primarily social—sometimes called Social Reference Theory—
involving what an individual believes to be happening in the lives of others, presumably in 






al., 2019; Frison & Eggermont, 2016; Boyce et al., 2010; Fox & Kahneman, 1992). In both 
understandings, negative primals theoretically should lead to not lower but higher life satisfaction. 
If primals operate as maximally general schemas used to interpret reality as has been theorized 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1989; Clifton et al., 2019; Clifton, 2018, 2020), then primals should presumably 
be used to interpret what is happening in the lives of others, a topic involving more ambiguity 
compared to knowledge of one’s own life. For example, if a white upper-middle class soccer mom 
living in a high-income neighborhood sees the world as a dangerous place, she might consider 
herself as having successfully carved out a modestly safe portion of the world and feel very 
fortunate to have been spared the perils that most others face. Likewise, if primals inform one’s 
sense of what could have been, then a negative primal like the belief that the world tends to fall 
apart (i.e., low Regenerative scores) might lead one to think that life could have been much worse 
(i.e., the counterfactual referent) or has become worse (i.e., the personal history referent). 
Indeed, if primals influence ambiguity interpretation writ large, then negative primals theoretically 
should negatively impact perceptions of all possible referents—though presumably to different 
degrees—making one’s own life look better in comparison. Indeed, in a terrible world, a mediocre 
life is a great success, but above results are inconsistent with this line of thinking.  
Two other perspectives of life satisfaction are more consonant with above results, often 
called the bottom-up and top-down approaches (e.g., Erdogan et al., 2012). The bottom-up 
approach frames life satisfaction as a general judgement that aggregates domain-specific 
judgements. For example, Cummins’ (1996) organized 173 studied domains into seven: material 
wellbeing, health, productivity, intimacy, safety, community, and emotional wellbeing. Domains 
are presumably weighted differently by each individual. Alternatively, the top-down approach 
considers life satisfaction to be an expression of stable person characteristics or traits—some 
people are simply more easily satisfied. If primals influence ambiguity interpretation and 
judgements of domains require ambiguity interpretation, then primals’ should influence domain-
specific judgements, which would be aggregated as systematic variance into the overall life 






heterogenous objects, and given Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) suggestion that the primary 
primal Good is largely determined by aggregating judgements of secondary and tertiary primals, 
Good may be formed by many of the same bottom-up judgement-related mechanisms and biases 
used to aggregate judgements of more specific life domains into the overall judgement of life 
satisfaction. Moreover, primary, secondary, and tertiary judgements—as well as how they are 
weighted and aggregated by individuals—may be systematically influenced by various personality 
traits, including meta-beliefs and BIG 5 personality traits. An example meta-belief capable of 
influencing both is when it comes to global value judgements of things one has to live with, it’s 
always good to err on the positive side. This meta-beliefs may motivate individuals to see value 
in, for example, purchased items one cannot return, a spouse one cannot leave, a life that cannot 
be re-lived (i.e., life satisfaction), or a world one cannot escape (primal world beliefs). Though the 
best candidate BIG 5 trait for influencing both life satisfaction and primals is neuroticism—since of 
BIG 5 traits neuroticism most strongly predicts life satisfaction—effect sizes between neuroticism 
and life satisfaction are not large enough to explain the relationship between life satisfaction and 
Safe, let alone other primals which are les related to neuroticism (Steel et al., 2008; Clifton et al., 
2019). Finally, one of the simplest explanations of covariance may be causal. In The Tale of Genji 
(2014/1000, p. 134) Shikibu writes, “It was a difficult world, which refused to give satisfaction.” 
Primals may influence a variety of behaviors and outcomes, including one’s emotional state, 
which impacts overall life satisfaction. This explanation presumes increased difficulty when trying 
to find satisfaction in any place perceived as terrible, barren, dangerous, and so forth, whether 
the place in question is a home, a restaurant, a town, or a world.  
Study 2h: Psychological Flourishing 
Measure 
Butler and Kern’s (2016) psychometrically-validated PERMA Profiler was used to 
measure general psychological flourishing. Whereas the SWLS scale assesses a global 
judgement of one’s life based on one’s own criteria that the researcher must guess at, the 






intrinsically value and weights them equally: positive emotion, engagement, relationships, 
meaning, and accomplishment (Seligman, 2011). Scores on the five three-item subscales 
strongly intercorrelate and were aggregated into a 15-item general measure, as is commonly 
done. No items are reverse-scored. An example item from the relationships subscale is To what 
extent do you feel loved? Responses were collected on an eleven-point scale.  
Analysis 
Same as above.  
Results 
Subjects with more positive primals enjoyed more psychological flourishing. Of 85 
relationships displayed in Table 12 (5 samples X 17 primals; total N=2,491), 82 were significant 
(p<.05). In all 82 cases, negative primals were associated with less psychological flourishing, 
often with large effect sizes. This pattern held when looking across 19 different occupations, as 
detailed below. Furthermore, putting aside those who see the world negatively, of 65 t-tests 
comparing those who hold slightly positive versus distinctly positive primals in which both groups 
had ≥30 subjects, 58 were significantly different (p<.05). In all 58 cases, those with slightly 
positive primal world beliefs enjoyed less psychological flourishing than those with distinctly 
positive primals. Primals notably associated with psychological flourishing include Good, Enticing, 








Psychological Flourishing’s Relationship to 17 Primals Using Pearson’s r 








Sample 6:  
Undergrads 
N 1,118 692 98 110 473 
Good .48** .61** .43** .57** .60** 
  Safe .39** .50** .41** .45** .51** 
    Pleasurable .44** .53** .35* .57** .51** 
    Regenerative .36** .46** .23* .41** .41** 
    Progressing .27** .41** .25* .33* .32** 
    Harmless .26** .34** .41** .12 .23** 
    Cooperative .20** .25** .27* .37** .35** 
    Stable .21** .25** .35* .31* .36** 
    Just .39** .49** .28* .40** .40** 
  Enticing .41** .55** .32* .57** .53** 
    Interesting .26** .34** .30* .48** .45** 
    Beautiful .30** .47** .34* .44** .35** 
    Abundant .35** .49** .28* .56** .41** 
    Worth Exploring .20** .37** .05 .25* .33** 
    Meaningful .31** .39** .17 .52** .46** 
    Improvable .38** .51** .25* .43** .39** 
    Funny .23** .30** .24* .22* .26** 
PR Sample 4 did not complete the entire PERMA Profiler so combined scores on the positive emotion  
and relationship subscales were used as a proxy. *p<.05 **p<.0001 
 
Occupation-Specific Psychological Flourishing Results in Sample 1: AH.Org. Within 
the 1,118 subjects who took both the PI-99 and PERMA Profiler, seven of ten professional 
groupings and eight of the 65 specific professions had n≥30 (detailed above). Of 255 examined 
relationships ((7 occupation groups + 8 specific occupations) X 17 primals), there were 160 
significant relationships (p<.05). In 99% of them, the negative primal was associated with less 
psychological flourishing, often strongly. The one exception was one of the five significant 
relationships found in a subsample of 39 teachers in which seeing the world as more threatening 
(i.e. low Harmless scores) was tied to increased psychological flourishing (r=-.36, p=.026). 
Primals especially predictive of psychological flourishing include Good, Just, Enticing, and 
Abundant. For example, flourishing was strongly related to Good among executives (r(47)=.59, 
p<.0001) and students (r(349)=.51, p<.0001) but not administrative personnel (r(44)=.25, p=.097).  
Occupation-Specific Psychological Flourishing Results in Sample 5: Philly Pros. Of 
51 relationships between 17 primals and flourishing among 3 professions (car salespersons, 
lawyers, and police), 34 were significant (p<.05). In all cases the negative primal was associated 






was notably related to flourishing in all three groups (car salespeople, r=.71; lawyers, r=.57; 
police officers, r=.41). Funny and Progressing were the only primals not correlated with 
flourishing in any of these three occupations.  
Discussion 
Because life satisfaction judgements rely on the individual’s own criteria, individuals may 
make these judgements in incommensurate ways, adding noise, suppressing effect sizes, and 
frustrating meaningful comparisons across persons. This can be partially side-stepped, however, 
by prescribing what the life domains will be and how they will be weighted. Seligman’s (2011) 
definition of psychological flourishing specifies five domains and the PERMA Profiler weighs 
these five domains equally in an aggregated psychological flourishing score. These domains are 
frequency of positive emotion and engagement, quality of relationships, finding meaning in 
activities and life direction, and frequency and feelings of accomplishment. While domain scores 
tend to intercorrelate and may not be statistically distinct enough to be considered separately 
(e.g., Ryan et al., 2019; Seligman, 2018), the overall prescriptive measure of wellbeing allows for 
greater commensurability across persons and groups than life satisfaction measures.  
Across persons, groups, and occupations, above results find psychological flourishing to 
be strongly related to holding positive primals, especially Good and Enticing, which replicates 
findings from Clifton and colleagues (2019). Effect sizes were often so large as to indicate that 
achieving high psychological flourishing if one sees the world strongly negatively is nearly a 
psychological rarity, as is the person who sees the world as exceedingly wondrous yet suffers low 
psychological flourishing—such exceptions should be studied. Likely some of this relationship 
between primals and psychological flourishing will be explained by measurement error, including 
positivity/optimism bias and shared method-variance. However, given the scale of effect sizes, for 
such an explanation to be sufficient either the Primals Inventory or the PERMA Profiler (or both) 
would have to be predominantly capturing error variance. Some of the relationship between 
primal world beliefs and psychological flourishing may also be explained by primal world beliefs 






of a place could influence a person while the person is in that place. Another explanation could 
involve causality in the other direction. For example, having deeper and more supportive 
relationships may increase emotional and material resilience in the face of hardship, thus actually 
making the world more dangerous, thus influencing danger perceptions. However, as I have 
recently argued (Clifton, 2020), primals may be largely unresponsive to past experiences in this 
way.  
General Discussion 
Primal world beliefs are (a) important to study; (b) challenging to study; and (c) have 
remained largely overlooked, all for precisely the same reason: because they are beliefs about 
the character of a uniquely encompassing place. As previously argued (Clifton & Kim, 2020), 
understanding the behavior of any given creature requires that the scientist observe the 
creature’s behavior in multiple environments. Scientists who observe a creature in one 
environment only, such as a dog in a dog park, are handicapped observers, being unable to 
distinguish context-specific behaviors (i.e., a state-like reaction to particular environments, or at 
least the creature’s beliefs/perceptions about that environment) from organism-specific behaviors 
(i.e., a trait-like expression of that creature’s peculiar temperament). But what if a creature had 
beliefs about the character of an environment that, for whatever reason, the organism never 
leaves? If so, such beliefs would theoretically drive patterns of action that would manifest as 
organism-specific traits while actually being driven by context-specific reactions to underlying 
perceptions. Furthermore, if said environment became populated by other creatures who also 
never left, but viewed the character of said environment differently, all such creatures would be 
handicapped observers, unable to distinguish context-specific from organism-specific behaviors. 
Moreover, if these creatures were ignorant of their disagreement—which is likely if these beliefs 
are implicit—all such creatures should be expected to misattribute numerous individual 
differences to differences in traits, thereby committing the fundamental attribution error on a 






Clifton and colleagues’ (2019) suggestion is that, for humans at least, this remarkable 
situation may be precisely the case. Substantial variance in human behaviors and outcomes (i.e., 
neuroticism, agreeableness, optimism, curiosity, gratitude, depression, subjective wellbeing, 
attachment style—perhaps most major variables psychologists study) could stem from 26 
differences in opinion about the most psychologically salient characteristics of the one place 
humans never leave (i.e., primal world beliefs). Given the import of this suggestion—and the 
obvious need for experimental and quasi-experimental research to determine causation—the 
reader may find cross-sectional research like that above quite unsatisfying. Nevertheless, 
establishing the direction and typical size of correlational relationships has value for four reasons. 
First, correlations can point to promising areas of research. Second, there is a gap in the 
literature concerning primals’ wellbeing correlates and the two studies that have been done found 
substantial effect sizes worth replicating (Clifton et al., 2019; Stahlmann et al., 2020). 
Third, establishing primals’ correlational relationship to wellbeing-related variables is 
valuable because, based on existing theory, the size and even direction of some of these 
relationships is not actually that obvious. Life satisfaction, for example, is commonly understood 
as a comparative judgement of one’s own life against a referent, such as a sense of what could 
have been (Fox & Kahneman, 1992; Zhang et al., 2014; Cheung & Lucas, 2016; Zaborskis et al., 
2019; Frison & Eggermont, 2016; Boyce et al., 2010). If so, living a mediocre life in an incredible 
world where much more was considered readily achievable should be less satisfying than living 
the same mediocre life in a terrible world in which one was highly fortunate—but above result 
indicate that seeing the world as a terrible place is associated with much lower life satisfaction. 
Another example is health: the belief that the world is dangerous should theoretically increase 
vigilance across circumstances, perhaps resulting in successful avoidance of physical dangers, 
dangerous habits, and pathogens, which should increase health outcomes—but seeing the world 
as dangerous is actually associated with moderately worse health.  
Fourth, moving past what researchers might learn directly from correlational research, 






beliefs that bolster negative primals. For example, a lawyer who thinks that lawyers who see the 
world as dangerous usually perform better than those that see the world as safe might be 
interested to know if, on average, this is not the case.  
Study 1 attempted to establish some prevalence for these meta-beliefs by asking 180 
parents which primals they thought most likely to help their children. Results suggested there are 
at least two prospective meta-beliefs that might encourage individuals to hold negative primals. 
First, a minority of parents—usually a fairly large minority and in one case a majority—reported 
their meta-belief that the best way to prepare their children to navigate life was to teach them the 
world is in different ways a terrible place, specifically that it is dangerous, unfair, not funny, 
unstable, cut-throat, and in decline. Secondly, looking at only those who saw more value in 
positive primals, clear majorities of parents saw less positive positive primals as better for their 
children than more positive positive primals. One parent volunteered the following rationale for 
this moderating approaching: I don't want my children to have so much fear that they're afraid to 
get out there and try stuff, but I do want them to be cautious and not trust people and situations 
blindly. In this line of thinking, positive primals are helpful but distinctly positive primals can make 
one naïve, overly trusting, and vulnerable. While this quote falls under prospective meta-belief #3 
identified in Table 2, all six prospective meta-beliefs listed can support either holding negative 
primals or holding less positive positive primals.  
The popularity of meta-beliefs favoring slightly versus distinctly positive primals is 
particularly interesting because, despite the surge of interest in positive psychology over the past 
few decades, this distinction is relatively underexamined. For example, it is now well-established 
that strongly negative beliefs—often so negative as to be called illusory such as I am a totally 
worthless person—contribute to depression (e.g., Beck, 1963, 1964, 1967, 2005; Beck et al., 
1979; Butler et al., 2006; Hofmann et al., 2012). But what about negative beliefs that are not that 
negative and slightly positive beliefs that could be more positive? Taylor and Armor’s (1996) 
review of the literature on positive illusions concludes that positive illusions are common and 






a very positive belief is illusory or not, understanding the comparative utility of positive and very 
positive beliefs when neither can be considered illusory—perhaps the truth is irrelevant or, as in 
the case of primals, unknowable—may help clinicians and coaches design interventions. While 
extremely negative negative beliefs may offer the most room for improvement, sometimes those 
darkest beliefs may not be sufficiently malleable—perhaps the client has already tried a variety of 
strategies to shape the very negative belief. If so, perhaps there is value-add in targeting beliefs 
that are already fairly positive to make them even more positive, presuming doing so is typically 
not associated with negative consequences that might indicate a damaging illusory belief.  
Study 2 consisted of a cross-sectional search for situations in which positive outcomes 
were associated with (a) negative primals versus positive primals and (b) distinctly positive 
primals versus somewhat positive primals. I examined correlations between 17 primals and eight 
outcomes among six samples with a total 4,535 unique subjects representing 48 occupations 
(n≥30). A total of 3,291 statistics were produced, 1,860 of which were significant. In only six of 
these relationships were more negative primals related to more positive outcomes. All six 
involved small effects and small occupationally-defined sub-samples. Thus, in 99.7% of 
significant relationships, more positive primals were associated with better outcomes, roughly 
categorized as slightly increased success and greatly increased wellbeing. Moreover, I could find 
no empirical justification for the popular moderation approach among the parents in Study 1. In 
422 t-tests conducted in Study 2, there were 297 significant differences in outcomes between 
those who saw the world as somewhat positive and those who saw the world as distinctly 
positive. In every case, seeing the world as distinctly positive was associated with more success, 
more job satisfaction, better physical health, less negative emotion, less depression, not 
attempting suicide, more life satisfaction, and more psychological flourishing. In sum, this cross-
sectional search yielded unambiguous results that replicates and extends two initial studies using 
the Primals Inventory as well as findings from the belief in a just world literature (Clifton et al., 






relationship exists between more negative primals and more negative outcomes, even when 
comparing positive beliefs to positive beliefs, and even when comparing within occupation.  
 If those with negative primals typically enjoy worse success and wellbeing outcomes as 
Study 2 demonstrates, why might meta-beliefs purporting the opposite be commonplace? I see 
two clues. The first lies in the diversity of primals themselves, which, like meta-beliefs, are 
normally distributed. One possibility is that individuals implicitly define relatively narrow bands of 
belief within which “reasonable” people can disagree. Then, recognizing some utility in being as 
positive as possible, position themselves near the upper limit of those bands. The result of 
positive self-positioning within normally-distributed bands of supposed reasonableness would be 
threefold. First, both meta-belief and primal world belief would be normally distributed (observed 
empirically). Second, virtually nobody would see their own primals as stubborn, totalizing, or 
precluding interpretive flexibility, regardless of one’s position along the continuum (observed 
anecdotally). Third, virtually all beliefs more positive than one’s own would seem inflexible and 
totalizing—like a Bayesian prior that refuses updating despite clear evidence—indicating a 
serious lack judgement on the part of others (observed anecdotally). If virtually all primal world 
beliefs more positive than ones own appear inflexible and totalizing, parents would of course not 
want to wish such beliefs on their children (now observed empirically in Study 2).  
 The second related clue comes from the optimism literature. Like primals, optimism 
correlates with many positive outcomes, yet common sense and empirical research (e.g., 
Foregeard & Seligman, 2012) suggest that high optimism can lead to problems in certain 
domains, such as when a pilot is doing a final equipment check before a flight or a gambler is 
doubling down on a bad bet. The proposed solution is flexibility and domain selectivity to avoid a 
totalizing pattern of interpretation or behavior (Seligman, 1991; Armor & Taylor, 1998). For similar 
reasons, individuals might believe that highly positive primals preclude flexibility and should be 
avoided for similar reasons. However, this may be mistaken. Primals are not behaviors, but 
beliefs, and, as beliefs about general character only, interpretive and behavioral flexibility is 






extrovert. As trait claims, those holding these beliefs are not expected to believe that Jill never 
tells the truth or that Jack has never been quiet at a party. Instead, these beliefs inform a posture 
towards Jack and Jill which is readily adjustable depending on contextual information—numerous 
exceptions are not just allowed but expected. Likewise, primals are traits claims about the 
universe. They likewise do not entail totalizing thinking. After all, it is unlikely that the hundreds of 
Study 2 subjects who saw the world as very safe and achieved much higher wellbeing than peers 
while stumbling through life in a positive haze, unable to perceive, anticipate, or respond to 
threats. To examine this further, researchers might empirically examine whether increasingly 
positive primals are associated with any losses in interpretive or behavioral flexibility; there may 
well be substantial orthogonality between responsiveness to primal-inconsistent information and 
Primals Inventory scores. If this turns out to be the case, parents might best serve their children 
by teaching them to avoid extreme optimism while embracing extremely optimistic primals.  
 Interestingly, if it pays to have accurate world beliefs (i.e., meta-belief #4 in Table 2), the 
pattern of results in Study 2 may shed some light—curiously enough—on the nature of the world 
itself (and, if so, may be worth incorporating into interventions). Charnov (1976) proposed 
Marginal Value Theorem to describe optimal foraging strategies when food is in clusters or 
patches and a forager must spend time travelling between patches. He states that foragers, 
“should leave the patch it is presently in when the marginal capture rate in the patch drops to the 
average capture rate for the habitat” (p. 132). If the forager leaves too late or too early, the 
forager will experience diminishing returns or spend too much energy wandering the environment 
in search of new patches, both of which should be associated with a variety of negative 
consequences. Now imagine a researcher did not know the average capture rate of a habitat, but 
did have a way to measure both expected average capture rates and differences in forager 
outcomes. If so, and if Marginal Value Theorem holds, comparing creature outcomes to creature 
habitat beliefs would shed light on the objective conditions of the creatures’ habitat. Theoretically, 






In humans, the average capture rate for the habitat is the same or at least very related to 
the primal labeled Abundant (versus barren), defined as the belief that the world is a promising 
place full of opportunities and resources. Above studies have shown that higher Abundant scores 
are linearly tied to positive outcomes, suggesting that, seemingly no matter how high Abundant 
scores get, even higher scores are associated with improved outcomes. That may mean the 
world is objectively, for humans at least, an abundant place. If so, the same logic applies to other 
primals. For example, in very dangerous places like a war zone, it is presumably beneficial to 
accurately recognize the objective reality of the situation, and people who do so should on 
average enjoy a variety of better outcomes while in that place. But, among humans, seeing the 
world as dangerous is clearly associated with much worse outcomes. This may indicate that, to 
some degree, the world is not a very dangerous place. However, another possibility is that the 
world is in fact a very barren and dangerous place, but the benefits of being accurate when it 
comes to this unusual topic of belief are minimal compared to the psychological costs involved. If 
so, when it comes to beliefs about the world as a whole, it may not pay to be accurate.   
Limitations  
While Study 1 aimed to shed light on the prevalence of a phenomenon, the population 
and primals that were examined were selected precisely because that is where the phenomenon 
was thought to be more prevalent, greatly limiting generalizability. In Study 2, though t-tests can 
help establish linearity between primals and positive outcomes at the upper levels, larger samples 
are needed to allow comparisons between subjects with more unusually high scores. In two 
samples, measures of socio-economic status or personal income were used as proxies for job 
success and are arguably poor proxies. For Sample 1 and 2, scale administration was not 
concurrent, which likely dampened effect sizes. Because the current interest was identifying 
trends across primals, samples, and outcomes, no correction was made for multiple comparisons, 
which limits the generalizability of any one relationship (see above discussion). Finally, previous 
literature connecting Just to increased victim-blaming and less prosociality (e.g., Benson & Ritter, 






outcome variables, future research may yet find undesirable correlates of positive primals. Finally, 
cross-sectional results like this do not allow causal inferences. Finally, all results were self-report, 
which is subject to several types of error.  
Concluding Remarks 
In their foundational primals paper, Clifton and colleagues (2019) laid down a gauntlet by 
suggesting that much of the variance in most major variables psychologists study might be driven 
by beliefs psychologists had largely overlooked. Exploring this possibility calls for a great deal of 
research, especially bold experimentation to examine causation. This chapter provides an 
incremental step in that direction. By replicating and extending previous correlational research, I 
have established that the correlational relationship between positive primals and positive 
outcomes is robust, contrary to various suppositions concerning the value of negative primals. 
Indeed, despite much searching, it remains unclear if negative primals have much value. Those 
with more negative primals were on average slightly less successful at their jobs, substantially 
less satisfied with their jobs, less physically healthy, suffered more frequent negative emotions, 
were much more likely to be depressed, slightly more likely to have attempted suicide, were much 
less satisfied with their lives, and reported dramatically less psychological flourishing—even when 
comparing those within the same occupation. If nothing else, this research suggests that further 
effort examining primal world beliefs is worthwhile. In the meantime, parents might consider 
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RESEARCH STATEMENT AND NARRATIVE SUMMARY 
Research Statement 
 Behavior is influenced—sometimes dramatically—by perceptions of the basic character 
of one’s environment. In places seen as fun, for example, people are more friendly; in places 
seen as dangerous, people are more alert; and so on for many pairs of perceptions and 
behaviors. My research explores the possibility that individuals also have numerous, widely 
varying, highly stable perceptions of the world as one giant place—the one place humans never 
leave—and that these perceptions may likewise influence many behavior patterns and wellbeing 
outcomes. I call these perceptions primal world beliefs (“primals”).  
 The first step in exploring this possibility was measurement. I needed to demonstrate that 
individuals hold primal world beliefs, empirically map what primals individuals hold, create a tool 
to measure primals, and demonstrate the plausibility of the ‘big idea’ that primals’ might shape a 
variety of outcomes. This five-year project was completed a year ago (the Clifton et al, 2019, 
article in Psychological Assessment), with short-form scales forthcoming and an interest in 
measurement methodology emerging in the process (e.g., the Clifton, 2019, Psychological 
Methods article on validity versus reliability trade-offs).  
The second step has been breadth. This involves integrating primals research into the 
most obviously relevant literatures, especially literatures already examining primals or similar 
beliefs. So far, this has been done via a few short theory papers examining connections between 
primals and health (Healthy in a Crummy World, Clifton & Kim, 2020, published in Medical 
Hypotheses), wellbeing (Happy in a Crummy World; Clifton, 2020a, published in The Journal of 
Positive Psychology), and experiences (Chapter 2, recently published as Clifton, 2020b, in 
Frontiers in Psychology). This dissertation continues the integration process with the first 
empirical efforts to build on the primals framework.  
The third step will be depth—moving beyond exploratory research to examine primals’ 
causal influence on personality and wellbeing. If causality is established, Step 4 will turn towards 






depression, political cooperation). Barring some decisive breakthrough, however, I expect basic 
research in Steps 2 and 3 to continue for several years.  
Narrative Summary 
 This dissertation’s main contributions are threefold. First, it represents early empirical 
demonstrations of primal world beliefs as a worthwhile research topic. Second, it advances 
multiple ongoing discussions about some of the few world beliefs previously studied. Third, it 
takes concrete steps towards intervention design by addressing two-types of meta-beliefs (i.e., 
beliefs about beliefs) thought to often bolster negative primals.  
Chapter 1 is an application of the primals framework to politics. Of the 26 primals humans 
hold, arguably only two have been studied, with one being belief in a dangerous world. This 
primal has been primarily studied in connection to political ideology. Based on theory, 
correlational research, and complementary experimental work, the consensus has been that 
conservatives tend to see the world as a more dangerous place, which increases conservatism, 
and liberals tend to see the world as safer, which increases liberalism. Chapter 1 examines 8 
diverse samples (N=3,734) and finds that dangerous world belief actually explained only .9% of 
the variance in political ideology, placing it nearly in the middle a large group of fifteen primal 
world beliefs—just below the belief the world is Funny at 1.0%—sharing so little variance with 
political conservatism that they were dubbed the primals of virtual agreement across the political 
spectrum. Why was previous political research so misleading? A second study finds that the 
primary scale formerly used to measure belief in a dangerous world happens to highlight threats 
conservatives fear and neglect threats liberals fear.  
Far from indicating primals’ irrelevance to politics, however, this research points to the 
importance of new primals. Six explained considerable variance in political ideology: Hierarchical 
(15%), Intentional (11.5%), Acceptable (9.2%), Worth Exploring (6.9%), Just (5%), and 
Progressing (2.6%). Their prominence suggests an alternative pair of perceived worlds in which 
opposite political behaviors make sense. Conservatives see an inherently hierarchical, fair, 






constraining change and tolerating inequality; while liberals see an inherently nonhierarchical, 
unfair world that is improving, suggesting wisdom in accelerating change and resisting inequality. 
This account—shorthanded hierarchy theory—is largely unrelated to fear-based political 
motivations and has numerous implications for topics such as contemporary political messaging, 
historical analysis, and the future of human cooperation.  
After Chapter 1 (hopefully) demonstrates the value of the primals framework, Chapter 2’s 
developmental question becomes more interesting and justified: where do primals come from? 
Specifically, what is the role of experiences in shaping primal world beliefs? On this point too 
some research has been conducted. Janoff-Bulman (1989) prominently suggested that trauma 
might powerfully shape a variety of fundamental beliefs about the self and the world, including 
some primal world beliefs. Her theory is one of a family of possible theories that suggest how an 
individual’s primals might reflect an individual’s background. For example, if one grows up 
wealthy (or poor), one may see the world as more abundant (or barren). I call this family of 
theories retrospective theories, contrasting them with interpretive theories. Interpretive theories 
hold that primals are not mirrors reflecting our backgrounds, but lenses used to interpret 
experiences while being largely uninfluenced by those experiences. I then identify 12 tests that 
would shed light on whether interpretive or retrospective theories tend to be more accurate and 
hypothesize in favor of interpretive theories. (My plan was to also present new data on these 
hypotheses but that was short-circuited by the Covid-19 pandemic).  
If future research supports my guess—if primals generally do not reflect our backgrounds 
in a straight-forward manner—what other experiences might shape primals? This question 
brought me to a juncture where thousands before have stood. After introducing a construct, 
researchers eventually ask, what experiences might shape my construct? Four years ago I asked 
this question and searched the literature for a tool that would enable systematic theorizing about 
a broad range of experiences in relation to my construct. What I found instead were a handful of 
largely overlapping clinically-oriented checklists dominated by a particular type of involuntary, 






the tool I sought, I made one—called the Cube Framework—which I introduce in Chapter 2 to 
facilitate the identification of promising areas for further primals research, but also in the hope that 
researchers might find it useful in other contexts. The Cube Framework identifies three 
dimensions by which all experiences vary—time (acute/chronic), control (internal/external), and 
valence (positive/negative)—permutations of which define eight experience types in which human 
experiences can be sorted: bad luck, bad times, bad choices, bad habits, good luck, good times, 
good choices, good habits. Applying this framework to primals research indicates good times and 
good habits might be promising areas for further research. However, I end Chapter 2 confessing 
skepticism that naturally occurring life experiences that reliably influence primals might be found. 
Instead, such experiences may have to be designed. In fact, some already have been (e.g., 
cognitive behavioral therapy).  
Chapter 3 turns towards intervention design. What will interventions have to accomplish 
in order to alter negative primals? Among other things, certain meta-beliefs (i.e., beliefs about 
beliefs) that bolster negative primals may need to be addressed. Chapter 3 observes that meta-
beliefs come in at least two types. First, retrospective meta-beliefs hold that our backgrounds 
dictate our primals, thus giving one little choice but to continue seeing the world as one does. 
Second, prospective meta-beliefs hold that one’s primals are associated with success and 
wellbeing, and are retained therefore in the hopes that they will likely prove useful in achieving 
future goals. Both types of meta-beliefs deserve study for being underexamined, involving clear 
implications for intervention design, and for being interesting in their own right as plausible 
explanations of behavior. Chapter 2 has already discussed a way forward in the study of 
retrospective meta-beliefs (which are nothing but personal lay retrospective theories of how one’s 
own primals developed). Thus, Chapter 3 tackles the issue of prospective meta-beliefs.  
Chapter 3 identifies several perhaps common prospective meta-beliefs. For example:  
• While positive primals might make me feel better, it’s a luxury I can’t afford 
because people usually don’t succeed in my job without a darker view of things. 
• More often than not, seeing the world as this amazing place leads to 
disappointment with what you get, both at work and home, which can make you 






• Seeing the world as safe where everyone sings ‘Kumbaya’ leaves people 
vulnerable to predation, physical threat, germs, illness, and even death—you 
gotta stay vigilant. 
 
Study 1 preliminarily finds that such prospective meta-beliefs purporting the value of negative 
primals are not unusual. This was done by asking parents which primals they most desire to instill 
in their children (N=180). Normally distributed response patterns indicated that substantial 
minorities of parents (and in one case a majority) believe the best way to prepare children to 
navigate life is to teach them that the world is in various ways a bad place: including that that the 
world is full of physical threats; does not reward or punish fairly; is rarely that funny; is full of 
fragile situations that could easily fall apart; is cut-throat; and is getting worse. Moreover, among 
those who aim to teach positive primals to their children, clear majorities preferred slightly positive 
primals to distinctly or very positive primals. Few, in other words, thought that teaching 
moderately to very positive primals to children was the best way to prepare them to navigate life.  
Might there be truth in these parental intuitions? Study 2 consisted of a cross-sectional 
search across six diverse samples representing 48 occupations (N=4,535) for instances in which 
any of eight key outcomes might be connected to either (a) more negative primals or (b) slightly 
less positive positive primals. This search discovered 1,860 significant relationships between the 
seventeen primals examined and the eight life outcomes. In 99.7% of these relationships, 
negative primals were associated with worse outcomes, as follows: slightly decreased job 
performance/success, much decreased job satisfaction, moderately decreased physical health, 
moderately increased suicide attempts, much increased negative emotions, greatly increased 
depression, greatly decreased life satisfaction, and dramatically decreased overall psychological 
flourishing. Given multiple samples, some large and diverse, replication, and pre-registration, 
there appears to be a robust correlational relationship between more negative primals and more 
negative outcomes, even when comparing positive beliefs to positive beliefs, and even when 
comparing within occupations. Such correlational findings do not indicate causation, but are 






interventions designed to combat inaccurate prospective meta-beliefs, and, perhaps, for 
motivating the reconsideration of certain parental goals.  
What are researchers to make of all this? Some findings are conclusive, with perhaps the 
most interesting being that political conservatives and liberals differ on the belief that the world is 
dangerous to an unremarkable degree. However, the value of this dissertation is not in any 
particular conclusion, but in the repeated discussion sections in which the primals framework is 
repeatedly applied to different outcomes—from politics to attempted suicide to job satisfaction to 
life satisfaction—and explanatory promise is seen as plain and obvious. Yet this is a small 
sampling of outcomes that primals might influence. Of course, for some of these outcomes—
perhaps most—the explanatory promise may never bear out. Substantial covariation between 
primals and outcomes may be explained in a variety of ways, depending on the outcome, person, 
or primal. Nevertheless, I suspect that every discipline that examines human behavior or 
outcomes will have to one way or another eventually take primal world beliefs into account to 
some degree, if only to control for them. This is because of a simple reason mentioned repeatedly 
throughout this dissertation: behavior can be highly influenced by the perceptions of the 
environment in which the behavior takes place, and primals concern the environment in which all 
behavior takes place.  








Definitions and Structure of 26 Primal World Beliefs  
 
Note. 26 primals (22 tertiary, 3 secondary, and 1 primals) as identified by Clifton and colleagues (2019). 













Comparing the BDW Scale to the Primals Inventory’s Safe Subscale 
The BDW scale 
10 items; unidimensional; Perry et al, 2013 
The Primals Inventory’s Safe subscale  
29 items; multidimensional; Clifton et al, 2019  
- My knowledge and experience tells me that the social 
world we live in is basically a safe, stable and secure 
place in which most people are fundamentally good.* 
- It seems that every year there are fewer and fewer truly 
respectable people, and more and more persons with no 
morals at all who threaten everyone else.  
- Although it may appear that things are constantly getting 
more dangerous and chaotic, it really isn’t so. Every era 
has its problems, and a person’s chances of living a 
safe, untroubled life are better today than ever before.* 
- Any day now chaos and anarchy could erupt around us. 
All the signs are pointing to it.  
- There are many dangerous people in our society who 
will attack someone out of pure meanness, for no 
reason at all.  
- The ‘‘end’’ is not near. People who think that 
earthquakes, wars, and famines mean God might be 
about to destroy the world are being foolish.* 
- My knowledge and experience tells me that the social 
world we live in is basically a dangerous and 
unpredictable place, in which good, decent and moral 
people’s values and way of life are threatened and 
disrupted by bad people.  
- Despite what one hears about ‘‘crime in the street,’’ 
there probably isn’t any more now than there ever has 
been.* 
- If a person takes a few sensible precautions, nothing 
bad is likely to happen to him or her; we do not live in a 
dangerous world.*  
- Every day as society becomes more lawless and bestial, 
a person’s chances of being robbed, assaulted, and 
































- On the whole, the world is a safe place. 
- Real danger is everywhere; even if we don’t notice it.* 
- Most things and situations are harmless and totally safe. 
- I tend to see the world as pretty safe. 
- On the whole, the world is a dangerous place.* 
- Instead of being cooperative, life is a brutal contest where you got to do 
whatever it takes to survive.* 
- For all life—from the smallest organisms, to plants, animals, and for people too—
everything is a cut-throat competition.* 
- Instead of being cooperative, the world is a cut-throat and competitive place.* 
- The world runs on trust and cooperation way more than suspicion and 
competition. 
- On the whole, the world is getting worse.* 
- It feels like the world is going downhill.* 
- Though the world has problems, on the whole things are definitely improving. 
- It feels like the world is getting better and better. 
- Though sometimes situations get worse, usually they get better. 
- Most things have a habit of getting worse.* 
- The usual tendency of most things and situations is to get better, not worse. 
- Over time, most situations naturally tend to get worse, not better.* 
- The world is a place where things are fragile and easily ruined.* 
- It takes a lot for things to fall apart. 
- Most things and situations are delicate and easily destroyed.* 
- Most situations are delicate. Though they may be fine now, things could easily 
unravel.* 
- The world is a place where working hard and being nice pays off. 
- If someone is generous and kind, the world will be kind back. 
- The world is a place where we rarely deserve what we get.* 
- Life offers more pain than pleasure.* 
- On the whole, the world is a good place. 
- Life in this world is usually pain and suffering.* 
- Life offers way more pleasure than pain. 
- Most things in the world are good. 







Primals Inventory Descriptive Statistics for Eight Samples in Chapter 1 
 Sample 1: 
AH.Org 
N = 773 
Sample 2: 
YM.Org (USA) 
N = 1070 
Sample 3: 
YM.Org (Intl.) 
N = 354 
Sample 4: 
Immigrants 
N = 98 
Sample 5: 
Philly Pros 
N = 80 
Sample 6: 
Undergrads 
N = 321 
Sample 7 
2019 mTurk 
N = 611 
Sample 8 
2015 mTurk 
N = 755 
M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α 
Good 3.40 .64 .97 2.94 .64 .95 2.77 .68 .96 2.86 .52 .95 3.25 .55 .96 2.91 .50 .95 2.83 .66 .97 2.57 .68 .97 
Safe 3.14 .77 .95 2.64 .79 .94 2.50 .82 .94 2.52 .65 .94 2.99 .67 .93 2.63 .60 .93 2.62 .76 .95 2.17 .81 .96 
Pleasurable 3.49 .90 .87 2.74 1.03 .86 2.52 1.05 .86 2.76 .87 .84 3.53 .82 .82 2.95 .80 .85 2.86 .93 .86 2.66 1.01 .90 
Regenerative 3.42 .82 .82 2.96 1.00 .86 2.87 1.05 .87 3.08 .78 .81 3.28 .75 .83 3.05 .77 .80 2.85 .90 .81 2.43 .91 .86 
Progressing 2.86 1.09 .90 2.80 1.22 .90 2.84 1.28 .91 2.40 .89 .78 2.71 1.06 .88 2.60 .96 .87 2.54 1.07 .87 2.09 1.16 .92 
Harmless 2.86 1.03 .88 2.34 1.08 .88 2.24 1.09 .88 1.92 .78 .78 2.57 1.00 .85 2.16 .78 .81 2.47 .92 .85 2.06 1.06 .91 
Cooperative 3.32 1.03 .82 2.88 1.11 .83 2.70 1.15 .84 2.61 .83 .73 3.04 .93 .77 2.66 .87 .79 2.63 .98 .80 1.90 1.01 .83 
Stable 2.80 .93 .77 2.22 1.09 .84 2.02 1.04 .83 2.32 .74 .71 2.63 .80 .73 2.24 .77 .79 2.34 .86 .75 1.54 .89 .82 
Just 2.89 .79 .71 2.25 .99 .78 2.03 1.04 .82 2.53 .83 .77 2.90 .79 .71 2.71 .75 .74 2.57 .88 .81 2.49 .90 .82 
Enticing 3.77 .62 .94 3.44 .71 .92 3.25 .77 .92 3.27 .52 .90 3.59 .56 .91 3.32 .53 .91 3.11 .72 .94 3.08 .73 .95 
Interesting 3.94 .83 .84 3.47 1.04 .84 3.33 1.10 .86 3.47 .78 .80 3.62 .80 .77 3.47 .78 .78 3.21 .95 .81 2.67 .92 .84 
Beautiful 3.72 .82 .80 3.29 1.03 .82 3.01 1.10 .82 3.13 .75 .71 3.42 .73 .65 3.18 .76 .73 3.04 .91 .78 3.13 .92 .83 
Abundant 3.85 .78 .81 3.57 .93 .80 3.39 .99 .82 3.39 .67 .65 3.81 .72 .74 3.49 .68 .76 3.14 .90 .79 3.18 .91 .84 
Worth Exploring 3.79 .71 .73 3.76 .92 .78 3.66 1.00 .81 3.20 .75 .72 3.60 .79 .78 3.48 .69 .69 3.16 .83 .74 3.20 .83 .80 
Meaningful 3.94 .89 .81 3.11 1.34 .87 2.85 1.40 .88 3.59 .85 .82 3.84 .86 .81 3.47 .89 .83 3.24 1.08 .84 2.78 1.01 .86 
Improvable 3.54 .76 .78 3.32 .91 .79 3.22 .87 .73 3.03 .68 .67 3.46 .63 .69 3.07 .65 .73 3.01 .78 .77 2.94 .82 .81 
Funny 3.32 .95 .86 3.26 1.19 .90 3.00 1.22 .90 2.81 .88 .79 3.09 .92 .81 2.83 .86 .82 2.77 .96 .81 2.84 1.06 .90 
Alive 2.82 .75 .85 1.87 1.01 .89 1.77 1.04 .91 2.99 .59 .80 2.61 .85 .89 2.68 .70 .85 2.48 .79 .88 2.18 .88 .91 
Intentional 2.84 1.11 .85 1.64 1.40 .90 1.50 1.38 .90 3.18 .84 .79 2.49 1.13 .84 2.67 1.00 .85 2.51 1.00 .82 2.08 1.14 .88 
Needs Me 3.47 1.08 .90 2.22 1.45 .91 2.03 1.42 .89 3.30 .96 .89 3.47 1.15 .91 2.90 1.09 .90 2.66 1.13 .87 2.51 1.20 .91 
Interactive 2.14 .91 .82 1.76 1.03 .86 1.84 1.07 .88 2.41 .86 .82 1.83 .85 .86 2.45 .79 .83 2.19 .80 .76 1.83 .91 .85 


















































Changing 3.17 .74 .74 3.04 .95 .85 3.12 .96 .87 3.25 .64 .76 2.94 .76 .77 3.18 .71 .82 2.97 .74 .76 2.92 .72 .80 
Hierarchical 1.96 .94 .76 2.17 1.25 .86 2.26 1.21 .83 2.32 .82 .72 2.25 .87 .73 2.36 .88 .81 2.42 .82 .73 2.22 .88 .77 
Interconnected 3.52 .88 .81 3.12 1.25 .89 3.09 1.23 .88 3.25 .76 .82 2.66 .92 .78 3.05 .74 .72 2.88 .89 .79 2.83 1.00 .87 
Understandable 2.97 .94 .80 2.62 1.11 .82 2.46 1.17 .84 2.22 .88 .79 2.88 .87 .77 2.13 .82 .74 2.59 .91 .75 2.16 .91 .79 









Primals Relationship to Political Ideology for Eight Samples in Chapter 1  



























 % 95% CI τ % τ % τ % τ % τ % τ % τ % τ % 
1. Hierarchical 15.0(+) [7.0, 23.0] .17*** 7.0 .36*** 28.4 .38*** 31.5 .16* 6.1 .04n.s. .5 .13** 4.2 .17*** 7.2 .21*** 10.1 
2. Intentional 11.5(+) [6.3, 16.7] .14*** 4.6 .29*** 19.8 .31*** 22.2 .16* 6.4 .17n.s. 6.8 .18*** 7.5 .21*** 10.6 .17*** 7.1 
3. Acceptable 9.2(+) [2.3, 16.0] .02n.s. .1 .30*** 20.2 .31*** 22.2 .18* 8.1  .46*** 44.1 .14** 4.6 .19*** 8.7 .10*** 2.3 
4. Alive (secondary) 7.9(+) [3.9, 11.8] .10*** 2.6 .24*** 13.7 .27*** 16.9 .08n.s. 1.4 .17n.s. 7.0 .19*** 8.9 .16*** 6.5 .15*** 5.6 
5. Worth Exploring 6.9(-) [3.3, 10.4] -.10*** 2.5 -.23*** 12.1 -.26*** 15.7 -.07n.s. 1.1 .00n.s. .0 .02n.s. .1. -.15*** 5.3 -.14*** 4.5 
6. Just 5.0(+) [1.9, 8.2] .07* 1.1 .18*** 7.8 .22*** 11.8 .02n.s. .1 .28** 18.2 .16*** 6.2 .19*** 8.6 .07** 1.3 
7. Interconnected 3.5(-) [1.9, 5.0] -.11*** 2.7 -.14*** 4.9 -.08n.s. 1.7 -.16* 6.0 -.01n.s. .0 .04n.s. .4 -.0 n.s. .3 -.15*** 5.4 
8. Needs Me 2.7(+) [.9, 4.4] .03n.s. .2 .13*** 4.1 .18*** 8.1 -.05n.s. .7 .12n.s. 3.6 .16*** 5.8 .11*** 3.1 .08** 1.7 
9. Progressing 2.6(-) [-.7, 6.0] -.07** 1.2 -.03n.s. .2 .05n.s. .7 -.07n.s. 1.2 .20* 9.6 .10* 2.5 .03n.s. .2 -.21*** 10.3 
10. Cooperative 2.1(-) [.7, 3.5] -.09*** 2.0 -.12*** 3.4 -.16*** 6.3 -.03n.s. .2 .07n.s. 1.1 -.03n.s. .2 .01n.s. .0 -.07** 1.3 
11. Harmless 2.0(-) [1.0, 3.0] -.10*** 2.4 -.12*** 3.4 -.12** 3.5 -.07n.s. 1.4 .11n.s. 3.1 .07n.s. 1.2 .02n.s. .1 -.08** 1.5 
12. Beautiful 1.5(-) [.7, 2.2] -.10*** 2.5 -.09*** 2.0 -.04n.s. .3 -.02n.s. .1 .04n.s. .3 .08n.s. 1.8 -.01n.s. .0 -.08** 1.5 
13. Interactive 1.4(+) [.3, 2.6] .02n.s. .1 .08** 1.7 .16*** 5.9 .01n.s. .0 .14n.s. 4.6 .05n.s. .6 .06* .8 .08** 1.7 
14. Changing 1.3(-) [.6, 2.1] -.05* .7 -.09*** 2.2 -.07n.s. 1.1 -.12n.s. 3.4 -.20* 9.9 -.09n.s. 1.8 -.09** 2.2 -.02n.s. .1 
15. Meaningful 1.1(+) [-.1, 2.4] -.01n.s. .0 .10*** 2.5 .15** 5.3 .02n.s. .1 .15n.s. 5.4 .12* 3.3 .03n.s. .3 .03n.s. .2 
16. Funny 1.0(-) [.4, 1.5] -.08** 1.6 -.04n.s. .3  -.10* 2.4 -.04n.s. .3 .03n.s. .2 .12** 3.4 -.03n.s. .3 -.07** 1.2 
17. Safe (secondary) .9(-) [.3, 1.5] -.07* 1.1 -.07** 1.0 -.06n.s. 1.0 -.06n.s. .9 .20* 9.1 .09* 2.0 .05n.s. .6 -.08** 1.7 
18. Enticing (secondary) .8(-) [.5, 1.1] -.07** 1.2 -.05n.s. .6  -.04n.s. .4 -.04n.s. .4 .07n.s. 1.3 .10* 2.6 -.04n.s. .4 -.07** 1.2 
19. Regenerative .7(-) [.2, 1.1] -.04n.s. .3 -.06* .8 -.05n.s. .5 -.01n.s. .0 .15n.s. 5.8 .03n.s. .3 .01n.s. .0 -.08** 1.5 
20. Interesting .6(-) [.3, 1.0] -.05n.s. .6 -.04n.s. .5  -.05n.s. .5 -.03n.s. .2 .00n.s. .0 .02n.s. .1 -.02n.s. .1 -.07** 1.3 
21. Pleasurable .5(-) [.1, .9] -.03n.s. .2 -.05* .7 -.03n.s. .3 -.05n.s. .6 .15n.s. 5.2 .12** 3.7 .03n.s. .2 -.07** 1.2 
22. Improvable .4(-) [-.1, .9] -.02n.s. .1 -.02n.s. .1  .01n.s. .0 -.01n.s. .0 .07n.s. 1.3 .07n.s. 1.2 -.01n.s. .0 -.08** 1.6 
23. Good (primary) .4(-) [.1, .7] -.05n.s. .6 -.02n.s. .1  -.01n.s. .0 -.04n.s. .5 .19* 8.3 .13** 3.8 .02n.s. .1 -.06* 1.0 
24. Stable .2(+) [-.6, .1.1] -.03n.s. .2 -.00n.s. .0  -.08n.s. 1.5 -.03n.s. .2 .15n.s. 5.7 .05n.s. .5 .10*** 2.3 .01n.s. .0 
25. Abundant .2(+) [.0, .4] .01n.s. .0 .05* .6 .04n.s. .4 .01n.s. .0 .07n.s. 1.2 .09n.s. 1.9 .01n.s. .1 -.00n.s. .0 
26. Understandable .0(+) [-.1, .2] -.02n.s. .1 .03n.s. .3  -.01n.s. .0 -.03n.s. .2 .24* 13.1 .05n.s. .6 .03n.s. .2 -.03n.s. .2 
n.s.Not significant *p<.05 **p<.01 ***p<.001 mSample-weighted mean % of variance explained, accounting for direction of relationships, and excluding samples 5 and 6 for using 
party as a proxy measure for political ideology. r2 is derived from Kendall’s τ b. Confidence intervals calculated using sample-weighted standard deviations. + or – in parentheses 







Descriptive Statistics for Additional Measures in Chapter 1 
Measure 611 mTurkers YourMorals.Org Subjects 
Mean SD Range α n Mean SD Range α 
Care 3.59 .82 0-5 .73 1278 3.25 .98 0-5.00 .78 
Fairness 3.55 .78 .17-5 .70 1276 3.42 .79 .17-5.00 .66 
Loyalty 2.60 .99 0-5 .79 1277 2.07 1.00 0-5.00 .78 
Authority 2.83 .95 0-5 .78 1286 2.20 1.03 0-5.00 .79 
Sanctity 2.58 1.23 0-5 .87 1283 1.60 1.21 0-5.00 .86 
Right Wing Authoritarianism 1.94 .99 0-4.53 .91 845 1.36 .95 0-4.93 .90 
Social Dominance Orientation 1.57 1.12 0-4.87 .94 494 1.89 1.42 0-6.33 .94 
Belief in a Dangerous World 2.34 .92 0-5 .87 NA NA NA NA NA 
Conservatism 2.53 1.83 0-6 NA 1460 2.06 1.17 0-6.00 NA 
Note. The Belief in a Dangerous World scale was not available to YourMorals.Org subjects and 


























Duplicating the Relationships Between Primals and the BDW scale  
Primals Pairwise r with 
BDW, Study 5 
(Clifton et al., 2019) 
122 mTurkers 





sig. calculated via 
2-tailed Fisher r-to-
z transformation 
Good -.58*** -.60*** -.02 
Safe -.68*** -.67*** .01 
Pleasurable -.49*** -.54*** -.05 
Regenerative -.53*** -.54*** -.01 
Progressing -.72*** -.66*** .06 
Harmless -.67*** -.67*** .00 
Cooperative -.59*** -.52*** .06 
Stable -.39*** -.41*** -.02 
Just -.34*** -.30*** .04 
Enticing -.40*** -.46*** -.06 
Interesting -.22* -.32*** -.10 
Beautiful -.47*** -.40*** .07 
Abundant -.40*** -.42*** -.02 
Worth Exploring -.32*** -.43*** -.11 
Meaningful -.15 -.22*** -.07 
Improvable -.46*** -.44*** .02 
Funny -.40*** -.43*** -.03 
Alive -.16 -.03 .13 
Intentional -.13 .08* .21* 
Needs Me -.19* -.13** .06 
Interactive -.01 .02 .03 
Other tertiary primals 
Acceptable 
 
-.16 .02 .18 
Changing .19* .17*** -.02 
Hierarchical .26** .21*** -.05 
Interconnected -.19* -.13** .06 
Understandable -.34*** -.41*** -.07 











Pairwise rs Between Key Primals and Major Correlates of Conservatism among 611 mTurkers 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Hierarchical (1)  1                
Intentional (2) .20*** 1               
Acceptable (3) .15*** .24*** 1              
Worth Exploring (4)  -.23*** .07 -.28*** 1             
Just (5) .17*** .56*** .27*** .12** 1            
Progressing (6) -.02 .25*** .19*** .26*** .52*** 1           
Care (7) -.19*** .11** -.24*** .24*** .04 -.05 1          
Fairness (8) -.18*** -.16*** -.35*** .22*** -.20*** -.10* .60*** 1         
Loyalty (9)  .28*** .37*** .36*** -.22*** .36*** .10* .15*** -.02 1        
Authority (10) .37*** .46*** .33*** -.25*** .35*** -.02 .12** -.03 .76*** 1       
Purity (11) .34*** .48*** .29*** -.28*** .30*** -.07 .11** -.07 .65*** .75*** 1      
RWA (12) .39*** .46*** .38*** -.37*** .28*** -.09* -.18*** -.37 .57*** .68*** .72*** 1     
SDO (13) .32*** .14*** .50*** -.41*** .17*** .02 -.43*** -.54*** .35*** .38*** .37*** .58*** 1    
BDW (14) .21*** .08* .02 -.43*** -.30*** -.66*** -.02 -.06 .18*** .31*** .37*** .44*** .22*** 1   
Safe (15) -.05 .38*** .17*** .36*** .72*** .79*** .06 -.10* .13** .05 .00 -.03 -.05 -.67*** 1  
Conservatismτ (16) .27*** .33*** .30*** -.23*** .29*** .04 -.25*** -.40*** .39*** .48*** .46*** .62*** .51*** .20*** .08 1 
Note. *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001. Measures 1-6 constitute the main primals of Hierarchy Theory. Measures 7-11 are the five subscales of the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire. Measure 12 is Right-Wing Authoritarianism. Measure 13 is Social Dominance Orientation. Measure 14 is Perry and colleagues 
(2013) Belief in a Dangerous World scale. Measure 15 is the PI-99’s Safe subscale. Measure 16 is the 1-item political ideology measure. τUnlike the other 









Pairwise rs Between Key Primals and Major Correlates of Conservatism among YM.Org Subjects 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
Hierarchical (1) 1 n=1424 
             
Intentional (2) .15*** n=1424 
1 
n=1424 
            





           







          









         











        













       















      

















     



















    









































































































Note. *p<.05   **p<.01   ***p<.001. Measures 1-6 constitute the main primals of Hierarchy Theory. Measures 7-11 are the five subscales of the Moral 
Foundations Questionnaire. Measure 14 is the 1-item political ideology measure. τUnlike the other results in this table, Conservatism’s relationships were 







Twelve Linear Models Exploring Where Hierarchy Theory Fits Within the Nomological Net 
Model  Predictors DV df r2 
1: Correlates of Political 
Ideology (mTurk) 
Care Fairness* Loyalty Authority 
Sanctity  RWA*** SDO**  
Conservatism 603 35.4% 
2: Significant Predictors 
from Model 1 (mTurk) 
Fairness* RWA*** SDO*** Conservatism 607 35.4% 
3: Main Predictors from 
Model 1 (mTurk) 
RWA*** SDO*** Conservatism 608 35.0% 
4: Hierarchy Theory 
(mTurk) 
Hierarchical*** Intentional*** 
Acceptable** Worth Exploring*** Just*** 
Progressing* 
Conservatism 604 19.3% 
4: Hierarchy Theory 
(YourMorals.Org) 
Hierarchical*** Intentional*** 
Acceptable** Worth Exploring*** Just* 
Progressing 
Conservatism 1089 43.2% 
5: All 26 Primals (mTurk) Just** Alive*** Intentional*** Needs 
Me*** Interactive** Acceptable** 
Hierarchical*** (no other significant 
primals) 
Conservatism 584 21.5% 
5: All 26 Primals 
(YourMorals.Org 
Alive* Intentional*** Acceptable*** 
Hierarchical*** Interconnected*** 
Changing*  (no other significant primals) 
Conservatism 1069 47.2% 
6: Model 2 & Hierarchy 
Theory (mTurk) 
Fairness RWA*** SDO*** Hierarchical 
Intentional Acceptable Worth Exploring 
Just* Progressing 
Conservatism 601 36.1% 
7: Hierarchy Theory 
Predicting RWA (mTurk 
Hierarchical*** Intentional*** 
Acceptable*** Worth Exploring*** Just** 
Progressing*** 
RWA 604 46.8% 




Acceptable*** Worth Exploring*** Just* 
Progressing** 
RWA 649 51.6% 
8:Moral Foundations 
Predicting Conservatism  
Care* Fairness*** Loyalty Authority*** 
Sanctity*** 
Conservatism 605 29.0% 
9: Moral Foundations 
Predicting RWA 
Care*** Fairness*** Loyalty Authority*** 
Sanctity*** 
RWA 605 67.7% 
10: Safe (mTurk Safe* Conservatism  .6% 
10: Safe (YourMorals.Org) Safe*** Conservatism 1094 1.0% 
11: Safe’s Seven Tertiary 
Primals (mTurk) 
Pleasurable Regenerative Progressing 
Harmless Cooperative Stable* Just*** 
Conservatism 603 10.6% 
11: Safe’s Seven Tertiary 
Primals (YourMorals.Org) 
Pleasurable Regenerative** Progressing 
Harmless*** Cooperative*** Stable* 
Just*** 
Conservatism 1088 15.5% 
12: Just only (mTurk) Just*** Conservatism 609 7.4% 
12: Just only 
(YourMorals.Org) 
Just*** Conservatism 1094 6.1% 
















Descriptive Statistics for the Primals Inventory for Six Samples in Chapter 3 




















M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α M SD α 
Good 3.31 .60 .96 2.86 .66 .95 2.91 .65 .96 2.90 .52 .95 3.18 .62 .96 2.93 .52 .95 3.13 .61 .96 
Safe 2.97 .77 .94 2.58 .80 .93 2.61 .73 .93 2.52 .65 .93 2.91 .72 .94 2.63 .61 .93 2.81 .76 .94 
Pleasurable 3.38 .90 .84 2.63 1.05 .85 2.93 .93 .79 2.81 .88 .83 3.45 .88 .84 2.99 .84 .85 3.12 .93 .84 
Regenerative 3.36 .85 .79 2.90 1.02 .84 2.86 .87 .68 3.08 .78 .78 3.18 .83 .77 3.05 .76 .79 3.17 .88 .79 
Progressing 2.79 1.11 .89 2.79 1.24 .90 2.53 1.05 .82 2.40 .89 .76 2.69 1.08 .88 2.64 .97 .88 2.75 1.12 .88 
Harmless 2.68 1.08 .87 2.28 1.08 .87 2.45 .95 .81 1.97 .79 .74 2.52 1.01 .84 2.18 .81 .83 2.51 1.04 .86 
Cooperative 3.06 1.08 .80 2.83 1.13 .81 2.52 1.01 .76 2.49 .86 .69 2.91 .97 .77 2.60 .86 .76 2.91 1.06 .79 
Stable 2.43 1.00 .79 2.18 1.09 .83 2.18 .82 .65 2.21 .76 .70 2.50 .93 .77 2.15 .79 .78 2.33 .99 .78 
Just 2.80 .92 .75 2.13 1.05 .80 2.78 .95 .78 2.67 .89 .78 2.86 .87 .69 2.81 .80 .75 2.63 .95 .76 
Enticing 3.82 .59 .92 3.35 .76 .92 3.28 .71 .93 3.35 .55 .90 3.52 .62 .92 3.37 .57 .92 3.61 .64 .92 
Interesting 3.85 .86 .82 3.46 1.06 .84 3.18 1.00 .78 3.35 .80 .79 3.55 .83 .77 3.41 .78 .79 3.64 .91 .82 
Beautiful 3.80 .79 .75 3.14 1.09 .82 3.25 .91 .73 3.24 .78 .67 3.33 .86 .68 3.23 .81 .73 3.53 .88 .76 
Abundant 3.90 .76 .75 3.48 .99 .81 3.36 .91 .74 3.50 .71 .67 3.77 .74 .76 3.58 .71 .77 3.71 .83 .76 
Worth Exploring 4.02 .70 .73 3.68 .96 .79 3.33 .84 .68 3.31 .74 .67 3.56 .79 .68 3.55 .74 .70 3.82 .78 .73 
Meaningful 3.57 1.08 .83 3.06 1.34 .86 3.28 1.09 .80 3.48 .84 .77 3.69 .92 .79 3.35 .92 .82 3.40 1.13 .83 
Improvable 3.66 .72 .73 3.24 .94 .78 3.20 .81 .76 3.17 .75 .71 3.45 .75 .72 3.16 .70 .73 3.47 .78 .75 
Funny 3.45 .98 .86 3.18 1.22 .89 2.93 1.01 .79 2.92 .92 .77 2.98 1.05 .85 2.90 .92 .83 3.28 1.04 .86 
Alive 2.65 .94 .90 1.82 1.05 .90 2.66 .86 .88 3.08 .63 .82 2.58 .98 .91 2.74 .76 .87 2.46 .95 .89 
Intentional 2.53 1.32 .89 1.59 1.41 .90 2.61 1.05 .79 3.23 .84 .77 2.43 1.19 .84 2.68 1.01 .84 2.33 1.28 .87 
Needs Me 3.28  1.19 .89 2.13 1.47 .90 2.93 1.14 .84 3.42 1.00 .89 3.34 1.29 .92 2.99 1.11 .90 2.95 1.25 .89 
Interactive 2.12 1.05 .87 1.75 1.10 .87 2.37 .96 .77 2.54 .91 .82 1.91 1.01 .86 2.51 .83 .83 2.08 1.04 .86 












































Changing 3.43 .78 .80 3.02 1.00 .85 3.15 .77 .71 3.39 .69 .76 3.00 .84 .78 3.30 .73 .82 3.29 .83 .80 
Hierarchical 2.23 1.09 .81 2.21 1.28 .85 2.51 .96 .77 2.45 .88 .74 2.35 .97 .75 2.43 .91 .81 2.27 1.10 .82 
Interconnected 3.62 .97 .82 3.06 1.28 .89 3.01 .96 .77 3.36 .80 .79 2.68 .98 .75 3.13 .81 .75 3.37 1.03 .83 
Understandable 2.68 .95 .71 2.57 1.13 .81 2.61 .87 .61 2.22 .88 .77 2.81 .91 .73 2.11 .81 .72 2.61 .98 .73 








Descriptive Statistics for Additional Measures for Six Samples in Chapter 3 
 











 n M SD α n M SD α n M SD α n M SD α n M SD α n M SD α 
Job Success  na na na na na 1639 6.08 1.87 na 476 51125 59087 na na na na na 98 .46 .27 na 426 233 70 na 
Job Satisfaction 1-5 na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na 110 3.79 .90 .94 473 3.47 .82 .92 
Depression 1-4 1291 1.77 .61 .93 na na na na 692 1.77 .80 .94 na na na na na na na na 473 1.65 .56 .88 
Suicide na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na na 110 1.35 .70 na 473 1.60 .78 na 
Life Satisfaction 1-7 1072 4.94 1.35 .88 328 3.94 1.54 .89 692 4.57 1.58 .93 98 4.49 1.30 .85 110 4.90 1.25 .87 473 4.69 1.27 .87 
Positive Emotion 1-11 1118 8.33 1.86 .87 na na na na 692 7.65 2.21 .91 98 7.63 1.56 .82 110 8.05 1.78 .88 473 7.64 1.66 .88 
Engagement 1-11 1118 8.64 1.60 .69 na na na na 692 7.77 1.70 .69 na na na na 110 8.47 1.54 .68 473 7.88 1.49 .68 
Relationship 1-11 1118 8.26 2.09 .82 na na na na 692 7.94 2.27 .88 98 8.01 1.75 .77 110 8.36 2.08 .81 473 7.97 1.84 .81 
Meaning 1-11 1118 8.57 2.04 .90 na na na na 692 7.79 2.32 .91 na na na na 110 8.67 1.76 .84 473 7.72 1.72 .84 
Accomplishment 1-11 1118 8.73 1.70 .81 na na na na 692 7.91 1.99 .85 na na na na 110 8.77 1.23 .78 473 7.89 1.44 .78 
Overall Flourishing 1-11 1118 8.51 1.59 .94 na na na na 692 7.81 1.89 .96 na na na na 110 8.46 1.46 .93 473 7.82 1.35 .93 
Health 1-11 1118 8.11 2.26 .92 na na na na 692 7.65 2.26 .93 na na na na 110 8.09 2.13 .91 473 7.77 2.00 .91 
Negative Emotion 1-11 1118 5.40 2.23 .77 na na na na 692 5.19 2.34 .84 98 5.53 1.82 .73 110 5.38 2.06 .67 473 5.90 1.67 .67 
Note. Bolded α values indicate instances where α<.70. M indicates mean. SD indicates standard deviation. α indicates standardized Cronbach’s α. na indicates not applicable 
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